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ABSTRACT 
Introduction: Values have a strong tradition in social psychology, but until recently 
they have been largely neglected in mental health literature. More recently, the 
importance of values has been recognised by some psychological therapies (e.g. 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy); however, the relative importance of values in 
mental health problems has not been empirically tested. 
Aims: The current research aimed to investigate the value priorities of people with 
anxiety and eating disorders, and to assess the relationship between value 
discrepancies and distress, and in doing so to draw upon Schwartz’s (1992) model of 
values and Higgins’s (1987) self-discrepancy theory. More specifically, it investigated 
whether people with anxiety and eating disorders differ from people without mental 
health problems in the values that they hold, and the level of value discrepancies in 
these values, and additionally whether these discrepancies were associated with 
anxiety and depression.  
Methods: A cross-sectional questionnaire-based design was employed, with data 
being collected from 122 participants (an anxiety disorder group, n=30; eating disorder 
group, n=31; and reference group n=61). Multivariate statistics, paired sample t-tests 
and Pearson’s correlations were used to test the hypotheses.  All participants 
completed a measure assessing values and discrepancies in values (adapted PVQ), 
and the mental health groups also completed a measure assessing psychological 
distress (HADS). 
Results: The reference group rated particular values (e.g. self-direction, stimulation, 
hedonism) as more important than did the mental health groups, apart from the 
achievement value, which the eating disorders group rated as more important. The 
mental health groups had higher value discrepancies than the reference group.  
Actual-Ideal and Actual-Ought value discrepancies were found to be related to anxiety 
and depression. However, unexpectedly, depression was found not to be specifically 
associated with Actual-Ideal discrepancies and anxiety was found not to be specifically 
associated with Actual-Ought discrepancies. 
Conclusions:  This study provides empirical support and evidence for considering the 
values that people with mental health problems hold and the role that values has in 
relation to the psychological distress experienced by people. The results are discussed 
with reference to existing literature and the strength and limitations of the research 
were outlined. In addition, the clinical limitations were discussed and ideas for future 
research were outlined. 
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                                      CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter one introduces key aspects of the research project. It will start by providing 
an introduction to values and discussing how they have been conceptualised and 
operationalised over the years, moving onto to how values are activated cognitively in 
order to motivate behaviour. It will then move on to present an argument for looking at 
values in relation to specific mental health problems (e.g. anxiety and eating 
disorders), and highlight the possible ways in which values could cause psychological 
distress. Higgins’s (1987) model of self-discrepancies will then be presented as a 
model and methodology for investigating the relationship between discrepancies in 
values and the psychological distress experienced in mental health problems.  A 
systematic review of studies investigating Higgins’s (1987) model of self-discrepancies 
in relation to mental health disorders will then be presented to demonstrate the utility 
of this methodology for the current study. The chapter finishes by outlining the 
hypotheses for the research.  
 
The methods chapter, chapter two, will then introduce the procedures used to 
complete the research, including what measures were used and how the sample were 
recruited. In chapter three, the results are presented firstly as descriptive statistics and 
secondly as inferential statistics in relation to each hypothesis. Finally, chapter four 
concludes with a critical evaluation, as the implications of the results are considered. 
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In this chapter the results are discussed in relation to the existing literature, clinical 
practice, future research and limitations of the current research. 
 
1.2 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
Values have been referenced in many psychological theories; for example the Beck et 
al. (1979) clinical theory of depression and the Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992) social 
theory of emotion posit that emotional experience is connected to values and 
perceived failures to live up to them.  In addition,  the importance and role of values 
has long been recognised in the field of social psychology; for example in theories of 
individual differences in goals and personality (Gouzet et al., 2005); pro-social 
behaviour (Schwartz, 1997); moral reasoning, moral development and decision 
making (Kristiansen & Hotte 1997; Rohan & Zanna, 1997; Tanner et al., 2008); self-
affirmation theory (Steele, 1988); terror management theory (Greenberg et al., 1997) 
and value-plurism model (Tetlock et al, 1997).  In addition, they have been central to 
value-based theories of prejudice (Katz & Hass, 1988; Pratto et al., 1994; Sears, 
1988), prosocial behaviour (Schwartz, 1977) and attitude ambivalence (Katz & Hass, 
1988).  However, the one area that values have not been sufficiently researched is in 
relation to mental health problems. 
 
This research aims to explore the role of values priorities of people with mental health 
problems and the relationship between value discrepancies and distress, by drawing 
from Schwartz (1992) model of values and Higgins (1987) self-discrepancy model.  
Values have been defined as relatively stable guiding principles in people’s lives which 
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exist across contexts and times (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1997), which can in turn 
affect people’s perceptions, attitudes and behaviour (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992).  
 
In this chapter an argument will be put forward for the current study, by first providing 
an introduction to values and discussing how they have been conceptualised, 
operationalised and empirically tested with non-clinical populations, paying particular 
attention to Schwartz’s (1992) model of values.  The conditions under which values 
are activated cognitively will then be outlined.  In doing this, the various ways in which 
values can act as powerful motivators for behaviour will be emphasised, and so an 
argument will be made for the motivational influence values could have within 
particular mental health problems such as anxiety and eating disorders, and 
subsequently the impact values could have on psychological distress.  The various 
psychological therapies (especially Acceptance and Commitment Therapy; Hayes et 
al., 2003) that have recognised this important link (but have not tested the relative 
importance of values in a mental health population) will be highlighted. 
 
Higgins (1987) theory of self-discrepancies will then be put forward as a model and 
methodology for the current study to investigate this link. A systematic review on the 
evidence base to date in relation to the role self-discrepancies play in the 
psychological distress experienced by people with mental health problems will be 
presented.  However, the systematic review has been done in relation to self-
discrepancies between domains of the self and not values, as this research has yet to 
be done with people with mental health disorders.  The chapter will then conclude with 
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outlining the research questions and hypotheses to be tested alongside the clinical 
and theoretical relevance of this study. 
 
In summary, the current study aims to test its hypotheses by drawing from and bringing 
together Schwartz’s model of values and Higgins’s model of self-discrepancies to 
further understand the relationship between values, value discrepancies and 
psychological distress experienced by people with mental health problems. To do this, 
the project will aim to investigate whether values are different across mental health 
problems (e.g. anxiety and eating disorders) and are different to people without mental 
health problems, whether discrepancies between values are related to psychological 
distress, and whether there is a difference in this between the mental health groups 
and reference group.   
 
The study has the additional aim of assessing Schwartz’s model of values on samples 
of people with mental health problems.  Moreover, this project will be piloting an 
adapted version of the Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ) to include Higgins’s model 
of self-discrepancies. 
 
1.3 CONCEPTUALISING AND OPERATIONALISING VALUES 
1.3.1 Overview 
This section will aim to provide an introduction to values and to discuss how they have 
been historically conceptualised, operationalised and tested empirically.  To illustrate 
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how this has been done, this section will be organized into the following sections: 
origins of values; defining values; the role of values; describing and differentiating 
between values; measuring and assessing values and mental representations of 
values with the main aim being to demonstrate the reasons why Schwartz’s model of 
values has been utilized in the current study.  
 
 
1.3.2 Origins and development of values  
It has been argued by many social psychologists (e.g. Kluckhohn, 1951; Meglino & 
Ravlin, 1998; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992) that values  develop as a joint product 
of an individual’s needs (Calogero et al., 2009), traits (Knafo et al., 2008), 
temperament (Kohn & Schooler, 1982), culture (Roccas et al., 2002), socialization 
(Schwartz, 2004), and personal experiences, (Verkasalo et al., 2006). 
 
 
1.3.3. Defining values 
Values have been defined as ‘guiding principles’ in people’s lives which exists across 
contexts and times (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1997). They have also been 
considered to be among people’s most important evaluative beliefs (Feather, 1990; 
Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992; Seligman & Katz, 1996).  
 
1.3.4 The role of values  
Values are thought to convey what is important in a person’s life (e.g. achievement 
and security), and it seems that people will often attach great worth to their values and 
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will vigorously defend them if challenged (Maio & Olson, 1998).  Furthermore, people 
will often draw on their values when considering a variety of important personal and 
social issues such as child rearing, criminal punishment, health care, education and 
social welfare (Maio & Olson, 1998), and as Pakizeh et al. (2007) succinctly argues: 
 
People rely on their values by using them implicitly or explicitly to determine 
their future directions and to justify their past actions, compare themselves 
with others, praise or blame themselves or others, take certain actions over 
others and to rationalise their attitudes and behaviour (p.458). 
 
Values have also been argued to be among the most important predictors of behaviour 
and attitudes (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Maio & Olson, 1995; Rokeach, 1973) and they 
serve as motivators, similar to needs (Schwartz, 2004).  Moreover, values have been 
found to be ordered in a personal hierarchy of importance (i.e. people’s value 
priorities), and the location of a value in that hierarchy determining perception and 
behaviour (e.g., Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992).  The next section will further discuss 
value priorities in relation to particular models of values. 
 
1.3.5 Describing and differentiating between values  
Allport et al., (1960), described six main values: social, theoretical, economic, 
aesthetic, political and religious, which he conceptualised as a kind of future activity 
that people may wish to perform; for example, social values entail helping people and 
involve occupations such as social work and theoretical values involve the search for 
7 
 
truth and involve occupations such as scientific study.  Thus, although Allport’s model 
was very useful for enhancing occupational understanding of vocational choice 
(Kopelman et al., 2003), Rokeach (1973) criticised his work for describing values as 
‘likes and dislikes’  and argued that values are instead more akin to idealised standards 
with an “ought” characteristic.  In addition, Rokeach (1973) argued that differences in 
value importance are more psychologically meaningful than the importance of any 
single value considered on its own.  For example, he noted that most people say that 
equality is important, but what matters is whether they view equality as being more or 
less important than other values such as freedom.  
 
To support this criticism, Rokeach (1973) offered an alternative list of 36 values which 
are meant to be ranked in order of their importance by selecting the most and least 
important values from the list.  Rokeach (1973) also distinguished between our central 
values and our peripheral values. Thus, our central values were considered to be more 
closely connected to our 'core self’ and act as an internal standard, and are therefore 
ranked uppermost in importance in an individual’s value priorities. Conversely, our 
peripheral values are ranked lower in importance and are also not as closely 
connected to our core self, but more closely connected to the values that are widely 
shared with other people in the individual’s culture.  Thus, relatively few values are 
said to become central to individual’s self-concept over time, while other values  
remain peripheral, and an individual’s cognitions and behaviours are guided more by 
their central values than their peripheral values (Rokeach, 1973; Verplanken & 
Holland, 2001). In addition, central values are said to act more strongly as ideals and 
peripheral values as oughts (Rokeach, 1973; Rees & Maio, 2009). 
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In summary, Allport and Rokeach’s model is useful in defining and differentiating 
between values; however, these models fail to talk about how values relate to each 
other. The Schwartz (1992) model of values aims to tackle this by using a circular 
model of 10 values (see Figure 1.1 & table I.1), According to this model, values are 
self-imposed criteria that help people to maintain a delicate balance between basic 
motives that arise from our individual needs and as members of larger social groups.   
 
Schwartz proposed that these motives can be organised along two dimensions.  One 
dimension comprises of values that promote the self at one end (e.g. self-
enhancement including values that promote achievement and power) and values that 
that transcend personal interests to consider the welfare of others at the opposite end 
(e.g. self-transcendence, including values that promote benevolence and 
universalism).  Orthogonal to this dimension is the second dimension which comprises 
of values at one end that serve to follow the status quo (e.g. the conservation quadrant 
includes values that promote tradition, conformity and security) and at the opposite 
end the values serve to pursue personal intellectual and emotional interests in 
uncertain directions (e.g. the openness quadrant includes values that promote self-
direction and stimulation). 
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Figure 1.1: Schwartz’s (1992) circular model of values 
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Table 1.1: Schwartz’s (1992) conceptual definitions of 10 basic values according 
to their motivational goals. 
 
Value Conceptual Definitions 
 Self-direction 
Independent thought and action – choosing, creating, 
exploring 
 Stimulation Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life 
 Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself 
 Achievement 
Personal success through demonstrating competence 
according to social standards 
 Power 
Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people 
and resources 
 Security 
Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and 
of self 
 Conformity 
Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset 
or harm others and violate social expectations or norms 
 Tradition 
Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and 
ideas that traditional culture or religion provide 
 Benevolence 
Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with 
whom one is in frequent personal contact 
 Universalism 
Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the 
welfare of all people and for nature. 
 
 
The most important feature of Schwartz’s model is the way in which this model 
effectively illustrates how values relate to one another.  That is, values that are 
adjacent in the circumplex (e.g., hedonism and stimulation) are similar and related as 
they share motivational goals. These values will often be positively correlated, 
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whereas orthogonal values positioned at opposing ends (e.g., hedonism and 
conformity and tradition) are dissimilar and unrelated as they do not share motivational 
goals. Therefore, these values will often be uncorrelated or more negatively related if 
directly opposing each other.  
 
Given this, Schwartz’s model predicts which values will be compatible and which 
values will conflict with one another.  This is important, as previous models have made 
few predictions about which values are more likely to complement and conflict with 
one another, although Schwartz (1992) did not state what the social and psychological 
consequences of pursuing either compatible or incompatibles values would be. 
However, some research has been done into the consequences of people holding 
incompatible values to important reference groups.  For example, Feather and Cross 
(1975) found that the discrepancies between adolescents’ values and their perception 
of their parents’ values were far greater for delinquents than for non-delinquents.  In 
addition, Sagiv and Schwartz (2000) found that business students and psychology 
students experienced a more positive sense of well-being when their personal values 
were congruent with the values promoted by their respective academic departments.  
Similarly, Rohan and Maiden (2000) found that teachers who experienced greater 
congruity between their values and their school’s values reported lower stress, more 
job commitment, and more satisfaction. Furthermore, Bernard et al. (2006) found that 
feelings of cultural estrangement can arise from discrepancies between personal and 
societal values. Research has also found that people experience feelings of 
ambivalence towards other people when they hold incompatible values (Gebauer et 
al., 2009). 
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Schwartz model has been assessed by data from hundreds of samples in 82 countries 
around the world (Schwartz, 1996, 2001, 2006b; Peng, et al., 1997; Davidov et al., 
2008; Bilsky et al., 2011). The samples include highly diverse geographic, cultural, 
linguistic, religious, age, gender, and occupational groups with representative samples 
from 37 countries.  Schwartz’s (1992) model has also been indicated in value response 
latencies (Pakizeh et al., 2007), value priming effects (Maio et al., 2009), and value 
change (Bardi & Goodman, 2011; Maio et al., 2009). Thus, this model is empirically 
validated by research and is therefore a conceptually sound model. 
 
Research has indicated that individuals differ substantially in the importance they 
attribute to the ten values (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001; Schwartz, 2012b); however, across 
societies there is a consensus regarding the hierarchical order of the values (i.e. value 
priorities). Thus, across representative samples, using different instruments, the value 
priorities are quite similar. Benevolence, universalism and self-direction are ranked as 
the most important values and power and stimulation as the least, with security, 
conformity, hedonism, achievement and tradition being in the middle.  This pan-cultural 
hierarchy provides a baseline with which to compare value priorities in any sample.  
Such comparison is said to be vital for identifying which, if any, of the value priorities 
in a sample are distinctively high or low. A sample may rank benevolence highest, for 
example, but compared with other samples the importance rating of this value may 
still be relatively low.  This will be thus done for the current study (see results section).  
The reason for the pan-cultural hierarchy of values has been hypothesised to be due 
to the importance of maintaining societies for our common human nature; thus, values 
ranked as most important help to do this and values ranked as least important 
compromise this (Schwartz, 2012b). 
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Schwartz et al., (2012a) more recently proposed a refined theory of his individual value 
model with an extra 9 values (see Figure 1.2 & Table 1.2).  This new model was 
intended to provide ‘greater heuristic and explanatory power than the original 10 
values” (p.663).  Thus, the refined model has been tested in 10 countries (N=6,059) 
using an updated version of the PVQ, which has been extended to 57 questions from 
40. Confirmatory factor and multidimensional scaling analyses support the 
discrimination of the 19 values.  
 
The refined theory is compatible with the original 10 broad value constructs, because 
the 19 values cover the same circular motivational continuum as the original 10.  
Schwartz (2012a) has extended the values by making some of the original values 
more conceptually broad, with multiple components; for example, universalism is now 
split into three components (tolerance, nature and concern), whereas self-direction is 
split into two components (thought and action), as is power (dominance and 
resources), security (societal and personal) and benevolence (dependability and 
caring). The new model is also grounded in three basic requirements that fulfil the 
various functions that Schwartz (1992, 2006) attributed to the basic values.  Thus, they 
focus on attaining personal or social outcomes, they promote growth and self-
expansion or anxiety-avoidance and self-protection, they express openness to change 
or conservation of the status quo, and they promote self-interest or transcendence of 
self-interest in the service of others.   
 
 
14 
 
Figure 1.2: Schwartz’s (2012a) refined model of individual values 
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Table 1.2: Schwartz’s (2012a) refined model of values: Conceptual definitions of 
19 basic values according to their motivational goal 
Value Defining motivational goal 
Self-direction –
thought  Freedom to cultivate one’s own ideas and abilities 
Self-direction-action  Freedom to determine one’s own actions 
Stimulation  Excitement, novelty, and change 
Hedonism  Pleasure and sensuous gratification 
Achievement  Success according to social standards 
Power -dominance  Power through exercising control over people 
Power - resources  Security and power through maintaining one’s public image and avoiding humiliation 
Face  Security and power through maintaining one’s public image and avoiding humiliation 
Security – personal  Safety in one’s immediate environment 
Security - societal  Safety and stability in the wider society 
Tradition  Maintaining and preserving cultural, family, or religious traditions 
Conformity - rules  Compliance with rules, laws, and formal obligations 
Conformity -
interpersonal Avoidance of upsetting or harming other people 
Humility  Recognizing one’s insignificance in the larger scheme of things 
Benevolence -
dependability  Being a reliable and trustworthy member of the in group 
Benevolence – 
caring  Devotion to the welfare of in group members 
Universalism –
concern  Commitment to equality, justice, and protection for all people 
Universalism – 
nature  Preservation of the natural environment 
Universalism -
tolerance  Acceptance and understanding of those who are different from oneself 
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The current study will be utilising Schwartz’s (1992, 2012a) model of values as it is 
apparent from the prior discussion that his model has been the most widely tested 
across cultures.  This has the added utility of describing how values relate to each 
other, and more recently how values relate to behaviour and motivation (e.g. express 
growth or self-expansion or self-protect), social aspects (e.g. distinction between 
social and personal focus and most importantly with relation to the current study how 
values relate to emotion (e.g. anxiety free and anxiety avoidance).  This is the first time 
that Schwartz has related values explicitly to emotion, but has yet to be empirically 
supported. 
 
The next section will describe how researchers have devised tools to measure values. 
 
1.3.6 Measuring values 
As discussed, a number of researchers have tried to define and differentiate between 
values, and in doing so have proposed several different models of values.  What 
follows from this has been a number of attempts to devise a tool that can access 
people’s values cognitively in order to measure and assess these values, which will 
test these models across cultures and enable researchers to find out more about 
values and how they relate to different concepts.  Rokeach (1973) made the first 
attempt at this by devising a list of 36 values based on pilot work which asked people 
to describe their values and by an examination of value-like trait words (Anderson, 
1968).  His approach involved asking people to rank all 36 values (split into two groups 
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of 18) from least to most important. This method has been used by many researchers 
(e.g. Lee et al., 2008; Steele & Liu, 1983; Tetlock, 1986).  
 
Schwartz (1992) then went on to devise two questionnaires to measure values, namely 
the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) and more recently the Portrait Value Questionnaire 
(PVQ) (Schwartz, 2001).  The SVS has been tested in more than 200 samples from 
more than 60 nations supporting the distinctiveness of the 10 values and the circular 
structure of relations among them (Fotaine & Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz, 1992, 1994; 
Schwartz & Sagiz, 1995; Schwartz, 2001).  Nonetheless, 5% of the sample deviated 
considerably from the theorised pattern. Deviations were most common and extreme 
in samples from sub-Saharan Africa, India, Malaysia and rural areas of less developed 
nations.  These deviations could suggest that the values theory may not hold 
universally, particularly those people from less developed, non-Western nations.  
However, it could also be that the problem does not lie in the theory but in the 
instrument used to measure these values. Thus, the SVS requires a high level of 
abstract thoughts and presents the values outside of any specific concept.  Notably, 
the samples in which the theory failed to yield support were exclusively from non-
Western populations that had not been educated in schools that emphasize abstract, 
context-free thinking.  The PVQ was devised to rectify this problem. 
 
The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) is an alternative to the SVS, which has been 
developed to also measure the ten basic values in samples of children from age 11, 
of the elderly, and of persons not educated in Western schools that emphasize 
abstract, context-free thinking.  The PVQ is thus more concrete than the SVS and uses 
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examples of each value; the rating scale is more comprehensible. The PVQ has been 
found to have good internal reliabilities and good convergence with the original SVS 
(Schwartz, 2005b).  In addition, the PVQ thus far has yielded, stronger evidence of fit 
to the model in the countries in which it has been used, including Uganda and South 
Africa (Schwartz, et al., 2001).  Given that the PVQ has been widely tested and has 
been found to be more effective than the SVS, then this will be used in the current 
study, but it will be adapted to include Higgins’s (1987) model of self-discrepancies 
(see methods chapter). 
 
The above sections have highlighted the different models of values (particularly 
Schwartz model of values) and the tools that researchers have used to measure 
values; however, these models have not stipulated how these values are activated. 
The next section will outline how researchers argue this is done. 
 
1.3.7 Value activation  
Maio and Olson (1998) argue that values often operate as “truisms”.  That is, values 
are often widely accepted by individuals (and perhaps some cultures) and are 
therefore rarely questioned.  Individuals do not tend to consider adequate reasons 
regarding a value and therefore do not have any arguments for why values such as 
helpfulness and equality are important; as a result values are held so firmly and deeply 
that they fail to be conscious of them.  However, a person’s values can be activated at 
a more conscious level when they are asked to consider reasons for or against a value 
they hold (i.e. they were asked to generate cognitive support for their value).  Maio 
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and Olson (2002) tested this and found that when participants considered reasons for 
their values, the importance ratings of the value changed, whilst participants who did 
not consider reasons did not change their values.  This therefore, implies that 
individuals will hold their values as ‘truisms’ and behave in accordance with them 
unless their values are challenged in some way, leading to their values being activated 
and individuals to then consider reasons for holding that value. 
 
Furthermore, values have also been found to be activated via priming. For example, 
Maio et al. (2009) found that priming certain values can increase or decrease value-
related behaviour; for instance they found that priming benevolence values decrease 
success and increase helpfulness.  Bargh et al., (2001) also found that participants 
were better at solving word puzzles if they first read an article that reminds them of the 
importance of achievement.  Similar effects have been found in other research that 
primed social value constructs (Roccas, 2003; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). 
Furthermore, Karremans (2007) found that having cognitive support for a specific 
value can increase behaviour that expresses a related value (e.g. considering 
arguments for and against honesty and loyalty can increase helping behaviour). 
 
Summary 1.3.8  
Values have been conceptualised and operationalised in many different ways; which 
has led to further understanding in how values are defined, developed, differentiated, 
assessed and measured.  It has been argued that values that are often activated at 
an unconscious level as values act as ‘truisms’, but they can be activated at a more 
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conscious level if people are asked to provide cognitive support for their values or if 
they are primed.    
 
It is evident from Schwartz’s model that values act as powerful motivators for 
behaviour and that people have value priorities.  Given this, it is curious that 
Schwartz’s model has to date only been tested on non-clinical populations.  A clinical 
group that would be interesting to test his model on is people with mental health 
problems as can be highly motivated to behave in certain ways.  For example, anxiety 
and eating disorders are mental health problems where people may be highly 
motivated to avoid feared situations or weight gain. The next section will describe 
these behaviours in more detail and hypothesis from these which of Schwartz (1992) 
values they may hold. 
 
1.4 VALUES AND MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS 
Research has indicated that values are powerful motivators for behaviour. Given this, 
values are likely to motivate people to behave in certain ways that cause them to 
experience psychological distress. Therefore, this section will describe two main 
mental health disorders (e.g. anxiety and eating disorders), consider the behaviours 
that they are motivated to engage in, and from this hypothesise the central values (e.g. 
those values that are most important to them and most closely connected to their core-
self) that may underpin and/or relate to these disorders.  
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1.4.1 Anxiety Disorders 
 The DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) identifies several different 
anxiety disorders. These include panic disorder (PD) with agoraphobia, PD without 
agoraphobia, agoraphobia without history of panic, specific phobia, social phobia, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), acute 
stress disorder, and generalised anxiety disorder (GAD).  For the current study a 
sample is going to be drawn from participants with PD and OCD.  
 
NICE (2006) guidelines for OCD state that the disorder is characterised by the 
presence of either obsessions or compulsions, but commonly both. An obsession is 
defined as “an unwanted intrusive thought, image or urge, which repeatedly enters the 
person’s mind” (NICE, 2006, p.15).  Obsessions are seen as distressing but are 
acknowledged as originating in the person’s mind, and not imposed by an outside 
agency.  They are usually regarded by the individual as unreasonable or excessive. 
Compulsion are “repetitive behaviours or mental acts that the person feels driven to 
perform” (NICE, 2006, p.15).  A compulsion can either be overt and observable by 
others, such as checking that a door is locked, or a covert mental act that cannot be 
observed such as repeating a certain phrase in the mind.  According to the NICE (2011, 
p.4) guidelines panic disorder, “panic disorder is characterised by recurring, 
unforeseen panic attacks followed by at least 1 month of persistent worry about having 
another attack and concern about its consequences, or a significant change in 
behaviour related to panic attacks. Panic disorder can be diagnosed with or without 
agoraphobia”. 
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It has been argued that anxiety disorders have common features such as the 
presence of fear, anticipatory anxiety, and worry, situational avoidance, 
avoidance of thoughts and feelings and interceptive anxiety, i.e. anxiety 
sensitivity and overprotective behaviours such as compulsive rituals and safety 
behaviours (Antony, 2002).  It seems apparent from the common features of 
anxiety disorders that people with these disorders are concerned and motivated 
with keeping their environment predictable and controllable (Lohr et al., 2007) as 
they struggle to tolerate uncertainty (Tolin et al, 2003; Holaway et al., 2006) and 
feeling safe and secure and away from danger is important to them (Hawton et 
al., 1989; Lohr et al., 2007).  In order to achieve this they may want to avoid 
anything that they perceive as a threat and engage in safety seeking behaviours 
(Salkovskis, 1985), as well as conforming to personal and societal rules. Given 
this, it seems likely that people with anxiety disorders, in accordance with 
Schwartz’s (1992) model, would have central values centred on conservation 
quadrant with values like security, tradition and conformity. 
 
1.4.2 Eating disorders 
Eating disorders have been described by the American Psychiatric Association (1994) 
as falling into four main categories: Bulimia Nervosa which is characterised by 
recurrent episodes of binge eating and secondly by compensatory behaviour 
(vomiting, purging, fasting or exercising or a combination of these) in order to prevent 
weight gain (NICE, 2004); Binge Eating Disorder which is characterised by binge 
eating behaviour without the compensatory behaviour; Anorexia Nervosa which is 
when the individual maintains a low weight as a result of a preoccupation with body 
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weight, construed either as a fear of fatness or pursuit of thinness (NICE, 2004); and 
Eating Disorders Not Otherwise Specified (EDNOS), where the eating disorder may 
resemble either both anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa, but which is considered 
atypical, as this does not meet the precise diagnostic criteria for these conditions 
(NICE, 2004).  Of the three types of eating disorders, EDNOS is the most common 
(Fairburn et al., 2007).  For the current study the sample will be drawn from all of these 
types of eating disorders. 
 
Fairburn et al. (2003)  argues that the different type of eating disorders share the same 
core psychopathology, namely over-evaluating eating, shape and weight and their 
control; and that people tend to move between these diagnostic states over time 
(Fairburn et al., 2003).  In addition, Fairburn et al. (2003) also argue that the three 
types of eating disorders also share common psychopathological features that function 
to maintain their eating disorder, for example, a dysfunctional schema for self-
evaluation, core low self-esteem, mood intolerance, interpersonal difficulties and 
‘clinical perfectionism’.   ‘Clinical perfectionism’ has been defined as: 
 
‘The over-evaluation of the striving for, and achievement of, personally 
demanding standards despite adverse consequences. In other words, they 
suggest that, at the heart of the psychopathology of clinical perfectionism, 
is a system for self-evaluation in which self-worth is judged largely on the 
basis of striving to achieve demanding goals and success at meeting them’ 
(Fairburn et al., 2003, p.515). 
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Perfectionism is well known to occur in eating disorders (Wonderlich, 2002; Shafran 
et al., 2002).  The person’s perfectionist standards are said to be applied to attempts 
to control their eating, shape and weight as well as other aspects of their life (e.g. their 
performance at work or at a sport, Fairburn et al., 2003).  Given this, it seems likely 
that the central values of people with eating disorders are centred on the self-
enhancement quadrant and more specifically achievement values when considering 
their values in relation to Schwartz’s (1992) model.  
  
1.4.3 Summary 
An overview has been provided of anxiety and eating disorders, and the common 
features within these disorders have been outlined.  When considering these common 
features in accordance with Schwartz’s (1992) model, it is apparent that the disorders 
could have particular value underpinnings which were highlighted.  Thereby, if people 
with mental health problems behaviours are motivated by particular values in some 
way, it is possible that these could impact on psychological distress. The next section 
will highlight the possible ways in which this could happen. 
 
1.5 VALUES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS 
As illustrated previously, values motivate people to behave in particular ways in 
accordance with their value priorities.  The Schwartz model also highlights how there 
are values that are compatible and incompatible with one another.  It is therefore likely 
that pursing incompatible values could lead to psychological distress, including 
feelings of ambivalence, as will behaving incongruently with one’s values.  In addition, 
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if a person’s values are violated or challenged in some way, this could lead to 
psychological distress.  Furthermore, Schwartz argues that certain values (e.g. 
conformity and security) will motivate individuals to avoid anxiety with the aim of self-
protection, whereas certain values (e.g. self-direction and stimulation) will be ‘anxiety 
free’ with the aim of self-growth, and that the act of constantly trying to avoid anxiety 
in an unpredictable world could lead to psychological distress.  Given all of this, it is 
likely that pursing incompatible values, behaving incongruently with your values or 
having your values violated or challenged could possibly be related to the 
psychological distress experienced in mental health problems. 
 
Several psychological therapies have recognised this; for example, Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy (CBT) draws on the theory of cognitive dissonance and stipulates 
that distress can arise when people do not meet their core beliefs or act against them, 
which can be formed from self-imposed unrealistic values and standards (Beck, 1979; 
Festinger, 1957).  Value-related processes have also been discussed in Person-
Centred Therapy (Rogers, 1964) and Motivational Interviewing (Wagner & Sanchez, 
2004), and more recently Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) (Hayes et al., 
2003), which places a specific emphasis on values and their role within psychological 
distress.  They also subsequently promote value-based interventions. 
 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) (Hayes et al., 2003) recognises the 
importance of values and promotes value-congruent behavioural interventions for 
various mental health problems, e.g. for OCD (Twohig, 2010).  Valued living has been 
posited as a primary core process of ACT (Hayes et al., 2006; Strosahl et al., 2004) 
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and has been theoretically associated with other core processes, such as mindful 
acceptance, and many important outcomes, such as decreased psychological 
distress, increased psychological adjustment, and improvements in quality of life 
(Wilson & Murrell, 2004). In the ACT model, individuals’ attempts to eliminate or 
attenuate difficult psychological experiences cause avoidance that increases 
psychological distress and has a negative impact on valued living (Hayes et al., 1999; 
Wilson, 2009). 
 
According to ACT theorists, values serve to motivate behaviour and facilitate 
acceptance despite the experience of painful emotions and stimuli (Hayes et al., 
1999).  Thus, they state that it is only through a person’s desire to live in accordance 
with their values that they are willing to endure pain that may be associated with 
acceptance.  All components of ACT are linked to values clarification as a source of 
motivation and life purpose (Hayes & Duckworth, 2006).  The ACT model utilises two 
main questionnaires to help people clarify their values: the Valued Living 
Questionnaire (Wilson et al., 2010) and the Bull’s Eye Measure of Valued Living 
(Lungren et al., 2005). 
 
There have been several studies looking at measuring the effectiveness of having a 
values based intervention. For example, Branstetter-Rost et al. (2009) compared the 
effects of an ACT-based acceptance intervention for pain tolerance with and without 
the values component. They found that the inclusion of the values component in the 
intervention led to greater pain tolerance than without.  Mc Cracken and Yang (2006) 
also examined the role of values, as conceptualised by ACT among patients with 
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chronic pain. Within this population it was found that those who were more successful 
at living and engaging in behaviour that was consistent with their values experienced 
better physical functioning and emotional well-being.  However, these studies have 
been done with a sample of people experiencing physical health problems; it would be 
interesting for further research to do this with people experiencing mental health 
problems. 
 
1.5.1 Summary 
Schwartz’s model of values has implicated in the various ways highlighted above that 
values could lead to psychological distress. Various psychological models and 
therapies have also recognised this and have argued that value incongruent behaviour 
could lead to the psychological distress experienced in mental health problems.  
However, this has yet to receive any empirical support with people with mental health 
disorders.  Investigating the link between values and the psychological distress 
experienced by people with mental health problems poses a challenge as it has not 
been done previously.  However, if we consider the argument that the psychological 
therapies put forward; thus, behaving incongruently with your values (e.g. not 
behaving in a way that is consistent with your values) causes’ psychological distress, 
then it would make sense to use a model and methodology which could assess this. 
Higgins’s (1987) model of self-discrepancies has been put forward as a model that 
could do this for the current study. 
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1.6 DISCREPANCIES IN VALUES 
1.6.1 Overview 
As argued in the sections above, value incongruent behaviour could have an impact 
on people’s psychological distress, and in turn play a role in mental health problems. 
However, this has not been evidenced by published research with people with mental 
health problems.  One way to investigate this is by drawing on a model and 
methodology that looks at discrepancies between domains of the self (i.e. our actual 
self, ideal self and the self we feel we ought to be) and the impact of these emotionally, 
and apply this to look at self-discrepancies in values instead of self-concept, to 
investigate the link with psychological distress.  The Higgins (1987) model of self–
discrepancies will be put forward as the model and methodology to do this.  The 
section below will firstly outline Higgins’s model of self-discrepancies and then finish 
with the only study to date that has utilised Higgins’s model in relation to values with 
an undergraduate sample (Rees & Maio, 2009), as well as discussing the implications 
of this to the current study. 
 
1.6.2 The Higgins (1987) self-discrepancies model 
The Higgins (1987) self-discrepancy theory describes discrepancies between self-
state representations and how these different types of discrepancies cause different 
emotions.   Higgins argues that one domain of the self (actual; ideal; ought) and one 
standpoint on the self (own; significant other) constitute different type of self-state 
representations. Combining each of the domains of the self with each of the 
standpoints of the self yields six basic types of self-state representations (see table 
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1.3): actual/own, actual/other, ideal/own, ideal/other, ought/own and ought/other. The 
first two self-state representations (particularly actual/own) constitute what is typically 
meant by a person’s self-concept.  The four remaining self-state representations are 
self-directive standards or acquired guides for being; in brief “self-guides” (see Higgins 
et al., 1986).   
 
Table 1.3: Self-state representations according to the Higgins model of self-
discrepancy 
  Actual Ideal Ought 
Own Self-concept Self-guide Self-guide 
Other Self-concept Self-guide Self-guide 
 
This theory proposes that people differ as to which self-guide they are especially 
motivated to meet.  Not everyone is expected to possess only ought to self-guides, 
whereas others may possess only ideal self-guides.  The self-discrepancy theory 
postulates that we are motivated to reach a condition where our self-concept matches 
out personally relevant self-guides.  Furthermore, Higgins (1989) found that AI self-
discrepancies lead to dejection-type emotions (e.g. sadness) and AO self-
discrepancies lead to agitation-oriented emotions (e.g. anxiety) (see figure 1.3).  
Carver et al. (1999) made a new amendment to Higgins’s theory by adding the domain 
of the feared-self which, unlike the other self-guides which imply an actual or desired 
(better) self, is a domain that measures what one does not desire to be. 
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Figure 1.3: Higgins’s (1987) Self-Discrepancy Theory 
 
 
 
The Higgins model of self-discrepancy also distinguishes between promotion-focused 
strategies which cause a state of eagerness or approach, which triggers behaviour 
designed to attain a goal and prevention-focused strategies which cause a state of 
vigilance or avoidance, triggering behaviour geared to avoid moving away from a goal.  
According to Higgins (1998), sensitivity to positive outcomes should predominate 
when the ideal self-guide induces a promotion focus, and sensitivity to negative 
outcomes should predominate when ought self-guide induces a prevention focus.  
Higgins (1999) also described four variables that moderate the likelihood of finding the 
unique discrepancy-emotion relations; the magnitude of a self-discrepancy, the 
 
Actual 
Self 
Ideal Self 
Ought self 
Unhappiness 
Disappointment 
Dissatisfaction 
Self- dislike 
 Fear 
Anxiety 
Personal inadequacy 
Alienation 
Discrepancy 
Self Guides 
Negative Affective 
Consequences 
Self-Discrepancy Theory 
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accessibility of a self-discrepancy, the applicability and relevance of a self-discrepancy 
in a current context, and the importance of a self-discrepancy to the person. 
 
Higgins (1985) devised the “selves” questionnaire to measure self- discrepancies. This 
questionnaire asks the participant to list up to 10 traits or attributes for each of a 
number of different self-states.  For example, it asks the participant to list 10 qualities 
they believe they actually have, 10 qualities they believe they ought to have and 10 
qualities they would ideally like to have.  It is administered in two sections, one 
involving the respondent’s own standpoint and the other involving the standpoint of 
the respondent’s parent or a close friend.   Another questionnaire is the “Regulatory 
Focus Strength Measure” (Higgins, 1997) which asks participants to list, one at a time, 
four attributes they would ideally like to possess and four attributes they believe they 
ought to possess, in a seemingly random order. 
 
The Selves Questionnaire has been commonly adopted by researchers (Cornette, 
2009; Fairborther & Moretti, 1998; Ferrier & Brewin, 2005; Scott & O’Hara, 1993), but 
has been criticised by some (Tangey et al., 1998; Rodebaugh & Donahue, 2007) as 
they found no support for self-discrepancy theory and suggested that the Selves 
Questionnaire actually taps into a generalized self-discrepancy that does not 
demonstrate the relations proposed by Higgins (1987). Other researchers have found 
this, and it has been therefore adapted and modified by many researchers (Strauman 
et al., 1989, 2001; Bentall et al., 2005; Crane et al., 2008) in response to this criticism 
(see systematic review). 
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Higgins's self-discrepancy theory has received support from a number of studies 
utilising non-clinical populations (e.g. Higgins, 1989; Scott & O’Hara, 1993; Strauman, 
1989; Strauman & Higgins, 1987, 1988).  In addition, the Higgins model has been 
tested in relation to clinical populations of participants with various psychological 
disorders (see systematic review section 1.7) and physical health problems (cancer, 
Heidrich, et al., 1994; chronic low back pain, Kinderman et al., 2011; brain injury, 
Cantor et al., 2005).  However, some published research has failed to support the 
distinctiveness of actual: ideal (AI) and actual:ought (AO) self-discrepancies relating 
to particular types of emotional distress (e.g. Tangney et al., 1998).  They did, however, 
find that the tendency to experience shame rather than guilt was positively related to 
all types of self-discrepancies 
 
In summary, Higgins’s (1987) model of self-discrepancy has been widely tested and 
supported.  However, In relation to values, Higgins model has only been tested by one 
study.  For example, Rees and Maio (2009) applied Higgins’s methodology to values 
with the aim of testing whether values that are ‘central’ to the self-function more 
strongly as ideal self-guides than as ought self-guides, whereas values that are 
‘peripheral’ to the self-function more strongly as ought self-guides than as ideal self-
guides. The secondary aim was to examine a potential emotional consequence of the 
difference in self-guide dominance.  
 
In the first study, they used Rokeach’s (1973) measure of value centrality to identify 
participants’ three most central values and three least important values from a set of 
20 across the circular model.  The values were core examples of each of the four 
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higher-order orthogonal value domains in Schwartz’s Value Survey (1992).  
Participants (undergraduate students) were then asked to rate the extent on a scale 
of 0 (not at all) to 3 (very much so) to which they actually, ideally, and should fulfil each 
value, using items that Higgins (1987) has developed for examining self-guides. These 
measures helped to test Rokeach’s prediction that central values are stronger ideals 
than oughts. As expected, the three most important values were rated as being 
significantly stronger ideals than oughts, whereas the reverse was true for the three 
least important values.   
 
The second study tested whether violation of central and peripheral values elicited 
different emotional consequences; more specifically whether the violation causes 
dejection or agitation type emotions in accordance with Higgins’s model of self-
discrepancies.   As expected, participants experienced more dejection after writing an 
essay against one of their most important values than after writing an essay against 
one of their least important values, and this effect occurred in both the private and the 
public contexts.  In contrast, participants experienced more agitation after writing an 
essay against one of their least important values than writing an essay against one of 
their most important values, but this only occurred in the public context and not in the 
private.  Maio (2010, p.23) argues that “this pattern perfectly fits Higgins’ (1999) 
summary of the conditions linking self-guides to emotional consequences, while 
integrating this prediction with an important distinction in the values literature: the 
distinction between those considered as central and those considered as peripheral 
values”. 
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1.6.3 Summary 
Previously Higgins’s model of self-discrepancy has been looked at in relation to 
domains of the self, but not in relation to values.  However, more recently, Rees and 
Maio (2009) carried out some research with regards to values as self-guides and 
values and emotion.  However, they did this with a non-clinical undergraduate sample, 
and to date this research has not been done with a clinical sample. 
 
As stated above, Higgins’s model of self-discrepancy has not been tested in relation 
to values on a clinical population, and therefore we cannot review the evidence base 
in relation to this for the current study.  However, Higgins’s self-discrepancy theory has 
been tested on various clinical populations (both with physical and mental health 
problems).   The next section will  systematically review the relationship between self-
guides and distress in mental health disorders in order to consider the application of 
Higgins’s theory in recognised clinical populations  (such as mental health disorders), 
and to investigate its utility for these groups as well as other groups (e.g., non-clinical 
populations such as undergraduates). 
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1.7 SELF-DISCREPANCIES AND DISTRESS IN MENTAL HEALTH DISORDERS: 
THE EVIDENCE 
 
1.7.1 The Aim and Scope of the Current Literature Review  
The present systematic review aims to critique and synthesise empirical research 
exploring the role that self-discrepancies play in psychological distress, based on 
clinical sample(s) of people with mental health problems. 
 
1.7.2 Systematic Review Question 
What role do self-discrepancies (Higgins, 1987) play in the psychological distress 
experienced in mental health disorders? 
 
1.7.3 Method 
1.7.3.1 Literature Review Strategy 
To locate relevant studies, the following electronic bibliographic databases were 
searched: PsychINFO, PsycARTICLES, Web of Knowledge, Medline, Science Direct, 
CINAHL and ASSIA. 
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1.7.3.2 Search Terms 
The following search terms were used in each of the above databases: 
 
 Self-discrepanc* and psychologic* distress* 
 
 Self-discrepanc* and distress* 
 
 Self-discrepanc* and emotion* 
 Self-discrepanc* and feeling 
 Self-discrepanc* and mood 
 Self-discrepanc* and affect 
 Self-discrepanc* and mental health 
 Self-discrepanc* and mental 
 Self-discrepanc* and difficult* 
 Self-discrepanc* and disorder 
 Self-discrepanc* and anxiety 
 Self-discrepanc* and depress* 
 Self-discrepanc* and delusion* 
 Self-discrepanc* and paranoi* 
 Self-discrepanc* and social anxiety 
 Self-discrepanc* and suicid* 
 Self-discrepanc* and bipolar 
 Self-discrepanc* and eatin* 
 Self-discrepanc* and obsess* 
 Self-discrepanc* and panic 
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1.7.3.3 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
The following inclusion and exclusion criteria were used to select relevant studies to 
address the review question. 
 
1.7.3.3.1 Inclusion Criteria 
1. Articles must be empirical studies 
 
2. Participants must be adults (age 18 and over) 
 
3. Participants must be drawn from a clinical sample ( e.g. participants with 
mental health problems) 
 
4. Articles must be in English 
 
5. The aims of the study must be in relation to the relationship between self-
discrepancies (Higgins 1987) and distress 
 
6. Studies after 1980 until 2013 
 
7. Published in peer-reviewed journal 
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1.7.3.3.2 Exclusion Criteria 
Participants must not be undergraduate or college students without a 
diagnosable mental problem 
 
Articles must not be reviews or opinion article 
 
Participants must not be drawn from a clinical sample of people with physical 
health problems (e.g. chronic back pain) as the current study is interested in 
clinical samples of people with mental health problems only. 
 
1. 7.4 Systematic Review Process 
A total of 3987 articles were identified using the search terms and databases outlined 
above, and were then reviewed by title and abstract for relevance to the topic of self-
discrepancies and psychological distress. Any article that clearly met one of the 
exclusion criteria was eliminated from the review at this stage. This process left 61 
abstracts which were then examined by the researcher and her supervisor in more 
detail to ensure that they were eligible for inclusion in the study. The clinical supervisor 
of the study acted as an independent rater, examining the 61 abstracts.  As the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria were used to judge inter-rater agreement, each of the 
articles not agreed on by both parties were discussed in a consensus building process 
until agreement was reached.   
 
Of the 61 abstracts 22 full text articles were retrieved and examined again in more 
detail by the researcher and supervisor: a further 5 articles were excluded, which left 
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17 studies which were eligible to be included in the systematic review. The process of 
article extraction is detailed in full in Appendix 1.  
 
1.7.5 Results 
1.7.5.1 Overview of the Critical Review  
The 17 studies that met the inclusion and exclusion criteria were critically reviewed in 
relation to samples included in the studies (e.g. participants’ mental health diagnoses, 
number, gender and age), research design (self-discrepancy measures used, 
psychological distress measures used),  key findings and strengths and limitations. 
The review had been presented in a table (see Appendix 2) which is to be used 
alongside the following narrative review.  
 
1.7.5.2. Samples included in the studies 
This section will provide the relevant details of the participants included in the studies 
such as the participants’ mental health diagnoses, sample size, gender and age. 
 
1.7.5.2.1 Participants’ mental health diagnoses 
The 17 articles included in this review examined the role of Higgins’s (1987) model of 
self-discrepancy across a range of mental health problems. These included, bipolar 
disorder (Alatig et al., 2010; Bentall et al., 2005); depression (Strauman et al., 2001; 
Fairbrother & Moretti, 1998; Scott & O’Hara, 1993; Crane et al., 2008; Vergara-Lopez 
& Roberts, 2012) social phobia and depression (Strauman, 1989; Weilage & Hope, 
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1999); psychosis (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996; McColluch et al., 2006; Kinderman et 
al., 2003);  borderline personality disorder (van den Broeck et al., 2012); eating 
disorders (Wonderlich et al., 2008); Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
(Sutherland & Bryant, 2008); suicidal ideation (Cornette et al., 2009) and OCD (Ferrier 
& Brewin, 2005). 
 
The samples consisted of different types of groups; for example, mental health groups 
(i.e. the mental health disorders being investigated in the study), psychiatric control 
group and ‘healthy’ control groups, which were recruited from a variety of convenience 
sampling methods.  The majority of the mental health groups (13) were recruited from 
outpatient and inpatient clinics with Crane et al. (2008) and also recruiting through 
local media.  The other 4 studies recruited via local media and print adverts (Weilage 
& Hope, 1999) and universities (Alatig et al., 2010; Cornette, 2009; Vegara-Lopez & 
Roberts, 2012) as these three studies were undertaken exclusively with 
undergraduates. However, only students with diagnosable mental health problems 
were included in these studies (as per the inclusion criteria).   
 
The majority of the studies (11) included a ‘healthy’ control group for comparison, and 
6 studies did not (van den Broeck et al., 2012; Cornette, 2009; Strauman et al., 2001; 
Vegara-Lopez & Roberts, 2012; Sutherland & Bryant, 2008). The ‘healthy’ control 
groups were recruited through a university (Alatiq et al., 2010; Scott & O’Hara, 1993; 
Strauman, 1989), informal contacts (Bentall et al., 2005; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996), 
university hospital adverts (Fairbrother & Moretti, 1998), volunteers (Ferrier & Brewin, 
2005), attendees at a General Practice (Kinderman et al., 2003), study local day centre 
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(McColluch et al., 2006) and television, radio and print adverts (Weilage & Hope, 1999; 
Wonderlich et al., 2008).  Six studies (Ferrier and Brewin, 2005; Kinderman & Bentall, 
1996; Kinderman et al., 2003; McColluch et al., 2006;) also included a psychiatric 
control group, with Crane et al. (2008)  and Sutherland & Bryant (2008) only having a 
psychiatric control group and not a ‘healthy’ control. These studies were also recruited 
from the same inpatient and outpatient mental health services as the mental health 
groups.   
 
The majority of the studies (14) established ‘caseness’  or a diagnosis for the mental 
health disorder they were investigating by a structured clinical interview carried out by 
various mental health professionals, based on criteria from the Diagnostic Statistical 
Manual Versions 3 and 4 (DSM-III-R, DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1984: 
1994). Two studies (Cornette, 2009; McColluch et al., 2006) used self-report 
questionnaires specific to the mental health disorder they were testing, whereas one 
study (Kinderman et al., 2003) only reviewed case notes and relied on discussions 
with staff regarding their diagnoses. 
 
1.7.5.2.2 Sample Size 
The total samples sizes in the studies ranged from 27 (Kinderman et al., 2003) to 152 
(Cornette, 2009).  The mean sample size was 66.  The mental health groups sample 
sizes ranged from 13 (Kinderman et al., 2003; McColluch et al., 2006) to 152 (Cornette, 
2009) and the mean sample size was 40.  The psychiatric control group ranged from 
11 (Kinderman et al., 2003) to 22 (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996) with a mean sample 
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size of 21. The ‘healthy’ control group sample size ranged from 5 (Strauman, 1989) to 
50 (Wonderlich et al., 2008) with a mean sample size of 30. 
 
 1.7.5.2.3 Gender 
Fifteen studies stated the gender of the participants. Two studies (Crane et al., 2008; 
Strauman, 1989) did not state the gender of the participants. 14 of the studies recruited 
both male and female participants and one study (Wonderlich et al., 2008) only 
recruited female participants. Thirteen of the studies recruited more female 
participants than males, ranging from 23% (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996) to 72% female 
(McColluch et al., 2006) .One study (Kinderman et al., 1996) conversely recruited  
more male participants than female; (77% males) . 
 
1.7.5.2.4 Age  
Eleven studies recruited participants between the ages of 18 to 65, with the mean age 
typically ranging from 19.2 (Cornette, 2009) to 39 (Weilage & Hope, 1999). One study 
(McColluch et al., 2006) recruited participants over the age of 65, with the mean age 
being 75. Five studies (Alatiq et al., 2010; Bentall et al., 2005; Kinderman et al., 2003; 
Scott & O’Hara, 1993; Strauman et al., 2001) did not state the ages of the participants. 
 
1.7.5.3 Study design and methodology 
Of the 17 articles included in this review, 15 were cross sectional and 2 were 
longitudinal.  The 2 longitudinal studies (Strauman, et al. 2001; Crane et al., 2008) 
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were testing the influence of particular psychological interventions (CBT and 
Interpersonal Psychotherapy and Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy) on self-
discrepancies at two time points (i.e. pre- and post-intervention).  
 
1.7.5.4 The measurement of self-discrepancies and psychological distress 
The tools used to measure both self-discrepancies and psychological distress will be 
outlined below. 
 
1.7.5.4.1 Self-discrepancy measures 
The 17 articles included in the review measured Higgins’s self-discrepancies using 
mainly either Higgins’s Selves Questionnaire or modified versions of this. 
Nine studies measured Higgins’s (1987) self-discrepancies using the Selves 
Questionnaire and two of these studies administered the Selves Questionnaire via 
interview rather than the self-rating method. The Selves Questionnaire involves asking 
the participant to list up to 10 traits or attributes for each of a number of different self-
states.  For example, it asks the participant to list 10 qualities they believe they actually 
have, 10 qualities they believe they ought to have and 10 qualities they would ideally 
like to have. It is administered in two sections, one involving the respondent’s own 
standpoint and the other involving the standpoint of the respondent’s parent or a close 
friend.   
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The other 6 studies used modified versions of the Selves Questionnaire. Two studies 
(Kinderman et al., 2003; McColluch et al., 2006) used the Self Concept Checklist, 
which is a modified version of Kinderman and Bentall’s checklist (2000), in which they 
were also provided with a list of 30 positive and 30 negative words to rate their self-
concept and self-guides.  Two studies (Bentall et al., 2005; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996) 
used the Personal Qualities Questionnaire. This differed from the Selves 
Questionnaire as individuals were not asked to make numerical ratings of the degree 
to which each word describes them, and the ‘other’ was changed to represent more 
specifically their parents.  One study used the Self-Description Questionnaire (Crane 
et al., 2008) which also asked participants to rate their self-guides in terms of similarity 
and likelihood of obtaining the self-concept and self-guides in the future, and two 
studies (Alatiq et al., 2010; Vegara-Lopez & Roberts, 2012) used the Self-Discrepancy 
Questionnaire which was modified from Carver et al. (1999) to include another self-
guide, the “feared self” and similar to Crane et al. (2008) ratings of similarity and 
likelihood. 
 
1.7.5.4.2 Measures of psychological distress 
The 17 articles included in the review have examined the role of self-discrepancies 
across a range of mental health problems.  Therefore, each study has used particular 
psychometric tools to measure the severity of the mental health disorder(s) that they 
are investigating as well as, in some studies, using the measure to establish whether 
the participants meet the criteria for the particular mental health disorder. For example, 
the studies investigating depression used a variety of psychometric tools to measure 
depression; four studies used the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Fairbrother & 
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Moretti, 1998; Crane et al., 2008; Strauman et al., 2001), one study (Vegara-Lopez & 
Roberts, 2012) also used the PHQ-9, and one study (Scott & O’Hara, 1993) used the 
Inventory to Diagnose Depression.   
 
The three studies investigating psychosis (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996; Kinderman et 
al., 2003; McColluch, et al., 2006) also used the BDI.  To establish that the participants 
met the criteria for psychosis and to establish severity, participants underwent a 
Present State Examination (PSE, 9th edition; Wing et al., 1974) focusing on questions 
on delusions and hallucinations (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996), case notes were 
reviewed and patients interviewed (Kinderman et al., 2003) and participants were 
asked to complete the Geriatric Mental State Questionnaire (McColluch, et al., 2006), 
again focusing on questions on delusions and hallucinations. 
 
The two studies investigating bipolar disorder again used the BDI and also the 
Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD). The studies also used the Mood 
Disorder Questionnaire (Alatiq et al., 2010) and the Mania Scale and Young Rating 
Scale for Mania (Bentall et al., 2005) to measure levels of Bipolarity. The two studies 
investigating social phobia used the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (Weilage & 
Hope, 1999) and Social Phobia Scale (Strauman, 1989) to measure levels of social 
phobia.  They also measured levels of depression via the BDI (Weilage & Hope, 1999) 
and the HRSD (Strauman, 1989).   
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The study investigating BPD (van den Broeck, 2012) used criteria from the DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) to establish whether participants met the 
criteria for BPD. In addition they also used the BDI. The study investigating bulimia 
nervosa also used the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) to establish 
that the participants met criteria for bulimia nervosa as well as the Multi-Dimensional 
Body Self Relations Questionnaire. The study investigating PTSD used the Clinician 
Administered PTSD Scale 2 to establish that the participants met the criteria for PTSD, 
and they also used the BDI.  The study investigating suicidal ideation (Cornette, 2009) 
used the Beck Scale for Suicidal Ideation and the Hopelessness Scale and the BDI. 
The study investigating OCD (Ferrier & Brewin, 2005) used the Padua Inventory to 
measure levels of OCD and they also used the BDI. To conclude, the majority (12) of 
the studies used the BDI to measure levels of depression alongside the other 
measures used.   
 
1.7.5.5 Key findings 
All of the articles included in the review have examined the role of self-discrepancies 
(Higgins, 1987) across a range of mental health problems. This section aims to outline 
the key findings of these studies in relation to the mental health disorders investigated. 
The mental health disorders are presented in the same format as they are in the table 
(see Appendix 2) starting with the disorder most investigated in the articles to the least.  
The current study will only be focusing on actual: ideal (AI) and actual: ought (AO) self-
discrepancies, which will therefore be reflected in the critical review. However, where 
studies have referred to other self-discrepancies; for example, actual: feared (AF), this 
will be highlighted in the narrative review which follows. 
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1.7.5.5.1 Depression 
Five of the studies explored the relationship between self-discrepancies and 
depression (Strauman et al., 2001; Fairbrother & Moretti 1998; Scott and O’Hara, 
1993; Crane et al., 2008; Vergara-Lopez & Roberts, 2012.) Three of the studies looked 
at differences between groups in self-discrepancies  (Fairbrother & Moretti 1998; Scott 
& O’Hara, 1993; Vergara-Lopez & Roberts, 2012) and two of the studies looked at the 
effect of particular psychological therapies on the self-discrepancies of people with 
depression (Strauman et al., 2001; Crane et al., 2008). 
 
The studies that investigated differences between groups in self-discrepancies 
showed mixed support for the role of self-discrepancies in depression.  For example, 
Fairbrother and Amoretti (1998) and Scott and O’Hara, (1993) reported that 
participants with depression had larger AI self-discrepancies than controls, t(65) = 
3.67‚ p < .001 ; t(76) = 2.56, p < .01, respectively.  Fairbrother & Amoretti (1998) also 
found this effect with the remitted group, t(76) = 2.80, p < .005) but it was a smaller 
effect. However, Vergara-Lopez and Roberts (2012) did not find any group differences 
in AI self-discrepancies F (1,81) =1.43, P=.24. 
 
In relation to AO discrepancies, Scott and O’Hara (1993) reported that participants in 
the anxious and depressed and anxious group had higher AO self-discrepancies, t(76) 
= 1.72, p < .05, than those in the control and depressed only group.  Again, Vergara-
Lopez and Roberts (2012) did not report any group differences in the AO domain and 
Fairbrother and Amoretti (1998) did not investigate AO self-discrepancies. Vegara-
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Lopez and Roberts (2012) also investigated AF self-discrepancies and reported that 
participants with a past history of depression had larger AF self-discrepancies than 
participants without a history of depression, F(1.81) = 16.40, p<01. 
 
The two studies that investigated the effect of particular psychological therapies (e.g. 
Interpersonal Psychotherapy, IPT and Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy, MBCT) 
on the self-discrepancies of people with depression found a decrease in self-
discrepancies following the psychological interventions.  Strauman et al. (2001) 
reported a significant decrease in AI, F (1.25) = 4.94, p<.05, self-discrepancies 
following IPT but not in AO. They also reported that participants with depression had 
a greater AI discrepancy than AO over the study, F(1.40) =7.71, p< .01, and 
participants that were more highly self-discrepant showed less improvement than 
other participants in all conditions, even after controlling for severity.  Crane et al. 
(2008) investigated self-discrepancies with participants undergoing MBCT and 
reported significant time X group interactions for both ideal self-similarity, F(1.40) 
=5.15, P=.03, and ideal self-likelihood ratings F(1.40) = 4.46, p=.04. In addition they 
reported that changes in self-discrepancy were not associated with changes in 
residual depressive symptoms, but in the MBCT group Bonferroni-corrected post–hoc 
comparison revealed that there was a significant association between increases in 
ideal self-similarity and the adoption of more adaptive ideal self-guides post treatment, 
P=.03. 
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1.7.5.5.2 Psychosis 
Three of the studies examined the role of self-discrepancies in psychosis (Kinderman 
& Bentall, 1996; Kinderman et al., 2003; Mc Colluch et al., 2006). The three studies 
looked at differences between groups in self-discrepancies. Kinderman and Bentall 
(1996) compared self-discrepancies between participants with paranoia and 
depression and the control group. Planned pairwise comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) 
revealed that the depressed group, had higher AI and AO self-discrepancies 
F(2.63)=6.35, p<.05; F(2,57)=11.57,p<.0l respectively) than the paranoid and control 
groups. The paranoid and depressed group had higher self:parent in AI F (2.52) =9.09, 
p<.01 and AO F (2.52) =9.43, p<.01 discrepancies than the control group but did not 
differ from one another.   
 
Kinderman et al. (2003) also compared self-discrepancies between groups of 
participants with delusions and depression and the control group. However, they also 
compared these differences with before and after the administration of an Emotional 
Stroop task to investigate whether self-discrepancies change in response to threat-
related information.  They reported no significant differences between the groups on 
the AI or self-actual:other-actual domain prior to the task, but after the task they 
reported that participants differed significantly in both AI, t(12) =2.33, p=.038 and self-
actual:other-actual discrepancies.  
 
The McColluch et al. (2006) study found that there was a significant three-way 
interaction of group, time, and type of discrepancy, F(2.40)=3.82, p=.03. The three-
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way interaction was due to the depression control group showing an increase over 
time in AI discrepancies as compared to the other two groups. The depression control 
group had significantly higher AI discrepancies than both the healthy control 
t(28)=2.93, p=.0035) and the late-onset psychosis group t(26)=2.74, p=.007. However, 
there were no group differences in current AO discrepancy scores. The AI 
discrepancies in the late-onset psychosis group showed similar changes to those of 
the healthy control group over time, but there was no increase in AO discrepancies 
over time.   
 
1.7.5.5.3 Bipolar Disorder 
Two of the studies examined the role of self-discrepancies in relation to bipolar 
disorder (Alatig et al., 2010; Bentall et al., 2005).  Both of these studies were looking 
at differences in self-discrepancies between groups, although they investigated 
different types of self-discrepancies.  Alatig et al. (2010) compared the self-
discrepancies (ideal and feared self-similarity and likelihood) of participants with 
bipolar disorder with a history of depression (BD), participants with bipolar without a 
history of depression (BD-HD) and a control group without mental health problems 
(HC). Bentall et al. (2005) on the other hand compared participants in different phases 
of bipolar disorder (e.g. manic, depressed, remitted and normal) in relation to AI, AO 
and self-actual:other-actual self-discrepancies.   
 
Alatig et al. (2010) reported no significant differences between the BD and HC groups 
and in relation to ideal and feared self-similarity and likelihood, and no significant 
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difference between the BD-ND and HC group in relation to ideal self-similarity and 
likelihood. However, significant differences were reported between the BD-ND and HC 
in feared self-similarity, t(36) = .2.05, p= .05 and likelihood, t(36) = 2.13, p=.04.  In 
contrast, Bentall et al. (2005) reported significant differences between the four groups. 
In both the AI and AO domain, post hoc comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) revealed that the 
depressed group had larger discrepancies than the other three groups F(3.74) =9.21, 
p< .005, F(3.74)=6.66, p< .005 respectively, and the manic group had smaller 
discrepancies than the remitted F(3.74) =9.21,p< .001, F(3.74)=6.66, p< .001 and 
control group F(3.74) =9.21,p< .001, F(3.74)=6.66, p< .005 respectively, but not the 
depressed group. They reported no significant differences between the groups in self-
actual:other-actual F (3. 74) = 1:23, p >.31. 
 
In summary, Alatig et al. (2010) did not find any significant differences between groups 
in AI similarity and likelihood self-discrepancies (but found a significant difference in 
feared self-discrepancies). In contrast, it appears that Bentall et al. (2005) did find a 
significant different difference in AI and AO discrepancies and upon comparison found 
that the depressed group had larger self-discrepancies and the manic group smaller 
self- discrepancies than the other groups. 
 
1.7.5.5.4 Social Phobia and depression 
Two of the studies examined the role of self-discrepancies in social phobia and 
depression (Strauman, 1989; Weilage & Hope, 1999). Both studies investigated 
differences in self-discrepancies between groups. Strauman (1989) reported that 
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participants with depression had larger AI (own) self-discrepancies, F(1,43) =4.06, 
p<.05) and participants with social phobia had larger AO (other) self-discrepancies, 
F(1,34) =8.53, p<. 01.  Weilage & Hope, (1999) also reported significant differences 
between groups. For example, participants with social phobia or dysthymia and the 
comorbid group (with both social phobia and depression) reported greater 
actual:ought:other (AOO) discrepancies than normal participants.  In addition they 
reported that the comorbid group had larger AI self- discrepancies, F(4,63) =1.90, 
p<.05) than the other groups.  
 
1.7.5.5.5 Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) 
One study examined the role of self-discrepancies in borderline personality disorder 
(van den Broeck et al., 2012); more specifically they were exploring memory specificity 
and BPD and their associations with depression and self-discrepancies. Van den 
Broeck et al. 2012 did this by investigating whether there was an association between 
self-discrepancies and participants with BPD with depression and without depression. 
This study reported only a significant correlation with the depressed subsample (n=11), 
between memory specificity and cues relating to highly discrepant domains (i.e. total 
score of AI, AO and feared self-guides), r= -.89, p<.01. This was also found to be 
related to depression severity, r = .71, p<.02. 
 
1.7.5.5.6 Bulimia Nervosa 
One study examined the relationship between self-discrepancies in bulimia nervosa 
(Wonderlich et al., 2008).  This study compared the self-discrepancies between 
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participants with bulimia to a ‘healthy’ control group to see if there was a difference 
between the groups.   On comparison, they reported that the BN group scored higher 
in both AI, F(15,95) =0.70, p<.001 and AO, F(8,45) =-0.46, p=.005 self-discrepancies, 
relative to the control group.   In both studies 1 and 2, individuals with bulimia ideal 
standards were characterized by more ideal appearance related words than were 
controls t(71) = 22.68, p=.009,  t(47) =23.56; p=.001. However, there were no 
significant differences between the groups in the proportion of ought appearance 
related standards, t(71) =20.65, p=.51, t(47) = 21.11; p=.27). Regression analyses 
appeared to show that higher levels of self-discrepancy were predictive of higher levels 
of depression, β=0.257, p=.05. 
 
1.7.5.5.7 PTSD 
One study examined the relationship between self-discrepancies and PTSD 
(Sutherland & Bryant, 2008). Thus, this study compared the self-discrepancies of 
participants with PTSD to participants without PTSD.  Participants were reported to 
have significantly greater AI and AO than non-PTSD participants, t(2,08) =2.12, 
p=.023, t=(2,26)= 1.29 ,p=.016.  Overall, there were greater AI discrepancies than AO.  
AI discrepancies were also positively correlated with trauma-related memories to 
positive cues (r=.47, p<.01), PTSD severity (r=0.49, p<.01) and depression (r=.47, 
p<.01). 
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1.7.5.5.8 Suicidal Ideation 
One study examined the relationship between self-discrepancies and suicidal ideation 
(Cornette et al., 2009).  This study aimed to investigate whether there was an 
association between self-discrepancies and the extent to which individual’s 
experienced suicidal ideation. The study reported an association between AI (r= .29 
p<.01), AO (r=.24, p<.01) and actual:ideal:future self-discrepancies and suicidal 
ideation. AI was not significantly more related to suicidal ideation than AO, but AI was 
more related to depression, t(149) = 2.04, p<.05.  In addition, covariance structure 
analyses indicated a best fitting model suggesting that AI and actual:ideal:future 
contribute to hopelessness, which in turn contributes to depression and suicidal 
ideation. All path coefficients differ significantly from zero at p<.05. 
 
1.7.5.5.9 OCD 
One study examined the relationship between self-discrepancies and OCD (Ferrier & 
Brewin, 2005).  This study compared the AI and AF self-discrepancies between three 
groups (participants with OCD, anxious control (AC) and ‘healthy’ control (NAC). They 
found that the OCD group reported intermediate discrepancies and did not differ from 
the other two groups.  Both the OCD group, F(2,60) = 29.89, p<.01 and the AC, F(2,60) 
= 21.95, p<.01   had significantly larger AI discrepancies than the NAC, F(2,60) = 
21.70, p<.01  but did not differ from each other. Contrary to prediction the OCD group 
was not significantly different from the AC on actual-feared discrepancies, but both 
groups had significantly smaller discrepancies than the NAC. 
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1.7.5.6 Strengths and limitations of the studies  
The studies’ strengths and limitations will now be discussed in relation to the samples 
in the studies, participants’ mental health diagnoses, sample size, gender, age, design 
and methodology, measurement of self-discrepancies and psychological distress, and 
key findings. 
 
1.7.5.6.1 Samples included in the studies 
1.6.3 This section will provide the strengths and limitations of the studies in terms of 
the participants’ mental health diagnoses, sample size, gender and age. 
 
1.7.5.6.1.2 Participants’ mental health diagnoses 
The 17 articles included in this review cover 9 mental health disorders, with depression 
being the most investigated.   
 
The majority of the studies (14) used DSM-III-R or DSM-IV criteria to establish whether 
participants have a particular “diagnosable” mental health problem (e.g. depression, 
OCD, bipolar disorder and bulimia nervosa), which was carried out by a clinician. The 
other two studies (Cornette, 2009; McColluch et al., 2006) used self-report 
questionnaires specific to the mental health disorder they were investigating. One 
study (Kinderman et al., 2003) did not use a formal procedure, reviewing case notes 
and relying on professional judgement to confirm whether they met the criteria for 
persecutory delusions or depression.  Therefore the majority of the studies used the 
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DSM-III-R or DSM-IV criteria to assess the presence of mental health problems, which 
means that the reader can be reasonably confident that the samples had the mental 
health disorder being investigated in relation to self-discrepancies. 
 
The participants in the studies often differed in terms of the severity of their mental 
health problem and phase of their disorder, with some samples having comorbid 
mental health problems. For example, in relation to depression, some studies included 
people experiencing a current depressive episode (Scott & O’Hara, 1993; Strauman, 
2001) and some studies included those in recovery or 'remitted' (Crane et al., 2008; 
Vergara-Lopez & Roberts, 2012), while one study (Fairbrother & Amoretti, 1998) 
included both. Furthermore, it appears that some samples had comorbid depression; 
for example in Sutherland and Bryant’s (2008) sample, 7 out of the 17 participants with 
PTSD also met the criteria for major depression. In van den Broeck’s (2012) sample 
of participants with BPD, 27 of the 34 participants had comorbid disorders (e.g. 8 with 
substance misuse, 7 adjustment disorder, 5 with an eating disorder and 5 with a 
depressive disorder) and with Kinderman and Bentall (1996) their participants with 
persecutory delusions also had significantly high levels of depression. However, most 
studies did try to control for this by excluding participants from the study if they had 
comorbid disorders.  
 
Furthermore, some studies also had a psychiatric comparison group to account for 
this and some carried out ANCOVAs to account for depression as a covariate, but, 
without these measures it is difficult to conclude whether the group difference or the 
association is related to the specific disorder being investigated.  However, this is a 
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common criticism of research and one that is hard to control for as patients typically 
experience comorbid disorders rather than a single disorder.  
 
The majority of the samples included a ‘healthy control’ group for comparison (n=11) 
and some studies also included a psychiatric control group. Thus, the inclusion of a 
‘healthy’ control and psychiatric control demonstrates a group difference and therefore 
adds further support to the hypothesis that participants with a mental health disorder 
have significantly different self-discrepancies to the other groups.  However, some of 
the studies did not use a psychiatric comparison (Bentall et al., 2005; Cornette, 2009; 
Mc Culloch et al., 2006; Strauman et al., 2001) and/or a ‘healthy control’ (van den 
Broeck et al., 2012; Cornette, 2009; Strauman et al., 2001; Vegara-Lopez & Roberts, 
2012; Sutherland & Bryant, 2008), which limits ability to conclude that the self-
discrepancies are related to the specific mental health problems (e.g. bipolar disorder 
or psychosis) investigated and not to low mood or psychological distress generally. 
 
Furthermore, some of the studies (Alatig et al., 2010; Cornette, 2009; Scott & 
O’Hara,1993; Vegara-Lopez & Roberts, 2012) used samples of undergraduate 
students who, whilst they had diagnosable mental health problems, it could be argued 
that they are still not generalisable to the community sample and the clinical population 
suffering from depression.   
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1.7.5.6.1.2 Sample size 
The studies had relatively small sample sizes, the lowest total sample size being 27 
(Kinderman et al., 2003) and four other studies with similarly small total sample sizes 
29, 33, 34, 37 participants (Strauman et al., 2001; Sutherland & Bryant, 2008; van Den 
Broeck et al., 2012; Strauman, 1989) and a mean of only 66.  Furthermore, the 
individual groups were also small; for example the mental health groups smallest 
sample sizes was 13 (Kinderman et al., 2003; McColluch et al., 2006), 11 for the 
psychiatric control groups (Kinderman et al., 2003) and 5 (Strauman, 1989) for the 
healthy control group, and the mean for the groups were still comparably small (40, 
21, 30 respectively). Therefore, a small sample size weakens the statistical power of 
the study and the conclusions that can be made from the findings as a result. However, 
some studies had relatively large sample sizes (e.g. 152, Cornette, 2009; 100, 
Wonderlich et al., 2008; 96, Weilage & Hope, 1999; 80, Scott & O’Hara, 1993), which 
was a strength of these studies. 
 
1.7.5.6.1.3 Gender 
The majority of the studies stated the gender of the participants and the number of the 
number of male and female participants, apart from two studies (Crane et al., 2008 & 
Strauman, 1989). Overall the majority of the samples included more females than 
males, but this reflects statistical findings that generally more female access mental 
health services than males (Mental Health Foundation, 2012). One study recruited 
only females (Wonderlich et al., 2008) but again this reflects findings that more females 
tend to experience BN than males (NICE, 2004). Two studies (Kinderman et al., 2003; 
Kinderman et al., 1996) conversely recruited more males than females.  Therefore 
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even though the studies do not have an equal number of male and females, the 
samples in the studies represent the general mental health population or the particular 
diagnosis. 
 
1.7.5.6.1.4 Age 
The majority of the studies (12) did state the participant’s age and all apart from one 
study (McColluch et al., 2006) recruited participants between 18 and 65.  However, 
the older adult population were not equally represented as  only one study (McColluch 
et al., 2006) recruited older adults. 
 
1.7.5.6.2 Design and methodology 
The majority of the studies (apart from the two studies looking at the impact of 
psychological interventions on self-discrepancies) are cross-sectional.   By using a 
cross-sectional study it is only possible to infer vulnerability and difference in the 
variables across the groups in the studies that may co-occur with diagnostic status, 
without being related to the specific disorder (e.g. depression). This means that it is 
not possible to determine the causal relations between the constructs measured or to 
comment on their etiological role in the various disorders; only longitudinal and 
experimental designs can evaluate causality effectively.   
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1.7.5.6.3 The measurement of self-discrepancies and psychological distress 
The strengths and limitations of the tools used to measure both self-discrepancies and 
psychological distress will be outlined below. 
 
1.7.5.6.3.1 Self-discrepancy measures 
Most of the studies used the Selves Questionnaire which therefore makes the studies 
more comparable to critically review. The modified versions of the Selves 
Questionnaire makes this more difficult as it could be argued that different 
measurements of self-discrepancies will yield different results, which therefore makes 
the studies less comparable with one another.  However, the modified versions of the 
Selves Questionnaires still contain the core elements of the original questionnaire. The 
Selves Questionnaire typically has been modified and this questionnaire had been 
criticised in the past as not distinguishing between the self-discrepancies.  In addition, 
the questionnaires were modified in some studies in accordance with the particular 
aims and objectives.  For example, Alatiq et al. (2010) and Vegara-Lopez and Roberts 
(2012) used the Self-Discrepancy Questionnaire as they were also investigating the 
‘feared self’’, which the Selves Questionnaire does not include. Bentall et al. (2005) 
and Kinderman and Bentall (1996) used the modified Personal Qualities Questionnaire 
as they wanted to simplify the Selves Questionnaire and include the ‘other’ as parents.  
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1.7.5.6.3.2 Psychological distress measures 
The 17 articles used different measures in accordance with the mental health problem 
they were investigating (see table in Appendix 2).  However, 13 of the studies used the 
BDI II to measure levels of depression; therefore there is some consistency in how 
psychological distress was measured in relation to self-discrepancies, which makes 
the studies more comparable with one another as a result. 
 
1.7.5.6.4 Key findings 
Overall, it appears that the findings from the 17 studies included in the review indicate 
that self-discrepancies do play a role in the psychological distress experienced by 
people with mental health problems.  In relation to the studies looking at differences in 
self-discrepancies between groups, they appear to show that overall participants with 
mental health disorders have greater self-discrepancies (more so AI than AO) than 
people without mental health disorders (control groups), and as expected less so with 
the psychiatric control group.  In relation to studies looking at correlation/association 
between self-discrepancies and psychological distress, they also appeared to show a 
correlation between self-discrepancies (again particularly AI more than AO) and the 
mental health disorder being investigated. 
 
Furthermore, participants with depression tended to have greater self-discrepancies 
than other groups (particularly AI), people with Bipolar (in the manic phase) tended to 
have lower self-discrepancies than other groups, and depression was overall more 
highly correlated with self-discrepancies than other mental health disorders. It also 
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appeared that greater levels of depression were often associated with greater levels 
of self-discrepancies (particularly AI). Moreover, it appears that particular 
psychological interventions can be useful in helping to reduce self-discrepancies and 
in turn psychological distress.  However, when considering the findings, one needs to 
take into account the various methodological and theoretical limitations of the studies 
included in the review (e.g. overall small sample sizes, no ‘healthy’ control and/or 
psychiatric control in some studies and some samples having comorbid disorders), 
and the fact that some of the studies are not comparable as they are measuring slightly 
different things and using different measures. 
 
1.7.5.6.5 Summary 
The systematic review process indentified 17 articles suitable for the critical review. 
The  studies were critically reviewed in relation to samples in the studies, research 
design, self-discrepancy measures used, psychological distress measures used, key 
findings and strengths and limitations.  The studies investigated 9 mental health 
disorders in relation to self-discrepancies, with depression being the most researched 
(n=5), then psychosis (n=3), bipolar disorder (n=2), social phobia and depression 
(n=2), with the following disorders having just one study: BPD, bulimia nervosa, PTSD, 
suicidal ideation and OCD.    
 
Overall, the findings from the 17 studies appeared to indicate that  people with mental 
health problems (particularly depression) have greater self-discrepancies (particularly 
AI)  than people without mental health problems, and the greater the level of 
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psychological distress the greater the level of self-discrepancies.  However, when 
considering the findings, the various methodological and theoretical limitations 
highlighted in this section must be taken into account.  Although, it appears that the 
findings are robust enough to indicate that Higgins’s (1987) model of self-
discrepancies has utility with a clinical population (i.e. people with mental health 
disorders) and is therefore an effective methodology for the current study to investigate 
the role of values regarding the psychological distress experienced by people with 
mental health difficulties. 
 
1.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Values have been conceptualised and operationalised in many different ways, so we 
now have an understanding about how values are defined, developed, differentiated, 
represented mentally and assessed and measured. The Schwartz (1992, 2012a) 
model of values has been the most widely tested across cultures, and has the added 
utility of describing how values relate to each other, and more recently how values 
relate to behaviour and motivation (e.g. express growth or self-expansion or self-
protect), social aspects (e.g. distinction between social and personal focus) and most 
importantly with relation to the current study how values relate to emotion (e.g. anxiety 
free and anxiety avoidance).  In relation to measurements of values, the PVQ has 
been widely tested and has been found to be more effective than the SVS and 
therefore for the reasons stated above, the Schwartz (1992) model of values and the 
PVQ will be used in this study. 
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It is evident from the Schwartz model that values act as powerful motivators for 
behaviour and that people have value priorities.  Given this, it is curious that 
Schwartz’s model has to date only been tested on non-clinical populations, as it could 
provide valuable information about how we understand and treat mental health 
problems.  People with mental health problems are a clinical group that are highly 
motivated to behave in certain ways is people with mental health problems.  For 
example, anxiety and eating disorders are mental health problems in which people are 
highly motivated to act in certain ways.  For example, people with eating disorders 
often have perfectionist tendencies and are motivated to achieve, and people with 
anxiety disorders are motivated with keeping their environment predictable and safe 
to avoid danger.  Given this, it is therefore likely (in accordance with Schwartz’s 1992 
model of values) that people with eating disorders will have central values centred 
around the self-enhancement quadrant (particularly achievement) and people with 
anxiety disorders will have central values centred around the conservation quadrant 
(particularly security, conformity and tradition).   
 
Schwartz’s model highlights how there are values which are compatible and 
incompatible, and that it is therefore likely that pursing incompatible values could lead 
to psychological distress, as will behaving incongruently with one’s values. In addition, 
if a person’s values are violated or challenged in some way then this could lead to 
psychological distress.  Furthermore, Schwartz argues that certain values (e.g. 
conformity and security) will motivate you to avoid anxiety with the aim of self-
protection, and that certain values (e.g. self-direction and stimulation) will be ‘anxiety 
free’ with the aim of self-growth, and that the act of constantly trying to avoid anxiety 
in an unpredictable world this could lead to psychological distress. Given all of this, it 
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is likely that pursuing incompatible values, behaving incongruently with your values or 
having your values violated or challenged could possibly be related to the 
psychological distress experienced in mental health problems. Various psychological 
therapies have recognised this, particularly ACT, and this model particularly argues 
that value incongruent behaviour can lead to psychological distress.  
 
However, this has yet to receive any empirical support with people with mental health 
disorders.  Higgins’s (1987) model of self–discrepancies was put forward as the model 
and methodology to do this as it can be adapted to investigate whether self-
discrepancies in values cause psychological distress. Maio and Rees (2009) has been 
the only study to utilise Higgins’s model in relation to values; however, this was done 
with an undergraduate non-clinical population. 
 
Higgins’s model of self-discrepancy has not been tested in relation to values on a 
clinical population, and therefore the evidence base could not be reviewed in relation 
to this for the current study.  However, Higgins’s self-discrepancy theory has been 
tested in relation to domains of self on various clinical populations (both with physical 
and mental health problems) and therefore a systematic review was undertaken to 
consider the application of Higgins’s theory in recognised clinical populations (such as 
mental health disorders) to see if it has utility in these groups as well as other groups 
(e.g., non-clinical populations such as undergraduates). 
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The systematic review identified 17 studies and overall they found that that there is 
evidence to suggest that people with mental health disorders (particularly depression) 
had greater self-discrepancies than those without. In addition, there appeared to be 
stronger evidence for AI self-discrepancies and psychological distress than AO, and 
those studies that included the AF self-discrepancies also indicated this. There is also 
some evidence, although limited that longitudinal designs involving interventions 
indicate that particular psychological interventions can help to reduce particular self-
discrepancies and in turn psychological distress. However, when considering these 
findings the limitations of the studies must be taken into account. Although, it appears 
that the findings are robust enough to indicate that Higgins’s (1987) model of self-
discrepancies has utility with a clinical population (i.e. people with mental health 
disorders). 
 
In summary, the study aims to utilise two widely tested and empirically supported 
models (e.g. the Schwartz,1992 model of values and the Higgins’s, 1987) self-
discrepancy model) to explore the role of values regarding the psychological distress 
of people with mental health problems. A more detailed description of the current study 
specific aims is detailed below. 
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1.9 INTRODUCTION TO THE CURRENT STUDY 
1.9.1 Hypothesis 
The following two hypotheses will be put forward for the current study: 
 
Hypothesis one: 
a) The mental health groups will hold different central values compared to the 
reference group. 
 
b) The anxiety disorder group will hold different central values from eating disorder 
group. More specifically, the anxiety disorder group’s values will be within the 
conservation quadrant (particularly security, conformity and tradition values). The 
eating disorder group values will be within the self-enhancement quadrant (e.g. 
achievement values). 
 
Hypothesis two: 
a) There will be a difference in value discrepancies between the mental health groups 
and the reference group.  
 
b) The mental health groups will have higher levels of value discrepancies than the 
reference group. 
.  
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c) There will be higher AI value discrepancies than AO value discrepancies in all 
groups. 
 
d) AI value discrepancies will be more associated with depression and AO value 
discrepancies will be more associated with anxiety. 
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                                      CHAPTER 2 – METHOD 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will describe the methods used for this research study, considering the 
design, sample and measures, the procedure for gathering the data, and clinical 
governance. 
 
2.2 DESIGN 
This study will employ quantitative methodology. A cross-sectional design (between 
subjects) was used.  The data will be analysed using multivariate statistics (MANOVA: 
refer analysis section). 
 
2.3 POWER ANALYSIS 
 A power analysis was carried using G Power. The effect size was obtained from a 
similar study (Ferrier & Brewin, 2005) to the current research.  A MANOVA power 
analysis was carried out with and effect size of 0.19, α =. 0.5, 1-β = 0.95, number of 
groups were 3 and response variables were 10 (i.e. 10 values).   A total sample size 
of 90 was calculated. 
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2.4 SAMPLE 
The study population comprised of 122 participants containing three groups of adults 
over the age of 18. Two of the groups were drawn from a clinical population of people 
with mental health problems, more specifically people with anxiety disorders (n=30) or 
eating disorders (n=31).  The anxiety disorder group was drawn from a sample of 
people with either obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) or panic disorder (PD), due 
to convenience sampling (see recruitment section).  The eating disorder group 
comprised of people with an eating disorder.  
 
The fourth group of participants acted as the reference group of people without mental 
health problems (n=61) as these were matched as far as possible to the mental health 
groups in terms of joint sample size, age and gender.  The reference group was 
matched similarly to the samples in Scott and O’ Hara (1993) study, which had a 
similar sample of three groups, two with mental health problems and one control group 
(see systematic review table in Appendix 2).  The reference group was also found to 
hold similar value priorities to that of cross cultural studies that have tested Schwartz’s 
(1992:2012a) model of values (see discussion chapter). This therefore demonstrates 
that the reference group is effective for comparison to the mental health groups. The 
majority of the participants were drawn from a large geographical area in South Wales 
(participants recruited through the NHS and the reference group) and the wider UK 
(for participants recruited via the OCD conference and national charities).   
 
 
 
The participants’ demographic information is outlined in the table below: 
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Table 2.1: Participants’ Demographic information 
 
 
 
 
 Group 
 
 
 
 
N 
 
Gender 
 
Age  
 
 
 
 
Ethnicity 
N 
Female (F) 
Male (M) 
 
 
% 
 
 
Mean (SD) 
 
 
Range 
1: Anxiety Disorders  
 
 30 F: 20 
M: 10 
F: 
67% 
M: 
33% 
 43.9 (12)  18-66  28: White British 
2: Not stated 
2: Eating Disorders  
 
 31 F:30 
M:1 
F: 
97% 
M: 
3% 
27.9 (8.6) 18-58  28: White British 
1: White Irish 
2: Not stated 
3: Reference Group  
 
 61 F: 41 
M: 20 
F: 
67% 
M: 
33% 
43.9 (17.3) 18-70 60:White British 
1: Mixed British 
 
 
Standardised questionnaires were used to establish whether the participants in the 
mental health groups met the criteria for either an anxiety or an eating disorder.  The 
anxiety disorder group used two questionnaires to establish this; one for the PD 
participants and one for the OCD participants.  The Panic Disorder Severity Scale 
(PDSS; see Appendix 3) was used to establish that participants met the criteria for PD.  
The PDSS provides clinical cut-off points and severity guidelines for both people with 
agoraphobia and people without agoraphobia.  The current study did not ascertain 
whether the participants had agoraphobia or not and therefore it will be presumed that 
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the sample does not have agoraphobia. The clinical cut off point is thereby 8, with 
people scoring between 8-10 being considered ‘slightly ill’, those scoring between 11-
15 being considered ‘moderately ill’ and those scoring between 16 or more being 
‘markedly ill’.  Three participants did not meet the cut-off score and were therefore 
excluded from the study.  This left 18 participants, with the majority of these 
participants (n=10) falling within the ‘markedly ill’ range, followed by 7 in the 
‘moderately ill’ range and 1 in the ‘slightly ill’ range.  The mean score was 17.1 
(SD=5.2) which falls within the ‘markedly ill’ descriptor. The scores ranged from 8 to 
25.  
 
The Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (OCI; see Appendix 4) was used to establish 
which participants met the criteria for OCD. The clinical cut-off point for this 
questionnaire is 42. Three people did not reach this cut-off score and were therefore 
excluded from the study, leaving 12 participants.  Participants scores ranged from 46 
to 147 with a mean score of 94.4 (SD=33).  
 
The Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q; see Appendix 5) was used 
to establish whether participants met the criteria for an eating disorder. The EDE-Q 
has clinical cut-off points for the four subscales based on the mean item score.  Thus, 
the restraint subscale has a clinical cut off point of 2.6, the eating concern scale has a 
cut of point of 1.5, the shape concern subscale has a clinical cut-off point of 3.8 and 
the weight concern subscale has a clinical cut off point off 3.  It is not stipulated in the 
EDE=Q guidance how many of these subscales need to meet the cut-off point to 
establish that the person has an eating disorder; the current study has therefore set 
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the criteria that participants scoring below the cut-off point on all four subscales will be 
excluded from the study.  
 
Four participants did not meet this criterion and were therefore excluded.   The majority 
of the sample (n=17) met the cut-off points for all four subscales, 7 people met the cut-
off points for 3 subscales and 7 people met the cut-off score for 1 subscale.  14 
participants met the criteria for restraint subscale, all participants met the criteria for 
eating concern subscale, 25 participants met the criteria for shape concern and 28 
participants met the criteria for weight concern. The eating disorder group scored 
highest in shape concern, then weight concern followed by restraint concern and lastly 
eating concern. 
 
2.4.1 Inclusion/exclusion criteria 
Inclusion 
The inclusion criteria for participants included in this study were as follows:  
 adults aged 18 and above with a diagnosis of obsessive compulsive disorder, 
panic disorder or an eating disorder; 
 
  a group of people from a non-clinical population without a known mental health 
problem. 
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Exclusion 
The exclusion criteria for participants in this study are as follows:  
 adults under the age of 18 years old; 
 
 people who do not reach the clinical cut off point for OCD, PD or an eating 
disorder. This will be established via the standardised questionnaires outlined 
in the measures section;   
 
 people who have not signed their consent form. 
 
2.5: Measures 
The variables under examination in this study are values, anxiety and depression 
levels and levels of OCD, PD or eating disorder.  In addition to the demographic 
questionnaire, three established questionnaires were used to measure these 
variables, and these four components comprised the questionnaire battery.  
 
For the mental health groups, the research pack given to the participants consisted of 
a battery of questionnaires printed over seven sides of A4 paper, alongside the 
consent form (see Appendix 6), participants’ information sheet  (see Appendix 7) and 
a stamped addressed envelope to return the completed questionnaires and consent 
form to the researcher. The battery, in the order that the measures were presented, 
comprised (in different formats, depending on the group) the following six measures: 
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1. Demographic questionnaire: all groups  
2. The Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ): all groups  
3. Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS): mental health groups only 
4. Panic Disorder Severity Scale  (PDSS): PN group only 
5. Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q): ED group only 
6. Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (OCI): OCD group only 
 
However, the reference group (non-clinical) was only asked to complete two 
questionnaires, namely the demographic questionnaire and the PVQ. They were also 
provided with the participant information sheet for their information and the consent 
form to complete.  The reference group was only asked to complete two 
questionnaires, compared to the four in the clinical group, because the purpose of the 
reference group was to act as reference in comparison to the mental health groups to 
test only hypothesis one and not hypothesis two in relation to psychological distress 
(see introduction section 1.10.3). 
 
To reduce any potential burden on participants, measures were selected that had 
suitable psychometric properties (see measures section), while also being relatively 
quick and straight-forward for participants to complete. 
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2.5.1 Demographic questionnaire 
All participants were asked to complete a demographic information sheet.  The 
information collected from this questionnaire included the participant’s age, gender, 
and ethnicity (see Appendix 8). 
 
2.5.2 Values Questionnaire 
2.5.2.1 PVQ 
The PVQ (see Appendix 9) was completed by all participants (n=158) as participants 
values were used to test both hypotheses. The PVQ was adapted in the current study 
to incorporate the Higgins (1987) model of self-discrepancies. The changes made to 
the PVQ for the purpose of this study will be outlined, but first the original PVQ will be 
described.  The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) is an alternative to the SVS (see 
introduction), which has been developed to also measure the ten basic values in 
samples of children from age 11, of the elderly, and of persons not educated in Western 
schools that emphasize abstract, context-free thinking.  The PVQ is thus more 
concrete than the SVS and uses examples of each value; the rating scale is also more 
simplistic.  
 
The PVQ includes short verbal portraits of 40 different people, gender-matched with 
the respondent (Schwartz, 2005b; Schwartz et al., 2001).  Each portrait describes a 
person’s goals, aspirations, or wishes that point implicitly to the importance of a value.  
For example: “Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes 
to do things in his own original way” describes a person for whom self-direction values 
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are important.  For each portrait, respondents answer: “How much like you is this 
person?” Responses from which people can choose are: very much like me, like me, 
somewhat like me, a little like me, not like me, and not like me at all.  Thus, 
respondents’ own values are inferred from their self-reported similarity to people 
described implicitly in terms of particular values.  The number of portraits for each 
value ranges from three (stimulation, hedonism, and power) to six (universalism), 
reflecting the conceptual breadth of the values. The score for the importance of each 
value is the average rating given to these items, all of which were designated a priori 
as markers of a value. The ten values are ranked in terms of importance from the 
highest (1st) to lowest score (10th). 
 
The PVQ has been adapted in various ways for this study.  For example, for this study 
the rating scale (see figure 5) has been changed to: Not at all (1), 2, somewhat (3), 4 
and very much (5).  The rating scale has been changed to incorporate Higgins’s model 
of self-discrepancies (more specifically participants’ actual/own, ideal/own and 
ought/own self-state representations).  This has been achieved by asking the 
participants to answer three questions for each verbal portrait (see figure 2.1): a) How 
much are you like this person? b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person? 
and c) How much should you be like this person?  The scale is devised to test for AI 
discrepancies or AO discrepancies between participants’ values.  
 
 
 
78 
 
Figure 2.1: Example of one of the questions in the adapted PVQ (female version) 
Question Answer 
1) Thinking up new ideas and being 
creative is important to her. She likes to 
do things in her own original way. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this 
person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
 
 
Participants were provided with the following instructions to complete the PVQ:  
Figure 2.2: Instructions displayed on the PVQ 
 
 
The PVQ was calculated for the current study in relation to the ten values and for value 
discrepancies to test the hypotheses.  The ten values in the current study were 
calculated for each participant in the same way as the original PVQ, with the exception 
of only the scores relating to actual domain being calculated (i.e. question a: how much 
Instructions: 
Here we briefly describe some people.  Please read each description and think about how 
much each person:  
 
(a) Is actually like you (e.g. has the beliefs and/or behaves as you actually do in reality). 
(b) Is ideally like you (e.g. has the beliefs and/or behaves as you would ideally wish to). 
(c) Is what you should be like (e.g. has the beliefs and/or behaves as you should do, but do 
not always do in reality) 
 
Put an X in the box to the right that shows how much the person in the description is like you. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers to these questions, so do not take too much time 
considering you answer to the question, just put a X in the box that applies best to you 
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are you like this person?).  For example, the 10 values were calculated by getting a 
mean score of the questionnaire items related to the value.  Conformity is calculated 
by getting a mean score of items 7a, 16a, 28a and 36a on the PVQ (see Appendix 10 
for scoring sheet).  A mean was calculated rather than the sum, as the values were 
comprised of differing numbers of items from the questionnaire.  
 
The ten values in the current study were ranked in terms of importance in the same 
way as the original PVQ; from the highest scoring value (1st) to the lowest (10th), with 
the exception of the current study only ranking the groups 10 values rather than the 
individual participants, as this study was interested in looking at group difference rather 
than individual participants’ differences.  Furthermore the top 3 values were 
considered the groups central values and the remaining 7 were considered the groups 
peripheral values in line with Rokeach’s (1973) model of central and peripheral values 
(see introduction).  
 
The AI and AO value discrepancy scores for each of the 10 values were calculated 
differently in the current study to the original Selves Questionnaire. This is because 
this study was not looking at traits, but rather was looking at values and utilising rating 
scales. The AI score was calculated by subtracting the actual mean item value score 
from the ideal mean item score, and the AO score was similarly calculated by 
subtracting the actual mean item value score from the ought mean item value score. 
For example, (Conformity actual-Conformity ideal =AI Conformity). This method for 
calculating discrepancies was taken from Higgins et al. (1997) Regulatory Focus 
Strength Measure. 
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The PVQ has been found to have good internal reliabilities and good convergence 
with the original SVS (Schwartz, 2005b).  In addition, the PVQ thus far has yielded 
stronger evidence of fit to the model in the countries in which it has been used, 
including Uganda and South Africa (Schwartz et al., 2001). All of the value items have 
demonstrated near equivalence of meaning across cultures in analyses using multi-
dimensional scaling (Schwartz, 2006a). The designers of the European Social Survey 
(ESS) chose the PVQ as the basis for developing a human values scale to include in 
the survey. The ESS version includes 21 PVQ items, with a few revised in order to 
better cover the content of the ten different values. 
 
2.5.3 Distress Questionnaire 
2.5.3.1 HADS 
The HADS was only completed by the mental health groups (n=61) as the HAD was 
only used to test hypothesis two (d) which does not entail a comparison to the 
reference group.  The HADS (Zigmond & Smith, 1983) (see Appendix 11 ) is a 14 item 
self-report questionnaire used to measure a brief state of both anxiety and depression.  
Zigmond and Smith (1983) initially developed this tool to detect anxiety and depression 
in people with physical health problems.  However, it has since been used in a variety 
of both physical and mental health settings to detect levels of anxiety and depression. 
 
The questionnaire consists of seven items related to anxiety and 7 items related to 
depression. Each item on the questionnaire is scored on a 0-3 (not at all, from time to 
time, occasionally, a lot of the time and most of the time) and this means that a person 
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can score between 0 and 21 for either anxiety or depression. The scale used is like a 
Likert scale and therefore the data returned from the HADS is ordinal.  
 
A number of researchers have explored HADS data to establish the cut-off points for 
‘caseness’ of anxiety or depression. Bjelland et al. (2002) completed a review of 747 
identified papers that utilised the HADS and they found that most factor analyses 
demonstrated a two-factor solution in good accordance with the HADS subscales for 
Anxiety (HADS-A) and Depression (HADS-D) respectively.  The correlations between 
the two subscales varied from .40 to .74 (mean .56). Cronbach's alpha for HADS-A 
varied from .68 to .93 (mean .83) and for HADS-D from .67 to .90 (mean .82).  In most 
studies an optimal balance between sensitivity and specificity was achieved when 
caseness was defined by a score of 8 or above on both HADS-A and HADS-D. The 
sensitivity and specificity for both HADS-A and HADS-D of approximately 0.80 were 
very similar to the sensitivity and specificity achieved by the General Health 
Questionnaire (GHQ).  Correlations between HADS and other commonly used 
questionnaires were in the range 0.49 to 0.83. 
 
2.5.4 Establishment of Clinical Groups 
The following questionnaires (PDSS, EDE-Q and OCI) were only used to establish 
whether the participants met the criteria for either the anxiety disorder or eating 
disorder group; these measures were not used in statistical analysis to test the 
hypotheses. 
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2.5.4.1 PDSS 
The PDSS was completed by participants with PD (n=18) to establish that they met 
the criteria for the anxiety disorder group. This measure was developed by Shear et 
al. (1997) (see Appendix 3) to measure severity of panic disorder. The PDSS is a 
clinician-administered interview, intended to assess severity and considered a reliable 
tool for monitoring of treatment outcome. For this study, it will not be clinician-
administered; it will be used as a self-report measure.  There is a PDSS self–report 
measure (PDSS-SR), but it consists of only five items, having excluded the items 
assessing social and occupational interference.  
 
The PDSS consists of seven items, each rated on a 5-point scale, which ranges from 
0 to 4. The items assess panic frequency, distress during panic, panic-focused 
anticipatory anxiety, phobic avoidance of situations, phobic avoidance of physical 
sensations, impairment in work functioning, and impairment in social functioning. The 
overall assessment is made by a total score, which is calculated by summing the 
scores for all seven items. The total scores range from 0 to 28.  Scores 9 and above 
suggest the need for a formal diagnostic assessment. 
 
Furukawa et al. (2009) devised an evidence-based guideline for developing the 
scores. The interpretation of the PDSS total score differed according to the presence 
or absence of agoraphobia. When the patients were not agoraphobic, score ranges 0-
1 corresponded with "Normal," 2-5 with "Borderline," 6-9 with "Slightly ill," 10-13 with 
"Moderately ill," and 14 and above with "Markedly ill." When the patients were 
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agoraphobic, score ranges 3-7 meant "Borderline ill," 8-10 "Slightly ill," 11-15 
"Moderately ill," and 16 and above "Markedly ill."   
 
Shear et al. (1997) administered the PDSS to 186 participants with panic disorder. 
Although the study found relatively low internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.65), significant correlations between the PDSS and similar measures were found, 
demonstrating acceptable convergent validity. Despite the significant results, however, 
some correlations were lower than might be expected (i.e. significant correlations 
ranged from 0.15 to 0.78). In a subsequent study evaluating 54 participants with 
current panic disorder, Shear et al. (2001) reported that the PDSS demonstrated 
acceptable test–retest and inter-rater reliability, and high internal consistency (i.e. 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.88). The PDSS also showed evidence of good convergent 
validity, correlating moderately with comparable measures such as the Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993; r = 0.67) and Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; 
Peterson & Reiss, 1993; r = 0.54).   
 
Furthermore, the PDSS has been widely used (e.g. Austin & Richards, 2006; Carrera 
et al., 2006; Huppert et al., 2006; Pollack et al., 2007) and translated into multiple 
languages (e.g. Spanish, Finnish, Italian, Korean; Lim et al., 2007; Shear et al., 2001). 
When the reliability and validity of the PDSS were evaluated after its translation into 
other languages, results again showed acceptable reliability and validity as well as 
sensitivity to change (Lim et al., 2007; Monkul et al., 2004; Yamamoto et al., 2004). 
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2.5.4. 2 EDE-Q 
The EDE-Q was completed by participants with eating disorders (n=31) to establish 
whether they met the criteria for the eating disorder group.  The EDE-Q 6th Version 
(Fairburn, 2008; see Appendix 5) was adapted from the Eating Disorder Examination 
interview (EDE-Q). The EDE-Q is a 41 item self-report questionnaire. It retains the 
same format of the EDE-Q including the 4 subscales (restraint, eating concern, shape 
concern and weight concern) and a global score. It also measures behaviours over a 
28 day period and retains the scoring system of 0-6 with 0 indicating no days, 1 = 1-5 
days, 2 = 6-12 days, 3 = 13-15 days, 4 = 16-22 days, 5 = 23-27 days and 6 being 
every day.  
 
Berg et al., (2012) carried out a study which systematically reviewed the reliability of 
scores on the EDE and the EDE-Q with the aim of examining the validity of their use 
as measures of eating disorder symptoms. They identified 10 studies that examined 
the EDE-Q and found the data provide support for the test–retest reliability of the EDE-
Q subscale scores and of scores on the following behaviour frequency items: objective 
bulimic episodes, self-induced vomiting and laxative misuse.  However, there is 
preliminary support for the test–retest reliability of scores on the items that assess the 
frequency of subjective bulimic episodes, objective overeating episodes and diuretic 
use. These data provide support for the temporal stability of the subscale scores over 
5 to 14 months, but scores on the behavioural frequency items do not demonstrate 
temporal stability. 
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2.5.4.3 Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (OCI) 
The OCI was completed by participants with OCD (n=12) to establish whether they 
met the criteria for the anxiety disorder group. The OCI (Foa et al., 1998) (see 
Appendix 4) consists of 42 items composing 7 subscales: Washing, Checking, 
Doubting, Ordering, Obsessing (i.e. having obsessional thoughts), Hoarding, and 
Mental Neutralizing. Each item is rated on a 5-point (0-4) (0 = Never and 4 = Almost 
Always) Likert scale of symptom frequency and associated distress. 
 
Excellent internal consistency has been found for the OCI Total frequency (0.93) and 
Total distress (0.92) scores in a sample of patients with OCD (Foa et al, 1998). Internal 
consistency ranged from 0.72-0.96 for sub-scale frequency ratings and 0.68-0.94 for 
sub-scale distress ratings. Foa et al (1998) also found the OCI Total scores to have 
high test-retest reliability in an OCD sample (r = 0.84 for Total frequency and r = 0.87 
for Total distress) and in non-patient controls (r = 0.90 for Total frequency and r = 0.89 
for Total distress).  Sub-scale scores also demonstrated high test-retest reliability in 
an OCD sample (ranging from r = 0.79-0.95 for sub-scale frequency scores and r = 
0.77-0.97 for sub-scale distress scores) and in non-patient controls (ranging from r = 
0.82-0.90 for sub-scale frequency scores and r = 0.68-0.89 for sub-scale distress 
scores). The total frequency and total distress OCI scores also discriminated between 
those with OCD and those with PTSD, Generalised Social Phobia or no anxiety. This 
was also found for all sub-scales except Hoarding. 
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2.6 RECRUITMENT 
The participants in the clinical groups were recruited via convenience sampling from 
various mental health services within two NHS local health boards, including 
Community Mental Health Teams (CMHTs), the Eating Disorder Service and from two 
self–help groups for people with OCD and PD.  Participants were also recruited from 
a national OCD conference and from two national charities via an advert on the 
Internet (see Appendix 12). Twenty five research packs were also sent to participants 
on one of the charities’ research database via a contact at the charity.  The adverts 
provided potential participants with basic information about the research and details 
to contact the researcher if they were interested in taking part via email or by 
telephone.  The researcher then sent research packs by post to participants who had 
contacted her. 301 research packs were sent out and 73 participants took part in the 
research. A further 12 were excluded from the study due to falling below the cut-off 
score for the measure (n=9) or because a large amount of data was missing (N=3), 
leaving a total sample size of 122.  They were recruited from the above populations 
because of the nature of the current study (see introduction). 
 
The reference group was obtained from a community sample. They were randomly 
selected by the community panel co-ordinator and then sent an email asking them to 
take part in the study via Psychsurveys online.  250 invitations were sent to the 
participants selected in the community panel and 76 participants took part. Only 61 
participants were included in the study as this number was only needed to match the 
mental health groups’ sample size. 
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2.7 PROCEDURE 
As stated in the recruitment section above, the participants in the mental health groups 
were recruited from various mental health services, self-help groups, an OCD 
conference and two national charities.  For the CMHTs, eating disorder service and 
self-help groups, the researcher gave the research packs to the clinical contacts/local 
collaborators (i.e. nominated mental health professionals within the above services or 
self help groups) to give to the participants.  For the OCD conference, the researcher 
was provided with a research stand to recruit potential participants during the 
conference breaks.  If participants were interested in taking part in the research they 
were provided with a research pack including a stamped addressed envelope to return 
the questionnaires and consent form in their own time.  
 
Participants were also recruited via two national charities by adverts on their website 
and monthly newsletter (see Appendix 12).  Twenty five research packs were also sent 
to participants at one of the charities research database via a contact at the charity. 
The adverts provided potential participants with basic information about the research 
and details to contact the researcher if they were interested in taking part. The 
researcher then sent research packs by post to participants who contacted her. 
 
The research packs for the mental health groups contained the following items: 
participant information sheets (see Appendix 7); consent forms (see Appendix 6); a 
battery of questionnaires (see Measures section) and a stamped addressed envelope 
with which to return the completed questionnaires to the researcher.   
88 
 
 
On the participant information sheet, the participants were asked to complete the 
questionnaire as soon as possible; they were also informed that the questionnaires 
should take no longer than half an hour to forty five minutes to complete and that they 
were anonymised. Once the researcher received the completed research packs from 
the participants, the consent forms were separated from the questionnaires to ensure 
anonymity.  The data from the questionnaires was then entered into the Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences Version 20 (SPSS 20) for analysis. 
 
The reference group was obtained from a community sample.  Participants were 
randomly selected by the community panel co-ordinator, and the researcher then sent 
an email to the selected participants asking them to take part in the study on line via 
Psychsurveys. The participants were also provided with a participant information sheet 
(see Appendix 13) and consent form (see appendix 14). Once the participants had 
completed the questionnaires the data was entered into SPSS for analysis. 
 
2.8 DATA ANALYSIS 
The current study employed quantitative methodology because the data (people’s 
values, self–discrepancies and psychological distress levels) is being obtained via 
standardised questionnaires (see measures section).  
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The quantitative data was inputted into SPSS, which was then used for storage and 
analysis.  The data was analysed using mainly multivariate statistics (MANOVA) as 
the hypotheses was testing whether there were any differences between independent 
groups (i.e. the anxiety disorder, eating disorder and reference group) on more than 
one continuous dependent variable (i.e. Schwartz’s 10 values) simultaneously.  Paired 
Sample t-tests were also used for hypothesis 2 (c) as opposed to a MANOVA because 
it was it was testing whether just two means are different (e.g. the actual:ideal grand 
mean and the actual:ought grand mean), and  not several means ( e.g. 10 values).   
 
A Paired Sample t-test was used as opposed to an Independent Sample t-test as the 
same participants underwent the same conditions (e.g. completing the PVQ).  A 
Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient (one tailed) was used for hypothesis 2(d) as this 
was investigating the relationship between self-discrepancies in values and 
psychological distress. A one tailed as opposed to a two tailed Spearman’s correlation 
was used as the hypothesis is stating the direction of the outcome.  A Spearman’s was 
used as opposed to the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient as the data was not normally 
distributed. 
 
2.9 CLINICAL GOVERNANCE 
2.9.1 Informed consent 
All potential participants were provided with participant information sheets (see 
Appendix 7 and 13) explaining the exact nature of the study and what taking part in 
the research involved.  Participation in the study was entirely voluntary for participants.  
Issues of informed consent were fully explained. Participants were made aware that 
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they could withdraw from the study at any time, and that participation/nonparticipation 
would not affect the mental health’s groups’ treatment in anyway.  
 
Participants from the mental health groups were asked to sign a consent form and a 
paper copy of the consent form, and participants from the reference group were asked 
to provide consent by clicking the relevant box on the online survey (see Appendix 14) 
before completing the questionnaires.  Participants were also informed in the 
participation sheet that, before taking part in the research, they could discuss and/or 
ask any questions about the study to the researcher or her supervisors (via telephone 
or email) if they wished to do so.  
 
2.9.2 Anonymity and confidentiality  
The participants were not asked to provide any personal details whilst completing the 
questionnaires, thus ensuring anonymity. The participants from the clinical groups 
were provided with an SAE to return the questionnaire to the researcher.  Once the 
researcher had received the research packs, she separated the consent forms from 
the questionnaires to ensure anonymity was maintained. The questionnaires and 
consent forms were stored separately and securely at the researchers’ training course 
base in a locked filing cabinet. 
 
Participants from the reference group are members of a research community panel, 
so have given permission for their contact details to be passed on to potential 
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participants. Their names and email addresses were stored securely on 
Psychsurveys, which was password protected. 
 
2.9.3 Participants’ well being 
It was not anticipated that the research would cause participants to become 
distressed. However, there was also a possibility that completing this questionnaire 
may have become distressing for a few people. If this were to happen, the participants 
were advised via the participants’ information sheet that they could contact the 
researchers’ Academic Supervisor, who was a Consultant Clinical Psychologist, to 
discuss the issues raised in more depth. 
 
2.10 ETHICAL APPROVAL 
Authorisation to conduct the research was obtained through application to the NHS 
Research and Development Department of the Local Health Board. After reviewing 
the proposal, the LHB’s Research and Development Committee granted approval for 
the study to be completed (see Appendix 15), Approval was also granted from the 
Local Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix 16).  Ethical approval was also 
granted from a University Ethics Board for the reference group to be obtained from the 
community panel (see Appendix 17). 
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                                      CHAPTER 3 – RESULTS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will describe the results of the study. The chapter starts by explaining the 
steps taken to ensure the quality of the data was sufficient for statistical tests used.  
For example, this section details how the data was screened for missing data and 
outliers, then how the data met the assumptions for conducting the particular statistical 
tests.  The descriptive statistics will then be outlined for the sample and measures 
used.  The chapter then moves on to the statistical analysis, where the results will be 
reported in relation to the two main hypotheses.  
 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS, Version 20) was used for data 
screening, descriptive and inferential statistics and to test the assumptions for the 
multivariate statistics.   
 
3.2. DATA SCREENING 
This section describes how the data was prepared for statistical analyses by screening 
for missing data, outliers and by checking that the data met the assumptions for 
conducting the statistical tests   
 
3.2.1 Missing Data Imputation 
The complete dataset was screened for missing values, and the following section 
outlines how missing values were handled.  The missing values were coded as ‘666’ 
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in SPSS to distinguish them from the other data. Firstly, the data was visually scanned 
for missing data and as a result two cases (from the eating disorder group) were 
removed from the data set as they contained a large amount of missing data for the 
PVQ.  
 
Missing Values Analysis (MVA) was conducted on the dataset, which showed that 
there were no variables that had 5% or more missing for the PVQ and for the HADS 
Variables.  
 
It was found that data was both Missing Not at Random (MNAR) and Missing at 
Random (MAR).  The MNAR data was where one participant did not complete the 
ideal and ought ratings for each question on the PVQ, but did complete the actual 
ratings. Therefore, a ListWise Deletion approach was taken, and the participant's data 
was included to test Hypothesis One, but the relevant data was excluded for 
Hypotheses Two as this is in relation to self-discrepancies (PVQ) where ideal and 
ought data was missing.  
 
The remaining missing data was Missing at Random (MAR). Thus, one participant’s 
missed three questions out at random, four participants did not complete one 
question(s) out at random, and two participants did not complete part of one question 
(e.g. PVQ5a).  The HADS data for one participant’s data was also MAR as they did 
not complete one question.  Rubin et al. (2007) suggests expected Maximisation is the 
most effective method for handling missing data when over 5% of the data is missing; 
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however, the MAR data in the PVQ and HADS is less than 5% and therefore EM was 
not used for the missing data in this study. 
 
3.2.2 Outliers 
Extreme values analysis was conducted using the Missing Value Analysis and no 
extreme values were found in either the PVQ or HADS. 
 
For the PVQ raw data, 2 outliers were found when screening for outliers via inspection 
of boxplots and histograms on SPSS.  A value of 44 was found which was changed to 
4 and a value of 6 was found which was changed to 5. The grand mean data for each 
value was also screened and two outliers were indicated for Actual:Ideal (AI) and 
Actual:Ought (AI) data sets.  These outliers were changed to the mean plus two 
standard deviations as suggested by Field (2009).  No outliers were found for the 
HADS. 
 
3.2.3 Tests of Multivariate Assumptions 
To test that the data meets the assumptions for conducting multivariate statistics (e.g. 
MANOVA), the PVQ and HADS data was best tested for nine assumptions as detailed 
below. 
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1) The two or more dependent variables should be measured at the interval or ratio 
level. 
 
The data from the PVQ and HADS are interval data as participants were asked to rate 
each question on a scale of 1-5 or 0-3 respectively.  Although, there has been much 
controversy about whether single item rating scales are interval or ordinal data (Field, 
2009), because for it to be interval data there must be equal intervals between the 
points on the scale (i.e. on the HADS, the scale is from 0-3 and the difference between 
and 1 and a 2 must be the same as between a 2 and 3) and this can be difficult to 
ascertain.   However, it is common practice in research to consider these scales as 
interval data in order to carry out statistical analysis.  For example, several of the 
studies outlined in the systematic review (see introduction chapter) have also made 
the assumption that their dependent variables are measured by interval data in order 
to carry out a MANOVA.  For example, Strauman, et al. (2001), Kinderman & Bentall 
(1996), Bentall et al. (2005) and Strauman (1989) used the Beck Depression Inventory 
which is based on 0-3 scale, similar to the HADS.  
 
2) The independent variable should consist of two or more categorical, independent 
groups. 
The independent variable was three independent groups, namely the anxiety disorder 
group, eating disorder group and reference group. 
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3) There should be independence of observations 
There was no relationship between the observations in each group or between the 
groups as there were different participants in each group and no participant was in 
more than one group. 
 
 
4) There should be an adequate sample size. 
Power analysis (see method section) reveals that there is an adequate sample size. 
In addition, there are more cases in each group than the number of dependent 
variables being analysed.  Thus, a power analysis (see method chapter) indicated a 
total sample size of 90; the current study has a total sample size that is larger than this 
(n-122), therefore this assumption has been met. 
 
 
5) There are no univariate or multivariate outliers 
As discussed in section 3.2.3.2, outliers were identified and changed. 
 
6) There is multivariate normality 
 
The normality of the variables was assessed through examination of histograms and 
also using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test (K-S test) (See Appendix 19).  The 
data was examined at the group level as Field (2009) suggests that the K-S tests are 
not as effective on a larger sample.  It was found that about a quarter of the data was 
not normally distributed.  
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In order to standardise the reported values for skewness and kurtosis (Appendix 18), 
they were converted to z-scores by dividing the standard error of skewness or kurtosis, 
as recommended by Field (2009).  This has been done on the group data as Field 
(2009) advises that tests of Skewness and Kurtosis are not as effective on large 
samples.  Therefore Skewness and Kurtosis have been tested on the group data for 
each of the ten values on the PVQ and for anxiety and depression in the HADS.  Field 
(2009) suggests that z-scores greater than 1.96 for both skewness and kurtosis should 
be considered significant at the p<0.05 level. It was found that the majority of the data 
was not skewed or kurtotic for the PVQ and HADS but that some were (see Appendix 
18).  For example, in one group (groups differed for each value), tradition, 
benevolence, hedonism, achievement and power were skewed. 
 
 
Therefore the normality assumption was considered not to be met. Transformation of 
the data was considered but was not undertaken for several reasons. Firstly, 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2006) argue that when the scale is meaningful and widely 
used, as the PVQ is, then transformation can hinder interpretation.  Secondly, the 
above normality tests were done on grouped data (means of the values) and with 
grouped data Tabachnick and Fidell (2006) argue that “the assumption of normality is 
evaluated with respect to the sampling distribution of means ( not the distribution of 
scores)  and the Central Limit Theorem predicts normality with decently sized 
samples” (p86).  Thirdly, Grayson (2004) warns against transforming the data as, for 
example, log transformation changes from the  arithmetic means to geometric means 
and transformation also means that you are addressing a different construct to the one 
originally measured, which has implications for interpreting the data (Grayson, 2004). 
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Furthermore, it is argued that F tests (i.e. MANOVA) are fairly robust even when the 
assumptions are broken (Field, 2009).  Thus, Finch (2005) compared parametric tests 
(I.e. MANOVA) to nonparametric tests when assumptions for normality are violated 
and found that the parametric test outperformed the nonparametric tests in type1 error 
and power 
 
 
7) There is a linear relationship between each pair of dependent variables for each 
group of the independent variable. 
Inspection of the scatterplot matrix indicated that there is linearity for each pair of 
dependent variables. In addition, on the correlation matrix (see assumption 9 below) 
the variables are correlated and are therefore linear.  
 
8) There is homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices  
 
To test the assumption of Homogeneity of variance, Box‘s M test of equality of 
covariance matrices was carried out (see Appendix 20) and it was found that the actual 
and ideal and ought data was not significant (p>.057, p>.39, p<.017 respectively) at 
the p<.001 level (as suggested by Field, 2009). The HADS data was also not 
significant p>.14.  Therefore the data has met the assumption of Homogeneity of 
Variance. 
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9) There is no multicollinearity 
There was no multicollinearity, as the dependent variables (i.e. 10 values) were not 
too highly correlated (e.g. above 0.9; see table 3.10 in descriptive statitsics). The 
highest correlation was at 0.58. 
 
 
3.2.4 Statistics summary 
The data has been found to meet all of the assumptions apart multivariate normality 
have been met for MANOVA.  The option of transforming the data was considered as 
some of the data is not normally distributed, but this was not carried out for several 
reasons which have been highlighted above on assumption six. 
 
3.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The descriptive data will be presented to describe, illustrate and summarise the data 
collected from the demographic information for the participants and for the measures 
used (e.g. the PVQ and HADS).  
 
3.3.1 Participants 
Data was collected from three groups of participants: the Anxiety Disorder group, 
Eating Disorder group and the Reference group. All demographic information collected 
can be viewed in Table 3.1. There were 122 participants in total; 30 participants in the 
anxiety disorder group, 31 in the eating disorder group and 61 in the reference group.  
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Table 3.1: Demographic information of the participants in the study 
 
  
 
 
 
Group 
 
 
 
 
N 
 
Gender 
 
Age 
 
 
 
 
Ethnicity 
N 
Female (F) 
Male (M) 
 
 
% 
 
 
Mean (sd) 
 
 
Range 
1: Anxiety Disorders  
 
 30 F: 20 
M: 10 
F: 67% 
M: 33% 
 43.9 (12)  18-66 28: White British 
2: Not stated 
2: Eating Disorders  
 
 31 F:30 
M:1 
F: 97% 
M: 3% 
27.9 (8.6) 18-58 28: White British 
1: White Irish 
2: Not stated 
3: Reference Group  
 
 61 F: 41 
M: 20 
F: 67% 
M: 33% 
43.9 (17.3) 18-70 60: White British 
1: Mixed British 
Total 122 F: 91 
M: 31 
F: 75% 
M: 25% 
39.8 
(15.8) 
18-70 116: White British 
1: White Irish 
1: Mixed British 
4: Not stated 
 
 
In the anxiety disorder group there were 20 females (67%) and 10 male (33%), in the 
eating disorder group there were 20 (97%) females and one male (3%) and in the 
reference group there were 41 females (67%) and 20 males (33%).   In total there 
were 91 (75%) females and 31 males (25%).  The participants in the anxiety disorder 
group were aged between 18 and 66 with a mean age of 43.9 (sd=12), participants in 
the eating disorder group were aged between 18 and 58 with a mean age of 27.9 
(sd=8.6) and participants in the reference group were aged between 18 and 70 and 
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with a mean age of 43.9 (17.3).  The total sample age ranged from 18-70 with a mean 
age of 39.8 (SD=15.8). 
 
A one-way ANOVA was used to look at differences between the groups in age and 
gender. See section 3.2.3. in this chapter for how the data met the assumptions for 
this test (e.g. normality distribution, homogeneity of variance as group sizes are 
unequal and the independence and interval assumption) 
 
One-way ANOVAs indicated that there were group differences for age, F (2,119) 
=14.59, p<.001. A Bonferroni post-hoc test indicated that the eating disorder group 
was significantly different in age to the anxiety disorder group p<.001 and the 
reference group p<.001, but the anxiety disorder group and the reference group were 
not significantly different p=1.00.  In relation to gender, similar group differences were 
found, F (2,119) =5.78, p=.004.  Thus, the eating disorder group was significantly 
different in age to the anxiety disorder group p=.018 and the reference group p=.006, 
but the anxiety disorder group and the reference group were not significantly different 
p=1.00. Thus, the eating disorder group appears to be statistically different in age and 
gender to both the anxiety disorder and reference group, but the anxiety disorder and 
reference group did not differ. This reflects a typical trend of people with eating 
disorders being predominantly young females (Smink et al., 2012).  
 
The majority of the total sample was white British (n=116), 1 was white Irish, 1 was 
mixed British and 4 did not state their ethnicity.  28 participants in the anxiety disorder 
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group were white British and 2 did not state their ethnicity. The eating disorder group 
had 28 participants who were white British, 1 participant who was white Irish and one 
participant who did not state their ethnicity. Sixty participants in the reference group 
were white British and one participant described themselves as ‘mixed British’.  
 
 
3.3.2. Measures 
Descriptive data for the two dependent variables, the PVQ and the HADS, are 
presented in the tables 3.2 to 3.14. The mean scores, standard deviations, and range 
obtained from the three groups are presented for each measure.   
 
 
3.3.2.1. PVQ 
The PVQ descriptive data will be presented in 3 sections. The first section will present 
the data for the actual, ideal and ought self concept and self guides and the second 
section will present the actual, ideal and ought value priorities between and within the 
three groups.  The third section will present the data for the Actual:Ideal (AI) and 
Actual:Ought (AO) value discrepancies. 
 
 
3.3.2.1.2 PVQ descriptive data 
Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 presents the mean, standard deviation and range for each 
value for each group. This will be presented for the Actual, ideal and ought scores.  
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Table 3.2 Descriptive data for the actual values for each group: Mean (standard 
deviation) and range  
 
  
 
 
Values 
 
Values 
Anxiety 
Disorder Group 
 
Eating Disorder  
Group 
Reference 
Group 
 
Mean 
 
sd 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
 
sd 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
 
sd 
 
Range 
Conformity 3.71 85 1.75-
5.00 
3.44 92 1.00-
4.75 
 3.37   .82  1.25-
5.00  
Tradition 2.96 .84 1.50-
4.50 
2.78 .87 1.25-
4.50 
2.56 .70 1.25-5.00 
Benevolence 3.88 .68 2.75-
5.00 
3.88 .85 1.25-
5.00 
3.55 .70 2.25-5.00 
Universalism 3.74 .70 2.33-
5.00 
3.46 .60 2.33-
5.00 
3.66 .66 2.33-5.00 
Self-
direction 
3.29 .98 1.00-
5.00 
3.60 .99 1.75-
5.00 
3.93 .58 2.75-5.00 
Stimulation 1.84 .82 1.00-
4.33 
2.34 1.18 1.00-
4.67 
2.80 .82 1.33-4.67 
Hedonism 2.18 .98 1.00-
4.67 
2.42 1.11 1.00-
4.67 
3.05 .50 1.00-4.00 
Achievement 2.19 .96 1.00-
5.00 
3.21 1.38 1.00-
5.00 
2.96 1.07 1.00-5.00 
Power 1.89 .81 1.00-
3.67 
2.06 1.38 1.00-
5.00 
2.96 1.07 1.00-5.00 
Security 3.36 .70 2.20-
5.00 
2.84 .56 1.20-
4.20 
3.26 .71 1.80-5.00 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive data for the ideal values for each group: Mean (standard 
deviation) and range  
 
  
 
 
Values 
Anxiety 
Disorder Group 
Eating 
Eating Disorder  
Group 
Reference 
Group 
 
Mean 
 
Sd 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
 
Sd 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
 
Sd 
 
Range 
Conformity 3.53 .85 2.00-
5.00 
3.39 .79 
 
1.75-
4.75 
 
3.23 .77 1.50-
5.00  
  
Tradition 3.01 .84 1.50-
4.75 
3.03 .61 1.67-
4.25 
2.75 .80 1.50-
5.00 
Benevolence 4.28 .80 1.50-
5.00 
4.39 .60 2.50-
5.00 
4.22 .59 2.50-
5.00 
Universalism 4.14 .58 2.50-
5.00 
4.09 .48 2.83-
4.83 
4.21 .57 2.50-
5.00 
Self-direction 4.05 .76 1.50-
5.00 
4.17 .55 3.00-
5.00 
4.20 .55 2.50-
5.00 
Stimulation 3.21 1.0
1 
1.00-
5.00 
3.70 .87 1.33-
5.00 
3.65 .85 1.67-
5.00 
Hedonism 3.72 .85 1.67-
5.00 
3.80 .83 2.33-
5.00 
3.03 .59 1.00-
5.00 
Achievement 2.99 .99 1.00-
5.00 
3.56 1.02 1.00-
5.00 
2.97 1.06 1.00-
5.00 
Power 2.23 .76 1.00-
3.67 
2.50 .76 1.00-
4.33 
2.27 .81 1.00-
4.33 
Security 3.39 .76 2.20-
5.00 
3.49 .55 2.40-
4.60 
3.49 .64 2.00-
4.80 
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Table 3.4 Descriptive data for the ought values for each group: Mean (standard 
deviation) and range  
  
  
 
Values 
Anxiety Disorder 
Group 
Eating 
Eating Disorder  
Group 
Reference Group 
 
Mean 
 
Sd 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
 
Sd 
 
Range 
 
 
Mean 
 
Sd 
 
Range 
Conformity 3.64 .63 2.00-
5.00 
3.40 
 
.66 2.50-
4.75 
3.41 .74 1.50-
4.75 
Tradition 2.90 .82 1.75-
5.00 
3.19 .35 1.75-
4.25 
2.77 .78 1.25-
5.00 
Benevolence 4.26. .60 3.00-
5.00 
4.33 .56 3.00-
5.00 
4.22 .56 2.50-
5.00 
Universalism 4.29 .59 2.60-
5.00 
4.16 .54 2.83-
5.00 
4.28 .56 2.50-
5.00 
Self-direction 3.95 .77 1.50-
5.00 
3.98 .59 2.50-
5.00 
3.91 .48 3.00-
5.00 
Stimulation 3.21 .99 1.00-
5.00 
3.56 .73 1.00-
5.00 
3.39 .78 1.67-
5.00 
Hedonism 3.48 .94 1.00-
5.00 
3.72 .64 2.67-
5.00 
3.02 .56 1.00-
4.33 
Achievement 3.93 .94 1.00-
5.00 
4.41 .89 2.00-
5.00 
3.66 .98 1.00-
5.00 
Power 2.17 .90 1.00-
5.00 
2.49 .63 1.00-
3.67 
2.13 .71 1.00-
4.00 
Security 3.45 .69 2.00-
5.00 
3.62 .56 2.60-
4.60 
3.56 .57 2.00-
5.00 
 
 
3.3.2.1.3 Value priorities for the anxiety disorder, eating disorder and reference 
group. 
This section will describe the value priorities for the three groups in relation to the 
actual, ideal and ought value domains. The Values are ranked in accordance with the 
means of each Value for each group from 1- 10, 1 being the most important (i.e. largest 
mean) and 10 being the least important (i.e. smallest mean). The top three highlighted 
values are considered as the group’s 'central' values and the remaining values are 
considered as 'peripheral' values (see method section). Only the central values will be 
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discussed in relation to the group’s values as these are the values that been found to 
be mostly closely related to the core self and most strongly motivate behaviour (see 
introduction section).  The value priorities will firstly be presented between groups and 
then within groups. A comparison of the value priorities will then be made to the cross-
cultural data obtained for Schwartz’s model of values to illustrate the quality of the 
data. 
 
3.3.2.1.3.1 Between group value priorities for the actual, ideal and ought domain 
Table 3.5 below presents the anxiety disorder, eating disorder and reference group’s 
value priorities for the actual value domain.  
 
Table 3.5:  Value priorities for each group in the actual value domain 
Rank Anxiety Disorder  Eating Disorder Reference group 
1 Benevolence (3.88) Benevolence (3.88)  Self-direction 3.93) 
2  Universalism (3.74)  Self-direction(3.60)  Universalism(3.66) 
3 Conformity (3.71)  Universalism (3.46) Benevolence (3.55) 
4  Security (3.36)  Conformity (3.44)  Conformity(3.27) 
5  Self-direction (3.29)  Achievement (3.21)  Security (3.26) 
6  Tradition (2.96)  Security (2.84)  Hedonism (3.05) 
7  Hedonism (2.18)  Tradition (2.78)  Achievement (2.96) 
8  Achievement (2.18)  Hedonism (2.42)  Stimulation (2.80) 
9  Power (1.89)  Stimulation (2.34)  Tradition (2.56) 
10  Stimulation (1.84)  Power (2.06)  Power (2.40) 
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Table 3.5 presents the central values that the 3 groups either share or hold alone. The 
anxiety disorder group holds conformity on its own and shares benevolence and 
universalism with the eating disorder and reference group.  The eating disorder group 
shares self-direction with the reference group and benevolence and universalism with 
both the anxiety disorder and reference group.  The reference group similarly shares 
benevolence and universalism with the anxiety disorder and eating disorder group and 
shares self-direction with the eating disorder group. Thus, benevolence and 
universalism are held commonly to all groups, and conformity is held only by the 
anxiety disorder group, with the eating disorder and reference sharing self-direction. 
 
Table 3.6 below presents the anxiety disorder, eating disorder and reference group’s 
value priorities for the ideal  value domain. 
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Table 3.6:  Value priorities for each group in the ideal value domain 
 
Rank Anxiety Disorder  Eating Disorder Reference group 
1 Benevolence (4.28) Benevolence (4.39)  Benevolence (4.22) 
2  Universalism (4.14)  Self-direction(4.17)  Universalism(4.21) 
3 Self-direction (4.05)  Universalism (4.09) Self-direction (4.20) 
4  Hedonism (3.72)  Hedonism (3.80)  Stimulation (3.65) 
5  Conformity (3.53)  Stimulation (3.70)  Security (3.49) 
6  Security (3.39)  Achievement (3.56)  Conformity( 3.23) 
7  Stimulation (3.21) Security (3.49)  Hedonism (3.03) 
8  Tradition (3.01) Conformity (3.39)  Achievement (2.97)  
9  Achievement (2.99) Tradition (3.03)  Tradition (2.75) 
10  Power (2.23)  Power (2.50)  Power (2.27) 
 
 
The anxiety disorder, eating disorder and reference group all share the same three 
central values, although they are in slightly different order. They all share benevolence 
as top values and followed by universalism and then self-direction for the anxiety 
disorder group and the reference group, but for the eating disorder group it is self-
direction followed by universalism. 
 
Table 3.7 below presents the anxiety disorder, eating disorder and reference group’s 
value priorities for the ought  value domain.  
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Table 3.7:  Value priorities for each group in the ought value domain 
 
Rank Anxiety Disorder  Eating Disorder Reference group 
1  Universalism (4.29) Achievement (4.41)  Universalism (4.28) 
2 Benevolence (4.26)  Benevolence (4.33) Benevolence (4.22) 
3 Self-direction (3.95)  Universalism (4.16) Self-direction (3.91) 
4 Achievement (3.93)  Self-direction (3.98) Achievement (3.66) 
5 Conformity (3.64)   Hedonism (3.72) Security (3.56)  
6 Hedonism (3.48)  Security (3.62)  Conformity (3.41) 
7 Security (3.45) Stimulation (3.56) Stimulation (3.39) 
8 Stimulation (3.21) Conformity (3.40) Hedonism (3.02) 
9 Tradition (2.90) Tradition (3.19) Tradition (2.77) 
10 Power (2.17) Power (2.49) Power (2.13) 
 
 
Table 3.7 illustrates similarly to the Ideal values, the anxiety disorder group and 
reference group hold the same central values but the eating disorder group holds 
achievement alone, but shares benevolence and universalism with the anxiety 
disorder and reference group. 
 
3.3.2.1.3.2 Within group value priorities for the actual, ideal and ought value 
domains 
Table 3.8 below presents the anxiety disorder group’s value priorities for the actual, 
ideal and ought value domains. 
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Table 3.8:  Value priorities for the anxiety disorder group in the actual, ideal and 
ought value domain 
 
Rank Actual  Ideal Ought  
1 Benevolence (3.88) Benevolence (4.28)  Universalism (4.29) 
2  Universalism (3.74)  Universalism (4.14) Benevolence (4.26) 
3 Conformity (3.71) Self-direction (4.05) Self-direction (3.95) 
4  Security (3.36)  Hedonism (3.72) Achievement (3.93) 
5  Self-direction (3.29)  Conformity (3.53) Conformity (3.64)  
6  Tradition (2.96)  Security (3.39) Hedonism (3.48) 
7  Hedonism (2.18)  Stimulation (3.21) Security (3.45) 
8  Achievement (2.18)  Tradition (3.01) Stimulation (3.21) 
9  Power (1.89)  Achievement (2.99) Tradition (2.90) 
10  Stimulation (1.84)  Power (2.23) Power (2.17) 
 
 
The table above illustrates that, for the anxiety disorder group, benevolence is the 
most important value and then universalism secondly, for the actual and ideal value 
domains. Conversely for the ought value domain universalism is the most important 
value and secondly benevolence. The third most important value for the ideal and 
ought value domain was self-direction, but for the actual value domain it was 
conformity. 
 
Table 3.9 below presents the eating disorder group’s value priorities for the actual, 
ideal and ought value domains. 
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Table 3.9:  Value priorities for the eating disorder group in the actual, ideal and 
ought value domain 
 
Rank Actual Ideal Ought 
1 Benevolence (3.88) Benevolence (4.39) Achievement (4.41) 
2  Self-direction(3.60)  Self-direction(4.17)  Benevolence (4.33) 
3  Universalism (3.46)  Universalism (4.09)  Universalism (4.16) 
4  Conformity (3.44)  Hedonism (3.80)  Self-direction (3.98) 
5  Achievement (3.21)  Stimulation (3.70)  Hedonism (3.72) 
6  Security (2.84)  Achievement (3.56)  Security (3.62)  
7  Tradition (2.78) Security (3.49) Stimulation (3.56) 
8  Hedonism (2.42) Conformity (3.39) Conformity (3.40) 
9  Stimulation (2.34) Tradition (3.03) Tradition (3.19) 
10  Power (2.06)  Power (2.50) Power (2.49) 
 
 
The table above illustrates that for eating disorder group,  benevolence is held as the 
most important values in the actual and ideal value domains but not in the ought value 
domain where achievement is held as the most important value.  The second most 
important value is self-direction again in the actual and ideal value domain but not for 
the ought value domain where benevolence is the second most important values. 
Universalism is the third most important value across all value domains 
 
Table 3.10 below presents the reference group’s value priorities for the actual, ideal 
and ought value domains. 
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Table 3.10 Value priorities for the reference group in their actual, ideal and ought 
value domain 
 
Rank Actual Ideal Ought 
1  Self-direction 3.93)  Benevolence (4.22)  Universalism (4.28) 
2  Universalism(3.66)  Universalism(4.21) Benevolence (4.22) 
3 Benevolence (3.55) Self-direction (4.20) Self-direction (3.91) 
4  Conformity(3.27)  Stimulation (3.65) Achievement (3.66) 
5  Security (3.26)  Security (3.49) Security (3.56)  
6  Hedonism (3.05)  Conformity( 3.23) Conformity (3.41) 
7  Achievement (2.96)  Hedonism (3.03) Stimulation (3.39) 
8  Stimulation (2.80)  Achievement (2.97)  Hedonism (3.02) 
9  Tradition (2.56)  Tradition (2.75) Tradition (2.77) 
10  Power (2.40)  Power (2.27) Power (2.13) 
 
The table above illustrates that, for the reference group, the central values for the self-
domains are the same but ranked in a different order. In the actual value domain, self-
direction is ranked as the most important value and then universalism, and 
benevolence. In the ideal value domain, benevolence is rated as the most important 
value and then universalism (similar to actual) and self-direction (similar to ought).  In 
the ought value domain universalism is ranked as the most important value and then 
benevolence and lastly self-direction (similar to ideal). 
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3.3.2.1.4 Comparison of cross-cultural value priorities obtained for Schwartz’s 
(1992) model of values. 
 
Table 3.11 and 3.12 below illustrates which values are correlated with each other for 
the actual value domain, the correlations for the ideal and ought value domain are in 
Appendix 27. This data is being presented as it illustrates how closely the value 
priorities for the current study fit with the cross-cultural value priorities obtained from 
extensive research testing Schwartz’s (1992) model of values.  Thus, Schwartz 
(2012b) stated that the value priorities obtained from extensive cross cultural data 
should be used to check the quality of the data as it should reflect cross-cultural 
findings in value priorities and that this can be then used as a baseline to look at 
differences in the sample in levels of importance for each value.  
 
The correlation matrix in table 3.11 and 3.12 displays the correlations between the 10 
values. A Spearman’s correlation coefficient was carried out as the data is not normally 
distributed (Field, 2009).  The correlations indicted that the current study largely 
reflects Schwartz circular model of values. Thus, the values that are significantly 
positively correlated are close together on the circular structure as they share similar 
motivational goals (see introduction chapter) and those values that are opposites or 
far away from each other on the circular structure of values are negatively correlated. 
For example, conformity is positively correlated with tradition, benevolence, 
universalism, achievement and security and is negatively correlated with self-direction, 
stimulation, hedonism and power. 
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Table 3.11: Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient and significance level (italics) for 
the conformity, tradition, benevolence, universalism and self-direction values 
 
  Conformity Tradition Benevolence Universalism Self-direction 
Conformity   
.470 
.001 
.359 
.001 
 .224 
.007 
 -119 
.096 
Tradition 
.470 
.001  . 
 .241 
.004 
 .157 
.042 
 .003 
.489 
Benevolence 
.359 
.001 
 .241 
,004   
 .392 
.001 
 .187 
.020 
Universalism 
.224 
.007 
 .157 
.004 
 .392 
.001   
 .274 
.001 
Self-
direction 
 -.119 
.096 
 ,003 
,489 
 .187 
.020 
 .274 
.001   
Stimulation 
 -.189 
.018 
 -.068 
.227 
 .093 
.154 
 .180 
.024 
 .423 
.001 
Hedonism 
 -.188 
.019 
 -.183 
.022 
 -.063 
.228 
 .186 
.020 
 .337 
.001 
Achievement 
 .001 
.497 
 -.025 
.393 
 -.012 
.450 
 .068 
.020 
 .350 
.001 
Power 
 -.085 
.177 
 -,139 
.063 
 -.167 
.033 
 -.086 
.173 
 .293 
.001 
Security 
 .402 
.001 
 .315 
.001 
 .280 
.001 
 .394 
.001 
 .180 
.023 
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Table 3.12: Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient and significance level (italics) for 
the stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power and security values 
 
  Stimulation Hedonism Achievement Power  Security 
Conformity 
 -.189 
.018 
 -.188 
.019 
 .001 
.497 
 -.085 
.177 
 .402 
.001 
Tradition 
-.068 
.227  
 -.183 
.022 
 .-.025 
.393 
 -.139 
.063 
 .315 
.001 
Benevolence 
 .093 
.154 
 -.066 
.228 
 -.012 
.450 
 -.167 
.033 
 .280 
.001 
Universalism 
 .180 
.024 
 .186 
.020 
 .068 
.229 
 -.086 
.173 
 .394 
.001 
Self-direction 
 .423 
.001 
 .337 
.001 
 .350 
.001 
 .293 
.001 
 .180 
.023 
 Stimulation   
 .473 
.001 
 .301 
.001 
 .252 
.003 
 .085 
.175 
Hedonism 
 .473 
.001  
 .354 
.001 
 .276 
.001 
 .092 
.157 
Achievement 
 .301 
.001 
.354 
.001   
 .588 
.001 
 .118 
.099 
Power 
 .252 
.003 
 .276 
.001 
 .588 
.001   
 -.002 
.491 
Security 
 .085 
.175 
 .092 
.157 
 .118 
.099 
 -.002 
.491   
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3.3.2.1.5 PVQ AI and AO value discrepancy descriptive data 
 
Table 3.13 and 3.14 presents the mean, standard deviation and range of the AI and 
AO value discrepancy scores for the 10 values for each group. Some of the means 
are negative values and this is because participant’s score on their ideal value would 
be lower than their actual value score and therefore when the AI score was calculated 
by subtracting the actual score from the ideal score this could lead to a negative value.  
The negative values are presented here for information, but with the statistical analysis 
the means were changed to absolute values as the current study examined the 
differences between the actual and ideal value score, and the actual and ought value 
score did not make predictions about the direction of any difference. 
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Table 3.13: Descriptive data for the AI value discrepancy: Mean (standard 
deviation) and range 
  
 
 
Values 
Anxiety Disorder 
Group 
Eating Disorder  
Group 
Reference Group 
 
Mean 
 
sd 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
 
sd 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
 
sd 
 
Range 
Conformity .18 .59 -.50-
2.00 
.05 .83 -.2.25-
1.75 
.05 .62 -2.25-
1.75 
 
Tradition -.071 .62 -1.75-
1.00 
 
-.24 
.76 -2.00-
1.25 
-.18 .45 -1.50-
.75 
Benevolence -.36 .61 -1.75-
1.00 
-.51 .80 -2.00-
1.00 
-66 .75 -.2.75 
Universalism -.40 .45 -1.33-
.83 
-.63 .52 -1.83-
.17 
.55 .50 -1.67-
1.00 
Self-direction -.76 .90 -3.25-
.75 
-.57 1.07 -3.00-
.75 
-.27 .55 -1.75-
1.00 
Stimulation -1.34 1.0
5 
-3.67-
.67 
-1.35 1.27 -4.00-
1.6 
.85 .79 -.3.00-
.33 
Hedonism -1.51 1.2
6 
-3.67-
1.00 
-.35 1.53 -3.75-
3.50 
.027 .55 -1.33-
1.00 
Achievement -.76 1.0
9 
-3.00-
1.25 
-.35 1.53 -3.75-
3.50 
-.21 .79 -2.50-
2.25 
Power -.31 .93 -2.67-
2.67 
-.44 .88 -2.00-
2.33 
.13 .64 -1.67-
2.00 
Security -.037 .54 -.80-
1.40 
-65 .71 -2.40-
1.00 
-.22 .47 -1.60-.8 
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             Table 3.14: Descriptive data for the AO value discrepancy: Mean (standard 
deviation) and range 
 
  
 
 
Values 
Anxiety Disorder 
Group 
Eating Disorder  
Group 
Reference Group 
 
Mean 
 
Sd 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
 
Sd 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
 
Sd 
 
Range 
Conformity .077 .50 -.75-
1.25 
.40 
 
.81 -2.00-
1.75 
-32 .71 -2.25-
1.75 
Tradition .43 .63 -1.25-
1.25 
-.41 .79 -1.75-
1.25 
-.21 .21 -1.25-
1.25 
Benevolence -.34 .65 -1.50-
.50 
-45 .88 -1.75-
1.25 
-.66 .75 -2.25-
1.00 
Universalism -.54 .56 -2.00-
.50 
-.70 .60 -2.00-
.33 
-.62 .52 -1.83-
.50 
Self-direction -.65 1.0
3 
-3.00-
1.50 
-.38 1.1 -3.00-
1.25 
.01 .60 -1.50-
1.75 
Stimulation -1.33 1.1
8 
-4.00-
1.67 
-1.22 .96 -2.67-
1.00 
-.59 .77 -2.33-
1.00 
Hedonism -1.26 1.1
4 
-3.67-
1.00 
-1.30 1.18 -4.00-
1.50 
.033 .58 -1.33-
1.67 
Achievement -1.7 1.2
3 
-4.00-
.50 
-1.21 1.54 -4.00-
1.50 
-.70 1.02 -3.00-
1.50 
Power -.25 1.0
6 
-4.00-
2.67 
-.42 1.03 -2.00-
1.00 
.27 .69 -1.33-
2.00 
Security -.09 .59 -80-
1.20 
-.42 1.03 -2.00-
2.33 
-.29 .51 -1.60-
.80 
 
 
 
3.3.2.1.6 Reliability of adapted PVQ 
A Cronbach Alpha test was carried out on the adapted PVQ to test its reliability. Values above 
0.7/0.8 are considered to indicate good reliability of a questionnaire (Field, 2009). The adapted 
PVQ questionnaire fell below this suggested level, (i.e. the overall scale was  =.67). When 
considering the tests reliability in terms of each value subscale, the questionnaire also fell 
below (subscales ranging from  =0.61-0.66). 
119 
 
3.3.3.2. Hospital and Anxiety Questionnaire 
Table 3.15 below presents the mean, standard deviation and range for the anxiety and 
depression scores for the anxiety disorder, eating disorder group and the two groups 
combined. The reference group did not complete these measures as this the HADS 
data is being used to investigate the role of self-discrepancies and psychological 
distress in the mental health groups. 
 
Table 3.15 Descriptive data including the mean (standard deviation) and range 
for the HADS 
 
Group 
Anxiety  Depression 
Mean 
(sd) Range 
Mean 
(sd) Range 
Anxiety Disorder 15.1 (3.2) 5-21 11.7 (4.5) 3-19 
Eating Disorder 13.4 (4.6) 3-21 8.8 (4.8) 1-18 
Combined 
Mental Health 
Group 
14.25 
(4.1) 3-21 
10.34 
(4.8) 1-19 
 
 
The cut off score for the HADS on both anxiety and depression is 8 (Bjelland et al. 
(2002), and therefore anyone scoring below 8 does not meet the criteria for clinical 
anxiety or depression in accordance the HADS guidelines.  Levels of severity are then 
classified as 0-7 for normal, 8-10 for mild, 11-14 for moderate and 15-21 for severe. 
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Combining both mental health groups, 5 out of 61 people scored within the normal 
range and therefore did meet cut-off for anxiety, 5 people scored within the mild range, 
18 people within the moderate range and the majority of participants (n=33) scoring in 
the severe range. In relation to depression the majority of participants (n=20) 
conversely fell below the cut-off score for depression and then 13 people fell within the 
mild range, 14 in the moderate range and 14 in the severe range. 
 
When looking at the HADS score within the individual groups it was found that within 
the anxiety disorders group participants scored higher in anxiety (M=15.1) than 
depression (M=11.7) as would be expected.  Thus, in the anxiety subscale the majority 
of participants scored within the severe range (n=18), 11 in the moderate range, no 
participants scored in the mild range and one participants did not reach cut-off for 
anxiety. For the depression subscale, 5 people did not reach the cut off score f, 6 
people scored within the mild range, 9 people scored within the moderate range and 
9 within the severe range. 
 
Similarly to the anxiety disorders group, the eating disorder group scored higher in 
anxiety (m=13.4) than depression (-m=8.8) over all.  In the anxiety subscale the 
majority of participants scored within the severe range (n=14), and 8 participants 
scored within the moderate range, 6 in the mild range and 3 people in the normal range 
which means these participants did not reach cut off for anxiety.  In the depression 
subscale, similar to the anxiety group the majority of the participants (n=15) did not 
reach cut-off score for depression, and then 6 people scored within the mild range, 5 
in the moderate range and 5 in the severe range. 
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In summary, participants in all groups scored higher in anxiety than in depression and 
with the anxiety subscale the majority of the people fell within the severe range. In the 
depression subscale, interestingly the majority of the participants fell within the normal 
range which indicates that they did not meet the cut-off score for depression. However, 
the mean score for depression in each group indicates that participants met the cut off 
score for depression, but only within the mild (eating disorder group and combined 
mental health groups) and moderate (anxiety disorder group) range. However 
Pearson’s correlation co-efficient indicated that anxiety and depression correlated 
significantly, r=.535, p<.001 for the combined mental health group, eating disorders 
group, r=.457, p=.005 and for the anxiety disorders group, r=.544, p<.001.  
 
 
3.4 INFERENTIAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
 
3.4.1 Overview 
The data was analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS, 
version 20). The results from the statistical analysis will be discussed in relation to the 
two main hypotheses.  In addition, age will be considered as a covariate.   
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3.4.2 Hypothesis One 
a)  The mental health groups will hold different values compared to the reference 
group. 
 
A MANOVA was used because this hypothesis was testing whether there were any 
differences between independent groups (i.e. the anxiety disorder, eating disorder and 
reference group) on more than one continuous dependent variable (i.e. Schwartz’s 10 
values) simultaneously.  Thus, an ANOVA was not used as it only measures one 
dependent variable and the current study needed to test 10 dependent variables.  In 
addition, the MANOVA has the advantage of being able to detect whether groups differ 
along a combination of variables, whereas the ANOVA can detect only if groups differ 
along a single variable and in this way it has greater power to detect an effect (Field, 
2009).  Pillai’s trace was used for the MANOVA as the groups differ on more than one 
variate (Field, 2009).  The independent variable was the three groups (e.g. the anxiety 
disorder group, eating disorder group and reference group) and the dependent 
variable was the 10 values (e.g. conformity, tradition, benevolence, universalism, self-
direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power and security).  As there was 
multiple comparisons taking place, a more conservative significance level will be used 
p<.01. 
 
In Pillai’s trace, there was a significant differences between the groups in values, V= 
.630, F(18,220)=5.66, p<.001. Univariate results (see table 3.16) revealed that there 
were significant differences (at the 0.01 level) between groups in five values: self-
direction F(2,119) =6.20, p=.002; stimulation, F(2,119) =11.09, p<.001;  hedonism, 
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F(2,119)=13.57, p<.001, achievement, F(2,119) =7.06, p<.001; and security, F(2,119) 
=5.34, p=.006.  However, there were not any significant difference between groups in 
the five values: conformity, F(2,119) =2.58, p=.080; tradition, F(2,119) =2.60, p=.079; 
benevolence, F(2,119) =2.94, p=.057;  universalism, F(2,119) =1.59, p=.209; and 
power,  F(2,119) =4.54, p=.013.  
 
When considering age as a covariate Pillai’s trace, revealed that there was still a 
significant difference between the groups in values, V= .491, F(20,220)=3.58, p=.001.  
Univariate results revealed (see table 3.16) that there were significant differences 
between groups in the five values: self-direction F(2,119) =6.32, p=002; stimulation, 
F(2,119) =11.47, p=.002;  hedonism, F(2,119) =15.94, p=.002; achievement, F(2,119) 
=5.27, p=006; and  power F(2,119) = 5.39, p=.006. However, there was not a 
significant difference between groups in five values: conformity, F(2,119) =2.58, 
p=.080; tradition, F(2,119) =2.60, p=.079; benevolence, F(2,119) =2.94, p=.057; 
universalism, F(2,119) =1.59, p=.209; and security, F(2,119) =1.93, p=.150. Therefore, 
when considering age as a covariate, the same values are significant and not 
significant apart from security which is significant without considering age as a 
covariate, but not significant when considering age as a covariate.  Furthermore, 
power is considered significant when considering age as a covariate but not significant 
when age is not considered as a covariate. 
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Table 3.16: MANOVA results for values: Degrees of freedom (df), F value, 
significance level and Partial Eta Squared for each value with age as a covariate 
(+age) and without age (-age) 
 
Values 
 
 
df 
F 
Significance 
level 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
+ Age  -Age   + Age  -Age  + Age   -Age 
Conformity 2,119 2.65 2.58 .075 .080 .043 .042 
Tradition 2,119 2.65 2.60 .075 .079 .043 .042 
Benevolence 2,119 3.00 2.94 .054 .057 .048 .047 
Universalism 2,119 .941 1.59 .39 .209 .016 .026 
Self-direction 2,119 6.32 6.50 .002 .002 .097 .099 
Stimulation 2,119 11.47 11.09 .002 .001 .163 .157 
Hedonism 2,119 15.94 13.57 .002 .001 .213 .186 
Achievement 2,119 5.27 7.06 .006 .001 .082 .106 
Power 2,119 5.39 4.54 .006 .013 .084 .071 
Security 2,119 1.93 5.34 .150 .006 .032 .082 
 
 
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons were used to indicate the direction of the significant 
group differences. Field (2009) suggests the use of Gabriel’s post-hoc test if there are 
unequal samples sizes. However, when the results were compared to Bonferroni Post 
Hoc comparisons they yielded the same results; therefore Bonferroni was used in this 
study as it has been found to control for type one error more effectively than the other 
post-hoc tests (Field, 2009). 
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Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons (see table 3.17) revealed that, for self-direction, the 
anxiety disorder group differed significantly, F(2, 119) = 6.50, p=.002 to the reference 
group, with the reference group (m=3.93) being higher in self-direction than the anxiety 
group (m=3.29).  The anxiety disorder and eating disorder group did not differ, F(2, 
119) = 6.50, p=.433 from one another on self-direction, and the eating disorder and 
reference group, F(2, 119) = 6.50, p=1.00 did not differ from one another.  Similarly in 
stimulation the anxiety disorder group differed significantly, F(2,119) = 11.09. p<.001 
to the reference group, with the reference group (m=2.80) being higher in self-direction 
than the anxiety group (m=1.84).  The anxiety disorder and eating disorder group did 
not differ from one another on self-direction, F(2, 119) = 11.09, p=1.00 and the eating 
disorder and reference group did not differ from one another, F(2, 119) = 11.09, p=.078 
.  
 
The anxiety and eating disorder group differed to the reference group on the hedonism 
value, F(2, 119) = 13.57, p<.001; F(2, 119) =  13.57, p=.002 respectively, and the 
anxiety disorders group and the eating disorders group did not differ, F(2, 119) = 13.57, 
p=.757, again the reference being higher in hedonism (m=3.05), then the eating 
disorders group (m=2.42) and anxiety disorders group (m=2.18).   In the achievement 
value, the anxiety disorders and eating disorders group differed to each other, F(2, 
119) = 7.06, p=.002 and the reference group differed to the anxiety group, F(2, 119) = 
7.06, p=.008,  but not the eating disorders group, F(2, 119) = 7.06, p=.933.  The eating 
disorders group was highest in achievement (m=3.21) then the reference group 
(m=2.96) and the anxiety disorders group (m=2.18).   Power and security were not 
found to be significantly different in post-hoc comparisons at P<.01. 
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Table 3.17:  Bonferroni post- hoc comparison: Means (standard deviations) and 
F value of group values 
 
Value 
Anxiety 
Disorder 
Eating 
Disorder Reference F (2,199) 
Self-direction  3.29a (.98)   3.60ab(.99)   3.93b (.58) 6.50 
Stimulation  1.84a(.82)   2.34ab (1.18)   2.80b (.82)  11.09 
Hedonism  2.18a (.98)  2.42a (1.11)   3.05b (.50)  13.57 
Achievement  2.18a (.96)   3.21b (1.38)   2.96b (1.07)  7.06  
 
Note: Means with different letters differ significantly at  P<.01 
 
In summary, there were significant differences between the groups in self-direction, 
stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power (only when age is a covariate) and 
security (only when age is not a covariate) and therefore we can reject the null 
hypothesis on these values, but not on conformity, tradition, benevolence and 
universalism values.  Post-hoc analysis revealed that the reference group was 
significantly different, and had the highest score to the anxiety disorder group alone 
on self-direction, and stimulation values. In addition, the reference group was 
significantly different and had the highest score for both the anxiety and eating 
disorders on the hedonism value alone. The eating disorders group was significantly 
different and had the highest value to the anxiety disorder group on achievement. 
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b) The AD group will hold different values from the ED group.  More specifically the 
AD group central values will be characterised by security, conformity and tradition 
values within the conservation quadrant and the ED group central values will be 
characterised by achievement values centred on the self-enhancement quadrant. 
 
This hypothesis was tested by Bonferroni Post Comparisons ( see table 3.17) as 
described previously. As predicted, the eating disorders group did differ significantly 
to the anxiety disorders group on the achievement value F (2,119) =7.07, p=.002. The 
anxiety disorder group did not differ to the eating disorder group on security F(2,119) 
= 5.34, p=.011, (but only marginally given that a p<.01 significance level is being used 
for the current study), conformity or tradition as hypothesised, F(2,119) = 2.58, p=.691,  
F(2,119) = 2.60, p=1.00 respectively.  The anxiety and eating disorder group did not 
differ on any other value. 
 
3.4.3 Hypothesis Two 
a) There will be a difference in value discrepancies in values between the mental 
health groups and the reference group.  
 
b) The mental health groups will have higher levels of value discrepancies than the 
reference group. 
 
128 
 
This section will describe the statistical findings of the Actual:Ideal (AI) value 
discrepancy first and then the Actual:Ought (AO) value discrepancy and then compare 
them. 
 
3.4.3.1 AI value discrepancies 
A MANOVA was used because this hypothesis was testing whether there were any 
differences between independent groups (i.e. the anxiety disorder, eating disorder and 
reference group) on more than one continuous dependent variable (i.e. AI value 
discrepancies on Schwartz’s 10 values) simultaneously.  Thus, an ANOVA was not 
used as it only measures one dependent variable and the current study needed to test 
10 dependent variables.  In addition, the MANOVA has the advantage of being able to 
detect whether groups differ along a combination of variables, whereas the ANOVA 
can detect only whether groups differ along a single variable, and to this end it has 
greater power to detect an effect (Field, 2009).  Pillai’s trace will be used for the 
MANOVA as the groups differ on more than one variate (Field, 2009).  The 
independent variable was the three groups (e.g. the anxiety disorder group, eating 
disorder group and reference group) and the dependent variable was the AI value 
discrepancies in the 10 values (e.g. conformity, tradition, benevolence, universalism, 
self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power and security).  As there will 
be multiple comparisons taking place, a more conservative significance level will be 
used p<.01. The MANOVA will be carried out on the means as absolute values. 
 
Pillai’s trace revealed that there was a significant difference between the groups in AI 
value discrepancies, V= .514, F(20,200) = 3.80, p<.001. Univariate results (see table 
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3.18), revealed that there were significant differences between the groups on six 
values in AI: tradition, F (2.118) =.843, p=.009; self-direction, F(2.118) =2.71, p=.002; 
stimulation, F(2.118) =3.51, p=.007; hedonism, F(2.118) =20.82, p<.001; achievement, 
F(2.118) =4.60, p=.004,  and security, F(2.118) =1.42, p<.001.  However, there were 
no significant differences found in conformity, F (2.118) =.1.17, p=.316; benevolence, 
F (2.118) = 1.47, p=.234; universalism, F (2.118) =1.56, p=.214; and power, F(2.118) 
=3.39, p=.037 . 
 
When considering age as a covariate, Pillai’s trace revealed that there was still 
significant differences between the groups in AI value discrepancies, V= .465, 
F(20,218) = 4.65, p<.001.  Univariate results (see table 3.15) revealed that dissimilar 
significant differences when considering age as a covariate between the groups on 
two values in AI value discrepancy: self-direction, F(2,118) =5.75, p=.004 and 
hedonism, F(2,118) =28.22, p<.001.  However, there were no significant differences 
found in conformity, F (2,118) =.548, p=.579; tradition, F (2,118) =1.76, p=.185; 
benevolence, F (2.118) =.1.45 p=.238; universalism, F (2,118) =1.32, p=.272; 
stimulation, F(2,118) =3.81, p=.025; achievement, F(2,118) =3.96, p=.022; power 
F(2,118) =1.90, p=.154; and security, F(2,118) =4.59, p=.012. 
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Table 3.18:  MANOVA results for AI value discrepancies: Degrees of freedom (df), 
F value, significance level and Partial Eta Squared for each value with age as a 
covariate (+age) and without age (-age) 
 
Values 
 
 
df 
F Sig 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
+ Age -Age  + Age -Age + Age  -Age 
Conformity 2,118 .548 1.16 .579 .316 .009 .019 
Tradition 2,118 1.76 .4.95 .185 .009 .028 .078 
Benevolence 2,118 1.45 1.47 .238 .234 .024 .024 
Universalism 2,118 1.32 1.56 .272 .214 .022 .026 
Self-direction 2,118 5.75 6.54 .004 .002  .089 .100 
Stimulation 2,118 3.81 5.23 .025 .007 .061 .081 
Hedonism 2,118 28.22 31.32 .001 .001 .325 .347 
Achievement 2,118 3.96 5.80 .022 .004 .063 .090 
Power 2,118 1.90 3.40 .154 .037 .031 .054 
Security 2,118 4.59 8.77 .012 .001 .073 .129 
 
 
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons were used to indicate the direction of the significant 
group differences. Field (2009) suggests the Gabriel’s post-hoc test is used if there 
are unequal samples sizes. When the results were compared to Bonferroni Post Hoc 
comparisons they yielded the same results; therefore Bonferroni was used in this study 
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as it has been found to control for type one error more effectively than the other post-
hoc tests (Field, 2009). 
 
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons (see table 3.19) revealed that, in the tradition value, 
there was only a group difference between eating disorders group and the reference 
group, F(2,118) =4.95 p=.007, with the eating disorders group having the highest level 
of AI value discrepancies (m=.24) and then the reference group (M=.18) and the 
anxiety disorders group (M=.07). There were no group differences between the anxiety 
and eating disorders group F(2,118) =4.95 p=.395 and the reference group and the 
anxiety disorders group, F(2,118) =4.95 p=.563. In the self-direction value, there was 
only a group difference between eating disorders group and the reference group, 
F(2,118) =6.54 p=.009 with the anxiety disorders group having the highest level of AI 
self-discrepancies (m=.76). There were no group differences between the anxiety and 
eating disorders group F(2,118) =6.54 p=1.00 and the reference group and  the anxiety 
disorders group, F(2,118) =6.54 p=.016.   
 
In relation to the hedonism value, there were group differences between the anxiety 
and eating disorders and the reference group,  F(2,118) =31.33 p<.001 for both, with 
the anxiety disorder group having the highest AI discrepancy (m=1.51), then the eating 
disorder group (m=1.37) and the reference group (m=.027). However, the anxiety and 
eating disorder group did not differ significantly F(2,118) =31.33 p=1.00.  In relation to 
the achievement value there were only group differences between the eating disorders 
group and the reference group, F (2.118) =4.80 p=.006, with the anxiety disorders 
group having the highest AI value discrepancies (m=.67), then the eating disorders 
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group (m=.35) and the reference group (m=.21). However, there were no group 
differences found between the anxiety and eating disorders group, F (2,118) =5.80 
p=1.00, and the anxiety disorders group and the reference group, F (2,118) =5.80 
p=.082. 
 
In relation to the security value, group differences were found between the eating 
disorder group and the reference group in the security value, F (2,118) =8.77 p<.001, 
and between the anxiety and eating disorders group, F (2,118) =8.77 p=.004. The 
eating disorders group had the highest AI value-discrepancies (m=.65), then the 
reference group (m=.22) and the anxiety disorders group (m=.037). However, there 
were no group differences between the anxiety disorders group and the reference 
group, F (2,118) =8.77 p=1.00. 
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Table 3.19:  Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons for AI value discrepancies: Means 
(standard deviations), F value and significance level of group differences 
 
Value 
Anxiety 
Disorder 
Eating 
Disorder Reference F (2,119) 
Tradition  .07ab (.62) .24a (.83) .18b(.62) 4.95 
Self-direction  .76ab (.90)   57a (1.07)   .27b (.55)  6.54  
Hedonism 1.51a (1.26)  1.37a (1.27)  .027b (.55)  31.33  
Achievement .76ab (1.09)   .35a (1.53)  .21b (.79)  5.80  
Security  .037a (.54)   .65b (.71)   .22a (.47)  8.77  
  
Note: Means with different letters differ significantly at P<.01 
 
In summary, in all of the values found to have significant differences between the 
groups, the mental health groups had greater value discrepancies than the reference 
group and the anxiety group had marginally higher AI value discrepancies on 3 of the 
values and 2 for the eating disorders group. There were no group differences found 
between the mental health groups on the values, except for the security value. 
Therefore in relation to AI value discrepancy, hypothesis 2(a) is supported and we can 
thereby reject the null hypothesis in relation to tradition, self-direction, hedonism, 
achievement and security. 
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3.4.3.2 AO value discrepancies 
The AO value discrepancies were statistically analysed in the same way as the AI 
value discrepancies in section 3.4.3.1 (e.g. MANOVA and Bonferroni Post 
Comparisons). 
 
Similarly to hypothesis 1(a), Pillai’s trace revealed that there was a significant 
difference between the groups in AO value discrepancies, V= .579, F(20,220),  = 4.48, 
p<.001. Univariate (see table 3.20) revealed that there were significant differences 
between the groups on six values in AO value discrepancies (see table 3.18): self-
direction, F(2,118) =10.60, p<.001; stimulation, F(2,118) =10.60, p<.001; hedonism, 
F(2,118) =27.57, p<.001; achievement, F(2,118) =6.85, p<.002; power F(2,118) =6.44, 
p=.002; and security, F(2,118) =11.55, p<.001.  However, there were no significant 
differences found in four values in conformity, F (2,118) =.886, p=.415; tradition, F 
(2,118) =4.44, p=.014; benevolence, F (2,118) = 1.94, p=.149; and universalism, F 
(2,118) =.916, p=.403.  
  
When considering age as a covariate, Pillai’s trace revealed that there was still 
significant differences between the groups in AO self-discrepancies, V= .512, 
F(20,218) = 3.75, p<.001, partial eta squared .256.  Univariate results (see table 3.15), 
revealed the same significant differences when considering age as a covariate 
between the groups on six values in AO (see table 3.15): self-direction, F(2,118) 
=10.32, p<.001; stimulation, F(2,118) =9.42, p<.001; hedonism, F(2,118) =24.34, 
p<.001; achievement, F(2,118) =6.85, p=.002: power F(2,118) =5.61, p=.005;  and 
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security, F(2,118) =6.10, p=.003.  However, there were no significant differences found 
in three values in conformity, F (2,118) =.552, p=.575; benevolence, F (2,118) = 1.85, 
p=.162; universalism, F (2,118) =.432, p=.650; and tradition, F (2,118) = 1.56, p=.211 
in contrast to when age was not considered. 
 
Table 3.20: MANOVA for AO value discrepancies: Degrees of freedom (df), F 
value, significance level and Partial Eta Squared for each value with age as a 
covariate (+age) and without age (-age) 
 
Values 
 
 
df 
F Sig 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
+ Age  -Age   + Age  -Age  + Age   -Age 
Conformity 2,118 .552 .886 .575 .415 .009 .015 
Tradition 2,118 1.58 4.43 .211 .014  .026 .070 
Benevolence 2,118 1.85 1.93 .162 .149 .031 .032 
Universalism 2,118 .434 .916 .650 .403 .007 .015 
Self-direction 2,118 10.32 10.62 .001 .001 .150 .153 
Stimulation 2,118 9.42 10.60 .001 .001 .139 .152 
Hedonism 2,118 24.42 27.57 .001 .001 .294 .319 
Achievement 2,118 6.85 6.86 .002 .002 .105 .104 
Power 2,118 5.60 6.44 .005 .002 .087 .098 
Security 2,118 6.10 11.55 .003 .001 .094 .164 
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The Bonferroni Post Hoc comparison (see table 3.21) revealed that, in the self-
direction value, there was a group difference between anxiety and eating disorders 
group and the reference group, F(2,118) =10.63 p<.001, F(2,118) =10.63 p=.004 
respectively, with the anxiety disorders group having the highest level of AO value 
discrepancies (M=.65) then the eating disorders group (m=.38) and the reference 
group (m=.01). There were no group differences between the anxiety and eating 
disorders group F(2,118) =10.63 p=.100.   
 
In the stimulation value there were group differences between the anxiety and eating 
disorder groups and the reference group, F(2,118) =10.60 p<.001, F(2,118) =10.60 
p=.002, respectively, with the anxiety disorder group having the highest AO self-
discrepancy, (m=1.33), then the eating disorders group (m=1.22) and reference group 
(m=.59).  However, there were no group differences between the anxiety and eating 
disorders group, F(2,118) =10.60 p=1.00.   In relation to the hedonism value, there 
were group differences between the anxiety and eating disorders groups and the 
reference group,  F(2,118) =27.58 p<.001 for both, with the eating disorder group 
having the highest AO discrepancy (m=1.30), then the anxiety disorder group (m=1.26) 
and the reference group (m=.033).  However, the anxiety and eating disorder group 
did not differ significantly F(2,118) =27.58 p=1.00.   
 
In relation to the achievement value, there were only group differences between the 
anxiety disorders group and the reference group, F (2.118) =6.85 p=.003, with the 
anxiety disorders group having the highest AO value discrepancies (m=1.7), then the 
eating disorders group (m=1.21) and the reference group (m=.70).  However, there 
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were no group differences found between the anxiety and eating disorders group, F 
(2,118) =6.85 p=1.00, and the eating disorders group and the reference group, F 
(2,118) =6.85 p=.047. 
 
Group differences were found between eating disorder groups and the reference 
group in the power value, F (2,118) =6.44 p=.003.  The eating disorders group had the 
highest AO value discrepancies in the power value (m=.42), then the anxiety disorders 
group (m=.25) and the reference group (m=.27).  However, there were no group 
differences between the anxiety and eating disorders group, F (2,118) =6.44 p=0.14 
and between the anxiety disorders group and the reference group, F (2,118) =6.44 
p=1.00.   In relation to the security value, group differences were found between the 
eating disorder group and the reference group in the security value, F (2,.118) =11.55 
p<.001, and between the anxiety and eating disorders group, F (2.118) =11.55 p=.002.   
The eating disorders group had the highest AO value discrepancies (m=.79), then the 
reference group (m=.29) and the anxiety disorders group (m=.09). However, there 
were no group differences between the anxiety disorders group and the reference 
group, F (2,118) =11.55, p=1.00. 
 
In summary, in all of the values found to have significant differences between the 
groups, the mental health groups had greater value discrepancies than the reference 
group, with the anxiety group and eating disorders group being equally greater than 
the reference group. There were no group differences found between the mental 
health groups on the values, except for the security value. Therefore, in relation to AO 
value discrepancy, hypothesis 2(a) is supported and we can thereby reject the null 
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hypothesis in relation to self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power and 
security. 
 
Table 3.21: Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons for AO value discrepancy: Means 
(standard deviations) and F value of group values 
 
Value Anxiety 
Disorder 
Eating 
Disorder 
Reference F (2,118) 
Self-direction .65a (1.03)  .38a (1.1)  .01b (.60)  10.63 
 Stimulation 1.33a (1.18)  1.22a (.96)  .59b (.77)  10.60 
 Hedonism  1.26a (1.14)  1.30a (1.18)  .033b (.58)  27.58 
 Achievement  1.7 a(1.23)  1.21ab (1.54)  .70b (1.02) 6.85 
Power  .25ab (1.06)  .42a (1.03)  .27b (.69)  6.44 
 Security  .09a (.59)  .79b (.80)  .29a (.51)  11.55 
  
Note: Means with different letters differ significantly at p<.01 level. 
 
To conclude, both AI and AO value discrepancy results reveal that the mental health 
groups have greater value discrepancies than the reference group, and that the 
anxiety group had marginally higher value discrepancies than the eating disorders 
group. There were no group differences found between the mental health groups on 
the values, except for the security value.  The findings from the AI and AO value 
discrepancies were very similar with the exception of the tradition value, which also 
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showed significant group differences between AI value discrepancies and not AO 
value discrepancies. Therefore, in relation to both AI and AO,  value discrepancy 
hypothesis 2(a) is supported and we can thereby reject the null hypothesis in relation 
to tradition (AI only), self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power and 
security. 
 
C) There will be greater AI value discrepancies than AO value discrepancies in all 
groups.  
 
A Paired Sample t-test was used for this hypothesis as opposed to a MANOVA, 
because it was testing whether only two means are different (e.g. the AI mean and the 
AO mean), and not several means (e.g. 10 values).  A Paired Sample t-test was used 
as opposed to an Independent Sample t-test as the same participants underwent the 
same conditions (e.g. completing the PVQ).  A significance level was set at p<.05 as 
this test is not making the same multiple comparisons as the MANOVA and it was done 
on a different variable (e.g. total AI and not separate AI for each value). 
 
A Paired Sample t-test was done on the grand mean of all the values combined on the 
total sample and on the individual groups (see table 3.22).  A significant difference was 
found between AI and AO on the total sample, t(120) =2.28, p<.001 with AO value 
discrepancies being greater(M=5.12) than AI (M=4.45), and with the anxiety disorder 
group, t(28) =2.28, p=.03 and reference group, t(60) =3.87, p=.015 . However, as a 
significant difference was not found with the eating disorder group, t(20) =1.87, p=.072, 
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the null hypothesis can be accepted as AI value discrepancies were not found to be 
higher than AO value discrepancies across all groups. 
 
Table 3.22:  Paired Sample t-test results: Mean, standard deviation (SD), Std 
error mean, degrees of freedom (df), t value, and significance level for t-test (sig)  
 
 Groups Mean (SD) 
Std. 
error 
Mean df t Sig 
Anxiety 
Disorders   .88 (2.1)  .39  28  2.28  .03 
Eating 
Disorders  .73 (2.2)  .39  30  1.87  .072 
Reference  .54 (2.2)  .22  60  2.50  .015 
Total  3.86 (1.9)  .17 120  3.87  .001 
 
 
D)  AI value discrepancies will be more associated with depression and AO value 
discrepancies will be more associated with anxiety in the mental health group. 
 
A Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient (one tailed) was used to test this hypothesis 
because this hypothesis was investigating whether there was a relationship between 
variables (e.g. between AI value discrepancy and depression and AI value discrepancy 
and anxiety).  A one-tailed as opposed to a two-tailed Spearman’s correlation was 
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used as the hypothesis is stating the direction of the outcome.  A Spearman’s 
correlation test was used as opposed to the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient as the 
data is not normally distributed. The significance level will be set at p<.05 for testing 
this hypothesis as the same multiple comparisons were not taking place as the 
MANOVA and it was done on a different variable ( e.g. total AI value discrepancy and 
not separate AI value discrepancy for each value). 
 
Spearman’s correlation (one-tailed) (see table 3.23) indicated that the eating disorder 
and anxiety disorder groups (i.e. mental health group) combined revealed a significant 
but small correlation between AI value discrepancy and depression, rs=.293, p<.011 
and anxiety, rs=.230, p<.039.  A t-statistic was used to test the difference between 
these correlations, and it revealed that there was no difference significant between the 
correlations as t(58) =0.37  was below the critical value of 1.68  at .05 level (one-
tailed).  AO value discrepancy was also found to significantly correlate with both 
anxiety, rs=.291, p<.012 and depression, rs=.294, p<.011. A t-statistic was used to test 
the difference between these correlations, and it revealed that there was no significant 
difference between the correlations as t(58) =0.02  was below the critical value of 1.68  
at.05 level (one tailed). 
 
When looking at the groups separately, it was found that within the anxiety disorder 
group the only significant correlation was found between AO value discrepancy and 
anxiety, rs=.329, p<.041. A t-statistic was used to test the difference between AO and 
anxiety and AO and depression correlations, and it revealed that there was no 
significant difference between the correlations as t(58) =1.56 was below the critical 
142 
 
value of 1.68  at.05 level (one tailed).  There were no significant correlations found 
between AI value discrepancy and anxiety, rs=.220, p>.126 and depression, rs=.160, 
p>.202 or AO value discrepancy and depression, rs=.092, p>.318.  In relation to the 
eating disorder group, no significant correlations were found in AI and anxiety, rs=.126, 
p>.250 and depression, rs=-.134, p>.236, and in AO value discrepancy and 
depression, rs=-.121, p>.258, and anxiety, rs=.212, p>.126.  
 
Table 3.23: Spearman’s correlation for the anxiety disorder group, eating 
disorder group and combined mental health group: Number of participants (n), 
Spearman’s correlation (r) and probability level (prob) 
 
  
Anxiety Disorder Eating Disorder Mental Health Group 
n r Prob n r Prob n R Prob 
AI Anxiety 
  
29 
  
.220 
  
.126 31 .126 .250 60 .230 .039  
AI Depression 29 .160 .202 31 -.134 .236 60 .293 .011 
AO Anxiety 29 .329 .041 31 .212 .126 60 .291 .012 
AO Depression 29 .092 .318 31 -.121 .258 60 .294 .011 
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In summary, null hypothesis 2(d) was accepted with the mental health group.  AI value 
discrepancy was found not to be specifically associated with depression and AO value 
discrepancy was found not to be associated with anxiety.  When looking at the groups 
separately with the anxiety group, the AO value discrepancy correlated with anxiety, 
but was not statistically different to AO and depression. Furthermore, there were no 
other significant correlations found in the anxiety and eating disorders group.  
 
3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The descriptive statistics were presented in relation to the participants and measures 
used (e.g. PVQ and HAD). The descriptive statistics indicated that, in relation to the 
participants, the anxiety and reference group did not differ in age or gender but the 
eating disorders group did, which reflect this clinical sample. Consequently, age was 
added as a covariate in the MANOVAs. The rationale for the statistical tests being 
used was outlined and then how the assumptions were met.  It was found that some 
of the data was not normally distributed but the data was not transformed for various 
reasons, the main one being that the descriptive data indicated that it reflected the 
cross-cultural finding; therefore it is proficient to be used as a baseline for looking at 
differences in value importance across groups (Schwartz, 2012). 
 
The descriptive data for the PVQ was presented in relation to values (actual, ideal and 
ought) and AI value discrepancy and AO value discrepancy.  The descriptive data 
largely reflected the cross-cultural priorities, indicating that the data was of good 
quality and therefore can be used as a baseline to look at differences in levels of 
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importance in the values. The descriptive data for the values also outlined the group’s 
value priorities and the central values were discussed for each group. The three 
groups shared benevolence and universalism as central values, with the anxiety 
disorder group holding conformity alone and the eating disorder and reference group 
sharing self-direction.  
 
The results from the statistical analysis were reported in relation to the two main 
hypotheses.  Hypothesis one revealed significant differences (around p<.001) 
between the mental health groups and the reference group. More specifically, 
differences were found between the groups in self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, 
achievement, power (with age as a covariate only) and security (without age as a 
covariate only), but not in conformity, tradition, benevolence and universalism.  
Hedonism and Stimulation revealed the largest effect size. Post-hoc analysis revealed 
that the reference group differed significantly as they rated the importance of self-
direction and stimulation values higher than the anxiety group (but not the eating 
disorder group).  In addition, the reference group also rated the hedonism value as 
more important than both the anxiety and eating disorders group. Conversely, in the 
achievement value, the eating disorders group rated this value as more important than 
the reference group and the anxiety disorder group.  Power and security were not 
found to be significantly different within post-hoc comparisons. 
 
Hypothesis two revealed that with AI value discrepancies there were significant 
differences (around p<.001) between groups in: tradition, self-direction, stimulation, 
hedonism, achievement and security, with the largest effect size being with hedonism.  
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With age considered as a covariate, only self-direction and stimulation were 
significantly different (around p<.001). In AO, value discrepancies revealed similar 
significant differences to AI; for example, in self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, 
achievement, and security, with age as a covariate or without. However, in contrast to 
AI value discrepancies, the power value was also found to be significantly different in 
AO value discrepancies and the tradition value was found to be significant in AI value 
discrepancy but not AO values discrepancies.  
 
Post–hoc analysis revealed that the mental health groups had greater AI value 
discrepancies than the reference group on tradition, self-direction, hedonism, 
achievement, and security, and the mental health groups did not differ, except for on 
the security value where the eating disorder group had large value discrepancies.  
Again, AO value discrepancies revealed similar significant differences to AI values 
discrepancies, with the mental health groups having greater value discrepancies in 
self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power and security.   
Unexpectedly, AO value discrepancies were found to be greater than AI values 
discrepancies when looking at the anxiety and eating disorder groups combined but 
not separately.  
 
Furthermore, AI value discrepancies were found to be related to anxiety and 
depression in the combined mental health group, and AO with the combined mental 
health group and the anxiety group. However, depression was found not to be 
specifically related to Actual-Ideal discrepancies and anxiety was found not to be 
specifically related to Actual-Ought discrepancies as expected. 
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Overall, the majority of the findings supported the hypothesis made. The interpretation 
of the findings will be discussed in the next discussion chapter. 
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                                      CHAPTER 4 – DISCUSSION 
 
 
4.1 OVERVIEW 
This chapter will reflect on how the results obtained during this study contribute to 
theory and knowledge about values and mental health problems and how self-
discrepancies between values can contribute to psychological distress. The results will 
be discussed with reference to current literature. Before discussing the clinical 
implications of the research, the strengths and limitations of the study will be 
considered. In addition, recommendations for future research will be outlined.  
 
 
4.2 SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS 
The aim of the current study was to: 
 
 Investigate whether people with particular mental health problems (namely 
anxiety and eating disorders) hold different values to those without mental 
health problems.  
 
 To find out whether people with mental health problems have more value 
discrepancies than those without mental health problems, and if Actual: Ideal 
(AI) value discrepancies were greater than Actual: Ought (AO) in all the groups. 
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 To test whether value discrepancies in values are related to psychological 
distress, and what type (e.g. anxiety and depression).  
 
To investigate this, the mental health groups were compared with the reference group 
in values and value discrepancies, using Multivariate statistics (MANOVA), Bonferroni 
post-hoc comparisons and Paired Sample t-tests. Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient 
was also used to investigate whether there is an association between value 
discrepancies and psychological distress (e.g. depression and anxiety). 
 
4.2.1 Hypothesis one: Differences between the mental health groups and 
reference group in values  
Multivariate statistics (MANOVA) revealed significant differences (around p<.001) 
between the mental health groups and the reference group. More specifically, 
differences were found between the groups in self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, 
achievement, power (with age as a covariate only) and security (without age as a 
covariate only), but not in conformity, tradition, benevolence and universalism.  
Hedonism and Stimulation revealed the largest effect size. Post-hoc analysis revealed 
that the reference group differed significantly as they rated the importance of self-
direction and stimulation values higher than the anxiety group (but not the eating 
disorder group).  In addition, the reference group also rated the hedonism value as 
more important than both the anxiety and eating disorders group. Conversely, in the 
achievement value, the eating disorders group rated this value as more important than 
the reference group and the anxiety disorder group.  Power and security were not 
found to be significantly different within post-hoc comparisons. 
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4.2.2 Hypothesis two: Discrepancies in values and how this relates to 
psychological distress 
In relation to value discrepancies (i.e. Actual:Ideal, AI and Actual:Ought, AO), it was 
found that with AI value discrepancies there were significant differences ( around 
p<.001)  between groups in: tradition, self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, 
achievement and security, with the largest effect size being with hedonism.  With age 
considered as a covariate, only self-direction and stimulation were significantly 
different (around p<.001). In AO, value discrepancies revealed similar significant 
differences to AI value discrepancies; for example, in self-direction, stimulation, 
hedonism, achievement, and security, with age as a covariate or without. However, in 
contrast to AI value discrepancies, the power value was also found to be significantly 
different in AO value discrepancies and the tradition value was found to be significant 
in AI but not AO value discrepancies.  
 
Post–hoc analysis revealed that the mental health groups had greater AI value 
discrepancies than the reference group on tradition, self-direction, hedonism, 
achievement, and security, and the mental health groups did not differ, except for on 
the security value where the eating disorder group had large value discrepancies.  
Again, AO revealed similar significant differences to AI, with the mental health groups 
having greater value discrepancies in self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, 
achievement, power and security.   Unexpectedly, AO was found to be greater than AI 
when looking at the anxiety and eating disorder groups combined but not separately. 
Furthermore, AI value discrepancies were found to be related to anxiety and 
depression in the combined mental health group, and AO with the combined mental 
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health group and the anxiety group. However, depression was found not to be 
correlated with Actual-Ideal discrepancies and anxiety was not found to be correlated 
with Actual-Ought discrepancies as expected. 
 
4.2.3 Summary of the findings 
The main differences between groups in values were found with the reference group, 
who rated particular values (e.g. self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, power and 
security) as more important than the mental health groups, apart from achievement 
values where the eating disorders group rated this value as more important than the 
reference group and the anxiety disorders group.  Interestingly, significant differences 
were also found in the same value in values discrepancies, with the addition of tradition 
(AI only), with the mental health groups having had higher  value discrepancies in 
these values than the reference group. The highest AI and AO value discrepancies 
were in hedonism, then stimulation, achievement, self-direction, power and lastly 
tradition.  AO value discrepancies were found to be greater than AI value discrepancies 
when looking at the groups combined but not separately. Unexpectedly, with the 
combined mental health group, AI value discrepancies were found not to be 
specifically associated with depression, and AO value discrepancies similarly were not 
specifically associated with anxiety. However, correlations were found between AI 
value discrepancies and anxiety and depression in the combined mental health group, 
and AO discrepancies value with the combined mental health group and the anxiety 
group. 
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4.2.4 Interpretations of the findings 
So how can we interpret these interesting findings?  Firstly, let’s consider the 
positioning of these values in Schwartz’s model (1992, 2012) (see Figure 4.1); the 
values found to be significantly different between groups are positioned within the 
same quadrants located next to each other (i.e. openness to change and self-
enhancement). This is except for security, but this is positioned close to these 
quadrants. These values are therefore said to have a personal focus, are ‘anxiety free’ 
and focused on personal growth.  Given this, one could argue that the findings suggest 
that people with anxiety and eating disorders are actually less personally focused and 
interested in personal growth via openness to change and self-enhancement. They 
are therefore less ‘anxiety free’, but ideally they would like to be more or less like this’ 
consequently this incongruence causes them psychological distress.  So based on the 
discrepancies in values, it was found that people with anxiety and eating disorders 
would like to be mostly more or less hedonistic, then more or less focused on 
stimulation, achievement, security, self-direction, power and tradition (eating disorder 
group only).  
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Figure 4.1: The Schwartz (2012a) refined model of values 
 
 
4.2.1 VALUES AND MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS 
In relation to Schwartz’s model of values (1992, 2012a), it is not possible to compare 
the current findings to other research done in relation to people with mental health 
problems (as this has not been done prior to this study), but the current results can be 
compared to cross-cultural findings (i.e., pan-cultural hierarchy, Schwartz, 2012b). 
According to Schwartz (2012b), the 'pan-cultural hierarchy’ provides a baseline with 
which to compare the priorities in any sample, and such comparison is critical for 
identifying which, if any, of the value priorities in a sample are distinctively high or low.  
In terms of values priorities, (see table 4.1) the three groups similarly to the pan-
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cultural hierarchy held benevolence and universalism as two of their top three central 
values, although the eating disorder and reference group have different value priorities 
from the cross-cultural studies.  In terms of least important values (power and 
stimulation), the groups again showed similar value priorities to the pan-cultural 
hierarchy.  As expected, the reference group is most closely matched in value priorities 
to the cross-cultural studies, to the anxiety disorder group the least and then eating 
disorder group.  Therefore, the value priorities are similar in some ways to the pan-
cultural hierarchy (e.g. the top three and bottom two) but different in other ways, and 
the mental health groups are the most different (particularly the anxiety disorder 
group). 
 
 
Table 4.1:  Value priorities for each group and from cross-cultural studies 
 
Rank Anxiety Disorder  Eating Disorder 
Reference 
Group 
Cross-cultural 
Studies 
1 Benevolence  Benevolence   Self-direction  Benevolence 
2  Universalism   Self-direction  Universalism Universalism 
3 Conformity   Universalism  Benevolence  Self-direction 
4  Security   Conformity   Conformity  Security 
5  Self-direction   Achievement   Security  Conformity 
6  Tradition   Security   Hedonism  Hedonism 
7  Hedonism   Tradition   Achievement  Achievement 
8  Achievement   Hedonism   Stimulation  Tradition 
9  Power   Stimulation   Tradition  Stimulation 
10 Stimulation   Power   Power  Power 
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Based on the Schwartz model of values (1992, 2012), predictions were made about 
which values people with anxiety and eating disorders would have when considering  
their motivational similarities.  The current findings supported some of these 
predictions; for example firstly, the eating disorder group held the achievement value 
as more important than the other two groups. This was predicted, as research 
indicates that people with eating disorders experience ‘clinical perfectionism’ 
(Wonderlich, 2002; Shafran et al., 2002; Fairburn et al., 2003), which in turn motivates 
people to be focused to achievement in life. 
 
Secondly, it was predicted that the anxiety disorder group would hold security, 
conformity and tradition as their most important values compared to the other two 
groups. However, unexpectedly the anxiety disorder group was not found to be 
different to the eating disorder group in these values.  
 
 
4.4 DISCREPANCIES IN VALUES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS 
With regard to the findings from the current study, it is not possible to compare the 
current findings to other research done in relation value discrepancies between values 
in mental health populations as, to the author’s knowledge, this not been done prior to 
the current research.  However, the findings of the current study can be compared 
alternatively to research investigating Higgins’s (1987) model of self-discrepancies in 
relation to self-domains.  The current study findings largely provide support for 
Higgins’s (1987) model of self-discrepancies, as AI and AO value discrepancies were 
evident and these were found to be related to anxiety and depression.  However, the 
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current study, in contrast to Higgins’s (1987) theory, did not find that AI was specifically 
associated with depression and AO with anxiety. 
 
The current project had different aims and objectives to Rees and Maio (2009), as they 
were looking at whether values that are ‘central’ to the self function more strongly as 
ideal self-guides than as ought self-guides, whereas values that are ‘peripheral’ to the 
self function more strongly as ought self-guides than as ideal self-guides, and the 
potential emotional consequence of the difference in self-guide dominance.  The 
current study on the other hand was concerned with whether discrepancies in values 
are associated with psychological distress.  However, they both demonstrated that 
Higgins’s model of self-discrepancies is an effective model and methodology for 
investigating different elements of values and also how they relate to emotions, and 
has great potential to be utilised further to explore values. 
 
The findings from the current study largely reflect the results found from the 17 articles 
from the systematic review. Thus, in all of  the articles (apart from Vegara-Lopez & 
Roberts, 2012 and Alatig et al., 2010), greater self-discrepancies were found in the 
mental health groups than in the control, which was found in the current research.  
However, conversely the current research found that AO values discrepancies were 
greater than AI  value discrepancies in the overall total sample, and the articles in the 
review found the opposite, with AI  self- discrepancies being greater than AO 
discrepancies overall.  The findings from the articles indicated that depressed mood 
was highly correlated with self-discrepancies; the current study also found this with the 
combined mental health groups but not with the mental health groups separately.   
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The study investigating OCD and self-discrepancies (Ferrier & Brewin, 2005) found 
similarly to the current study that the OCD group had greater value discrepancies (but 
only AI self-discrepancies, whereas the current study found both).  However, the 
participants in the current study with OCD were not considered uniquely, as they were 
combined with participants with panic disorder.  Studies investigating other anxiety 
disorders, e.g. social phobia (Strauman, 1989; Weilage & Hope, 1989) and PTSD 
(Sutherland & Bryant, 2008) similarly found that participants with anxiety disorders had 
greater self-discrepancies. Strauman (1989) found that participants with social phobia 
had greater AO self-discrepancy than AI, but the other studies did not find this. 
 
 
Similarly to the current study, Wonderlich et al. (2008) investigated self-discrepancies 
in people with a diagnosis of bulimia nervosa and found that the participants with 
bulimia nervosa were higher in self-discrepancies (both AI and AO) than the control 
group (for the current study this was in terms of the reference group).  However, they 
also investigated self-discrepancies in relation to appearance-related ideal and ought 
standards, which the current study did not do. 
 
 
 In summary, the current study findings largely reflect those found by Higgins (1987, 
1989, 1997, 1999) and the studies in the review. However, it is important to consider 
that those studies were investigating discrepancies in self-domains and that the 
current study was investigating discrepancies in values, although interestingly they still 
found  (similar to the current study) that self-discrepancies were higher in the mental 
health samples than in the samples without mental health disorders. 
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4.5 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
 
4.5.1 STRENGTHS 
There are a number of theoretical and methodological strengths in the current study. 
The strengths will be discussed in relation to the following areas: empirical support, 
evidence base, design, sample, measures and the implications of these strengths.  
 
 
4.5.1.2 Empirical support 
One of the most important strengths of this study is that it provides empirical support 
and evidence for considering the values that people with mental health problems hold 
and the role values have in relation to the psychological distress experienced by 
people with mental health problems.  This has been hinted at previously in Schwartz’s 
(1992, 2012a) model of values (e.g. anxiety free and anxiety avoidance and 
consequences of pursuing incompatible values), and referred to in psychological 
theories and therapies (e.g. in value incongruent behaviour in ACT) but to date these 
predictions have not been empirically tested.  This study therefore contributes to the 
evidence base by providing empirical support. In doing so it raises awareness about 
the role of values in psychological distress, more specifically in mental health 
problems, and encourages future research in this area.  
 
 
4.5.1.3 Evidence base 
The current research is also the first research that has tested the Schwartz (1992) 
model of values on clinical populations, more specifically people with anxiety and 
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eating disorders; therefore it is not only contributing to that evidence base but has also 
found that people with eating and anxiety disorders hold different values to people who 
co not have a mental health disorder. In addition, it is the first time that self-
discrepancies in values have been investigated in relation to people with mental health 
problems (more specifically eating and anxiety disorders), and it is the first time that 
Schwartz’s model of values and Higgins’s model of self-discrepancies have been 
brought together to investigate the role values play in psychological distress, thus 
illustrating that this can be done effectively.  
 
 
4.5.1.4 Design 
The current study utilized two well established, empirically derived models, namely 
Schwartz’s (1992, 2012a) model of values and Higgins’s (1987) model of self-
discrepancies. 
 
 
4.5.1.5 Sample 
Furthermore, the total sample size is fairly large (n=122), which is bigger than the 
sample size indicated in the power analysis (n=90) and 16 out of 17 studies in the 
review. The observed power was fairly large (see Appendix).   
 
 
4.5.1.6 Measures 
The current study also used well validated scales in terms of group membership (e.g. 
PDSS, OCI and EDE-Q) and psychological distress (HADS).  
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4.5.2 LIMITATIONS 
There are a number of theoretical and methodological limitations that need to be noted 
in the current study. The limitations will be discussed in relation to the following areas: 
design, measures used, use of self-report measures, sampling, and the implications 
of these limitations.  
 
 
4.5.2.1 Design 
As the current study is cross sectional, the direction of the relationships cannot be 
clarified.  Further research using longitudinal designs would allow for investigation of 
the direction of the relationships between the variables in the model.   Statistical 
analysis also involved multiple comparisons comparing ten dependent variables, 
which could therefore increase the risk of type one error occurring.  However, to 
account for this the significance level was more conservative at p<.01, but of the 
significant differences were p<.001.  Multivariate statistics (i.e. MANOVA) account for 
this and therefore limits the risk of a type one error (Field, 2009; Tabacknick & Fidell, 
2006).   
 
A decision was taken to not transform the data when one of the assumptions were not 
met (e.g. normality of distribution), but the reasons for this were stated (see results). 
However, this could mean that the findings could have been affected by non-normally 
distributed data, although considering this the data still reflected the cross-cultural 
findings of Schwartz’s model of values (1992, 2012a) which is used as a baseline for 
investigating differences in samples, even though the data was not normally 
distributed.  
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4.5.2.2 Measures used 
The original version of the PVQ was used, but the more recent PVQ which has been 
adapted to fit the Schwartz (2012) refined theory of individual values could have been 
used. However, the refined PVQ contains 54 questions and, with adding the ideal and 
ought value domain question as well, this would amount to 162 questions. This would 
have been very taxing for the participants and would have possibly discouraged them 
from taking part; therefore the original PVQ could have still been the better option.  
 
An adapted PVQ was used to incorporate Higgins’s (1987) model of self-
discrepancies.  This measure was not extensively piloted and tested beforehand and 
therefore there is some evidence that in the current study, the psychometric properties 
of the test fell below established standards for reliability.. For instance, a Cronbach 
alpha test was carried out on the adapted PVQ and this indicated that the test fell 
below (  =.67) acceptable levels of reliability for the scale (0.7/0.8). However, further 
research is needed to be more confident with regards to the properties of the adapted 
scale. However, it was found that the adapted scale did reflect cross-cultural findings 
for the Schwartz model and findings from Higgins’s (1987) model of self-discrepancies 
when tested on a mental health population. 
 
The AI and AO value discrepancies were highly correlated, so it may have been that 
people found it hard to distinguish between the ideal and ought part of the question.  
Thus several participants did not complete these items on the PVQ and their data was 
either excluded or used only for the first hypothesis which was not testing self-
discrepancies. To assess for this, there could have been an additional question asking 
participants if they understood the concepts of actual, ideal and ought and whether 
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they distinguish between them. Rees and Maio (2009) did this in their research and 
participants reported that they did not find any difficulty in distinguishing between them.  
 
The researcher was not able to establish whether panic disorder participants had 
agoraphobia or not. As a result it was assumed that they did not have agoraphobia 
and this criterion was used to establish ‘caseness’ for panic disorder. However, the 
differences between the criteria for with and without agoraphobia were very small. In 
addition, the criteria for the EDE-Q had to be set for the current study as it does not 
state how many of the subscales need to be met in order to meet the criteria for an 
eating disorder.  It was decided to exclude them if they did not meet the criteria for all 
four subscales.  The implications for this could be that, as the criteria for the PDSS 
and EDE-Q were adapted, then it could be questioned whether the participants actual 
met the criteria for these disorders. However, the majority of the participants were 
obtained from an eating disorder service and a panic disorder service, so they would 
have had to meet the criteria for these disorders to access the service. 
 
The current study could have also used other questionnaires to measure distress such 
as the Beck Depression Inventory or the Beck Anxiety Inventory, as these were the 
measures mostly used in the articles in the systematic review.  However, the HADS is 
a reliable and valid measure of anxiety and depression and has the advantage of being 
shorter and therefore easy to complete, especially considering participants had a fairly 
large battery of measures to complete. The study also only measured psychological 
distress in terms of anxiety and depression; other types of distress could have been 
measured, but in accordance with Higgins’s model (1987), anxiety and depression 
would suffice as these were the types of distress that were stipulated in his model.  
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4.5.2.3 Use of self-report measures 
As with all self-report measures, the measures used may be subject to various forms 
of response bias and/or socially desirable responding (Van de Mortel, 2008).  A social 
desirability scale could have been used to minimize the effect of this on research; 
however, none of the other articles in the systematic review used these.  
 
 
4.5.2.4 Sample 
Self-report measures rather than clinical assessment were used to establish whether 
participants met the criteria for mental health problems, and therefore this could 
reduce confidence that the participants met the criteria for either anxiety disorder or 
eating disorder.  However, the majority of the participants were recruited from 
community mental health services, and to access this service they would need to meet 
the criteria of a mental health disorder.  In addition, by using the self-report measures, 
comorbidity was not assessed and therefore the findings could have also been related 
to other comorbid disorders. Participants also differed in the severity of their mental 
health problems and this was not used as a covariate. Therefore, it was not established 
in this study whether the severity of the participant’s level of distress impacted on the 
level of self-discrepancies.   
 
The sample was underrepresented amongst male participants and older adults. Thus, 
75% of the total sample was female and 97% of the eating disorder group was female. 
The reference group was therefore not significantly different to the anxiety disorder 
group but it was significantly different to the eating disorder group. The reference 
group was matched as far as possible to the mental health groups sample in total; it 
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may have been better to have a reference group for each mental health group. 
However, there were not enough female participants in the reference group sample to 
match each mental health group without the participants data being used in both 
groups, and therefore independence of observations would not have been achieved. 
   
 
4.6 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The results indicated that people with mental health problems (particularly anxiety 
disorders) hold different particular values (e.g. self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, 
achievement, power and security) to people without mental health problems, and that 
they have greater value discrepancies in these values (with the addition of the tradition 
value) than people without mental health disorders.  These value discrepancies are 
also associated with psychological distress (e.g. anxiety and depression). Given these 
findings, it is important to consider the clinical implications.  The implications will be 
outlined in terms of the clinical cycle. 
  
4.6.1 Clinical cycle  
The most important clinical implication from this study is that it stresses the importance 
of considering a client’s values at every stage of the clinical cycle.  Thus, at 
assessment, clinicians can clarify what their clients’ values are by using a values 
measure, for example the PVQ or adapted PVQ used in the current study. This will 
also allow clinicians to also assess for values discrepancies in values or they could 
use the values questionnaires used in ACT.  At this point, a clinician will also be able 
to assess a number of things, for example, whether the client is pursuing incompatible 
values and whether this is causing conflict, or if the client is behaving incongruently to 
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their values and this is causing them distress, or lastly if other people are challenging 
their values which could lead to distress. People’s values could then be considered in 
the client’s formulation if their values are in some way contributing to their distress (i.e. 
if they were behaving inconsistently to their values) or as a protective factor (i.e. when 
they behave consistently with their values it enhances their psychological wellbeing). 
Following this, value-based interventions could be utilised in accordance with the 
client’s values to encourage value congruent behaviour to decrease psychological 
distress and improve their psychological wellbeing.   
 
 
4.6.2 Decreasing value discrepancies 
Earlier in this chapter, the findings were interpreted to suggest that people with anxiety 
disorders and eating disorder group are actually less personally focused and 
interested in personal growth via openness to change and self-enhancement and are 
therefore less ‘anxiety free’, but would ideally like to be more or less like this (as 
indicated in the self-discrepancies); consequently this incongruence causes them 
psychological distress (according to Higgins).   In particular, people with mental health 
problems would like to be mostly more or less hedonistic, then more or less focused 
on self-direction, stimulation, achievement, security and lastly power. Given this, 
clinicians could consider values-based interventions that help the client to reduce the 
discrepancies in their values.  To do this they could refer to the psychological 
interventions (e.g. Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy, Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy and Interpersonal Psychotherapy) that have been utilised to decrease self-
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discrepancies between self-domains and adapt it for values (e.g. Crane et al., 2008; 
Strauman et al., 2001). 
 
Higgins (1999) described four variables that moderate the likelihood of finding the 
unique discrepancy-emotion relations: the magnitude of a self-discrepancy, the 
accessibility of a self-discrepancy, the applicability and relevance of a self-discrepancy 
in a current context, and the importance of a self-discrepancy to the person. Clinicians 
could consider these four variables if the client has significant discrepancies in their 
values and from these clinicians could consider whether to devise an intervention that 
aims to decrease and/or change these value discrepancies.  
 
 
 4.6.3 Values clarification and activation 
Values are often held as ‘truisms’, which means that we are often not consciously 
aware of our values. To help clients to become more aware of their values and to clarify 
for them what they are, value activation techniques could be used if it is beneficial for 
the client (see introduction section); for example asking them to provide cognitive 
support for their values (Maio et al., 2009) or by priming their values (Bargh et al., 
2001; Roccas, 2003; Verplanken & Holland, 2002).  
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4.6.4 Value change 
Values have largely been considered to be positive, and therefore psychological 
therapies such as ACT promote value congruent behaviour to manage psychological 
distress.  However, it is possible that for some people holding particular values rigidly, 
inconsistently or trying to pursue incompatible values may cause them psychological 
distress, and that in this case their values may act as a 'risk' factor rather than a 
protective factor for psychological distress.  If this is the case, Bardi and Goodwin 
(2011) have a model that outlines the processes of individual value change to which 
clinicians could refer.   
 
 
4.7 FUTURE RESEARCH 
The current study has provided initial empirical support and evidence for the values of 
people with anxiety and eating disorders being different to those without mental health 
disorders, and for values being associated with psychological distress.  However, 
more research needs to be done to explore these findings further and to provide more 
evidence for the current study. 
 
Future research could involve undertaking the current study with a larger sample size 
and with the reference group being more matched to the mental health groups.  In 
addition, this research could be carried out with participants with other mental health 
disorders to see if similar or different results are found.   This could also be done 
longitudinally to allow the investigation of the direction of the relationship between the 
values in the study.  In doing this, the adapted PVQ could be tested further to ensure 
the reliability and validity of the measure. 
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As mentioned previously, it is not certain whether values can act as a risk, as protective 
factors or as both for people with mental health problems; it would be interesting to 
investigate this further. One way to investigate this could be by comparing people who 
are living consistently with their values to those who are not.  This study focused on 
values and psychological distress, but it would be interesting to investigate values in 
relation to psychological wellbeing. 
 
Carver et al. (1999) extended Higgins’s theory by adding the domain of the ‘feared 
self’ which, unlike the other self-guides which imply an actual or desired (better) self, 
is a domain that measures what one does not desire to be. It would be interesting for 
future research to include the feared self when investigating discrepancies in values. 
Previous research has investigated the ‘feared self’ in relation to mental health 
disorders and found that people with mental health problems have greater 
actual:feared self-discrepancies than people without mental health problems (Vegara-
Lopez & Roberts, 2012; Alatig et al., 2010).  Carver et al. (1999) also talked about 
‘approach’ motive and ‘avoid’ motive, which were derived from Higgins’s ideas around 
promotion and prevention focused strategies in relation to our self guides.  It would be 
interesting to apply this to values and to investigate which values people with mental 
health problems ‘approach’ and ‘avoid’ and in what behaviour they partake to promote 
values and prevent value violation, as well as what impact this has on their 
psychological wellbeing. 
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Research (Branstetter-Rost et al., 2009; McCracken & Yang, 2006) has previously 
compared the effects of an ACT-based acceptance intervention with and without the 
values component and found it was more effective with the values component. 
However, this was done in relation to physical health problems and it would be 
interesting to investigate this is in relation to people with mental health problems. In 
addition, this could be tried with other psychological interventions other than ACT to 
see whether a value-based intervention is effective. 
 
Schwartz (1992, 2012) refers to the possibility of people pursuing incompatible values, 
but does not state what effect this could have. It is likely that this could lead to 
psychological distress, but this has not been investigated and it would be interesting 
to do so with people with mental health problems. Furthermore, it would be interesting 
to see, if discrepancies in values were decreased, whether this would lead to improved 
psychological wellbeing. 
 
Previous studies (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996; Bentall et al., 2005) have also looked at 
self-discrepancies in relation to the ‘other’, for example, the ‘other’ being the 
individual’s partner or family, to see whether this contributes to psychological distress. 
It would be interesting to undertake the current study but also including the 
Actual:Other dimension.  
 
The current study has investigated discrepancies in values by looking at the difference 
between their actual and ideal values and their actual and ought values. The 
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differences between these have yielded both positive and negative values as 
participants rated their ideal or ought value as either higher or lower than the values 
they actually hold.  For example, they either felt that they would ideally like to hold a 
particular value more (i.e. be more traditional than they actually are) and therefore 
their ideal score would be higher than their actual score, or they ideally would like to 
hold that values less (i.e. be less traditional than they actually are); in this case their 
ideal score would be lower than their actual score.  
 
Given this, the value discrepancies scores not only indicate the difference between 
the actual and ideal score and actual and ought score, but also state a direction.  In 
the current study, the difference between value domains has only been investigated 
(as is the case with Higgins model) and not the direction. Therefore, the theoretical, 
clinical and statistical implications of the direction of the discrepancies have not been 
explored in this study and therefore the importance of the direction of value 
discrepancies remains unknown. It would be interesting for future studies to 
investigate what the direction of the discrepancies could mean in terms of the 
development of Higgins’ model of discrepancies, statistical analysis and psychological 
distress. 
 
4.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The current study utilised Schwartz’s (1992;2012a) model of values and Higgins’s 
(1987) self-discrepancy model to investigate the value priorities of participants with 
eating and anxiety disorders and value discrepancies and the association they have 
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with psychological distress.  More specifically, the current study aimed to investigate 
whether people anxiety and eating disorders hold different values to those without 
mental health problems.  In addition, the study aimed to investigate whether people 
with anxiety and eating disorders have more value discrepancies than those without 
mental health problems, and to see if AI value discrepancies were greater than AO 
value discrepancies in all the groups. The current study also aimed to test whether 
discrepancies in values are related to psychological distress, and what type (e.g. 
anxiety and depression).  
 
The study found that the main differences between groups in values were found with 
the reference group, who rated particular values (e.g. self-direction, stimulation, 
hedonism) as more important than the mental health groups (particularly the anxiety 
disorders group, as the eating disorder group only differs to the reference group on 
hedonism), apart from achievement values where the eating disorders group rated this 
value as more important than the reference group and the anxiety disorders group.  
Significant differences in value discrepancies were also found in the same values 
mentioned above, with the mental health groups having higher value discrepancies in 
these values than the reference group.  The highest value discrepancies were in 
hedonism, then stimulation, achievement, security, self-direction, power and lastly 
power (AI only).  AO value discrepancies were found to be greater than AI value 
discrepancies when looking at the groups combined but not separately. Unexpectedly, 
AI value discrepancies value were found not to be specifically associated with 
depression, and AO value discrepancies similarly were not specifically associated with 
anxiety in the combined mental health groups. However, correlations were found 
between AI value discrepancies and anxiety and depression in the combined mental 
171 
 
health group, and AO discrepancies value with the combined mental health group and 
the anxiety group. 
 
The findings were interpreted in accordance with Schwartz’s  (1992, 2012a) model of 
values to suggest that people with eating and anxiety disorders are actually less 
personally focused and interested in personal growth via openness to change and self-
enhancement and therefore are less ‘anxiety free’, but would ideally, and feel they 
ought to be ( as indicated in their value discrepancies) more or less  personally 
focussed, and motivated by personal growth; consequently this incongruence causes 
them psychological distress.    
 
The current research supported the majority of the findings from previous studies in 
relation to value and self-discrepancies in mental health disorders. The strengths and 
the limitations were highlighted for the current study, and the clinical implications were 
outlined as well as suggestions for future research.   
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